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ABSTRACT
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) experience subpar performance in some of their
foreign subsidiaries. Despite the clear importance to practitioners, there are surprisingly few
comprehensive studies on the appropriate responses to be taken when such a situation occurs.
Studies addressing the subpar performance phenomenon have been fragmented across research
domains, causing there to be a lack of theory-driven studies within an international context to
provide insights. Thus, the research questions guiding this thesis are: When a foreign subsidiary
experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of response is
chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery
and survival prospects? What factors determine the timing of a response and what role does the
timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in increasing recovery and
survival prospects?
Drawing from a resource orchestration framework and related constructs, hypotheses are
developed

to

differentiate

between

processes

of

“Identifying”,

“Responding”,

and

“Synchronizing” when subpar performance occurs in foreign subsidiaries. Sequence analysis,
multinomial logit regression, gap time competing-risk event history analysis, OLS regression,
and estimations of curvilinear effects in logit regressions are performed to test a series of
hypotheses on a sample of 17,982 observations, representing 5,669 subsidiaries in 94 countries.
Our findings suggest that the subpar performance phenomenon is quite prevalent, with
hundreds of subsidiaries in the sample experiencing as much as 10 or more years of consecutive
subpar performance. Surprisingly, the most frequent sequences are those in which subsidiaries
appear to not respond to subpar performance, at least according to the responses measured
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herein. Regarding “Identifying”, we find that determinants at the country-level, MNE-level, and
the subsidiary-level help predict whether a response is administered and if so, which one.
Generally, if responses occur (“Responding”), they result in superior results over non-responses if the focus is on the long-term survival prospects of the subsidiary. In the short-term, responses
may be followed by adjustment periods which may prolong the subpar performance period.
Moreover, increases in headquarter commitment appear to have a more beneficial effect than
decreases in commitment. Regarding the “Synchronizing” dimension, we find that the existence
of communication channels appear to improve the timeliness of a response. Moreover, the
relationship between the time-to-first-response and the probability of recovery (versus exit) is
curvilinear (inverted U-shape), such that recovery is most likely when the response occurs at a
medium amount of time (3 to 6 years) after the onset of the subpar performance sequence. This
curvilinear relationship is amplified for deceases in commitment, suggesting that the
effectiveness of such responses is more sensitive to timing than increases in commitment.
Regarding the replacement of general managers, we find that only early replacements enhance
the likelihood of recovery.
The study is expected to advance understanding of the subpar performance phenomenon
as well as appropriate responses by conceptually integrating the perspectives scattered across
multiple research domains, thereby responding to calls from several literatures. The findings also
provide some guidance to practitioners in MNEs who face the dilemma of how to appropriately
respond to subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries.
Keywords: Subpar performance, foreign subsidiaries, turnaround, organizational decline,
resource orchestration
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Much of the international business literature has focused on growth (Whetten, 1980;
Benito, 2005). As Tsui (2007) notes in her review of international management research, this
focus has been a reflection of the broader context which, especially after World War II, has been
characterized by an unprecedented increase in prosperity in many countries. Following the lead
of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which expanded their boundaries across an increasingly
larger number of countries, international business scholars emphasized growth-related topic
areas such as understanding the global business environment, internationalization, entry mode
decisions, international collaborations, and foreign direct investment. Indeed, these are the top
five areas of research Werner (2002) identified in a review of 20 top management journals in the
period between 1996 and 2000. Lu (2003) identified similar areas of focus in her review of
international strategy research.
As Whetten (1980) and Tsui (2007) note, this enthusiasm for growth-related research
may particularly be a reflection of the fact that much international business research has
originated from a North American research paradigm. This context is characterized by periods of
particularly strong growth, widespread global expansion of MNEs originating from it, and a
culture in which failure can be considered a taboo and reason for blame. As a result, the need and
the openness for anything but growth-oriented research have been limited.
This overarching bias towards growth, however, has increasingly been faced with a
societal and organizational reality of decreasing rates of growth, progressively tighter profit
margins, rising global wages, diminishing returns, and more dynamic competitive markets. How
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high some societies and organizations can fall after years of growth was most painfully brought
to light by the recent global financial crisis. This crisis lasted from 2007 until 2009 in the U.S.
but much longer in other regions such as Europe, where it funnelled into a debt crisis. What this
crisis and smaller ones before it revealed is that the global marketplace consists of multitudes of
connections which can harm a whole system when a part of it falters. As a result, GDP per capita
rates fell, as did exports of goods and services (as a percentage of GDP) for countries like China,
Germany, and Japan. Unemployment rates increased in many countries as well (e.g. in Germany
between 1990 to 2006 and in the US during the financial crisis). While aggregated indicators
such as GDP per capita or export rates recovered for most countries some years after the
financial crisis, the fate of selected countries and organizations may be much bleaker. In the U.S.
alone, the total decline in the number of firms during the crisis amounted to 365,231 firms (about
6 percent), throwing the economy back to levels from 2002 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).
However, organizational decline and survival prospects may not just be the result of
financial crises or other external factors such as the uncertainty associated with conflict zones
(Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013) or the results of overall industry decline (Filatotchev & Toms,
2003). Internal factors such as ineffective management (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb,
2007), an insufficient degree of fit with the organization’s external environment (Zajac, Kraatz,
& Bresser, 2000) or conflict (Morrill, 1991) also play a role in causing organizational decline. In
sum, organizational decline has become an increasingly apparent organizational reality which
makes research in this area imperative.
Since the mid-1970s, a growing group of scholars has turned their attention to studying
the phenomenon of organizational declines and turnarounds. In their 1993 review of the
turnaround literature, Pearce and Robbins note that “The identification of appropriate managerial
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responses to financial decline has become increasingly important.” (p. 613). Two decades later,
Trahms, Ndofor, and Sirmon (2013: 1278) second this, noting that “about half (49.8%) of firms
in the S&P 500 index for the year 2010 had experienced more than 3 years of decline within the
prior 5 years. […it is thus] likely to remain a highly relevant concern to managers worldwide”.
Despite an increasingly interconnected global economy (exemplified by the worldwide
rippling effects of the financial crisis) and the multitude of MNEs with vast networks of foreign
subsidiaries, research on organizational decline has mostly been focused on corporate-level
and/or business-level declines in a domestic context. These are characterized by declines that
either affect the entire structure of the organization (e.g. Johnson, 1996) or its overarching
business strategies (e.g. Barker & Duhaime, 1997). Anecdotes abound, however, of prominent
examples of MNE investment decisions turning sour, such as U.S.-based Target Corp pulling out
of the Canadian market after only two years with a US$2bn operating loss (Shaw, 2015) or
Bombardier retrenching about 10 percent of its global workforce after disappointing performance
(Marotte, 2016). Many ventures report subpar performance for several years in a row (much
beyond Target’s two year) before any action is taken. The British retailer Tesco PLC sold its USsubsidiary “Fresh & Easy” in 2013 after it had incurred five consecutive years of subpar
performance, amounting to £1 billion in losses (Gordon, 2013). Wal-Mart Inc. in Germany
sustained losses that amounted to US$1bn before pulling out of the market nine years later
(Norton, 2006).
These cases of corporate-level/business-level and especially subsidiary-level declines in
an international context have been understudied by management researchers, leaving little
guidance about how to turn such ailing subsidiaries around. The research that does exist remains
fragmented, resulting in conflicting findings, and driven by phenomena rather than theory.
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Indeed, based on their review of the literature, Trahms et al. (2013: 1297) conclude that “what
we do not know […] far outweighs what is known about decline and turnaround”. What is
notable as well is the fact that the exploration of the subpar performance phenomenon has been
addressed in several literatures, often in parallel research domains, rather than in a coherent
manner.
The three literatures most closely related to the phenomenon are the organizational
decline/turnaround literature, the international divestments literature, and the escalation of
commitment literature. Most studies on the subpar performance phenomenon at the corporatelevel and business-level were conducted in the organizational decline/turnaround literature in
the strategic management domain. Here, the subpar performance phenomenon is coined a
turnaround situation (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 634) and has focused mostly on domestic (withincountry)

operations

and

efficiency-enhancing

operational

responses

such

as

downsizing/retrenchment (cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Tangpong, Abebe & Li, 2015; Celly,
2008). The level of analysis is usually the corporate-level or business-level organization within a
domestic context.
The international divestments literature within the international strategy domain has
placed emphasis on de-internationalization (in the form of partial or full divestiture), for which
subpar performance is but one cause (Benito & Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005; Mata & Portugal,
2000; Turcan, 2013). This literature is still at a relatively nascent level of research and which
response to select from the range of available actions when a subsidiary is performing poorly
remains an underexplored topic. The level of analysis here is usually at the corporate-level or
business-level in the international context. Similarly, real options logic has been applied to joint
ventures to examine the occurrence of dissolutions (by acquisition or divestment) (Kogut, 1991).
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The application of real options logic is generally restrained by rather specific parameters, causing
the body of real options research that specifically applies to responses to subpar performance at
foreign subsidiaries to also be at a rather nascent stage.
The escalation of commitment literature in the behavioral decision-making domain draws
specific attention on the individual decision-maker’s responses to subpar performance (Staw,
1976; Shapira, 1997; Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara & Miles, 2012). The research in this
literature shares some commonalities with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The
focus here is on the psychological processes and biases that are reflected in responses to subpar
performance and the level of analysis is the respective decision-maker.
The fact that the phenomenon of subpar performance has been examined from a number
of different perspectives has led to several concerns. First, there are conflicting findings within
and across domains. For instance, some literatures recommend divestiture over continuance in
light of subpar performance (e.g. turnaround theory, real options logic if parameters apply),
while others warn of premature abandonment (Drummond, 2014). Similarly, some literatures
view increased commitment to a declining venture as a detrimental approach (e.g. escalation of
commitment, prospect theory), while others view it as a potentially important factor of long-term
stability (Lane & Beamish, 1990).
Second, there are gaps in the comprehensiveness of the analysis, e.g. a heavy focus on
retrenchment/downsizing responses has caused non-divestment responses to be examined
significantly less often. This brings about a relative emphasis on operational responses (those
that are geared towards short-term performance improvements) and a relative de-emphasis of
strategic responses (those that are geared towards improving the market positioning and strategic
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health of the entity, with improvements in performance following thereafter). Strategic responses
in the context of the present study are differentiated from strategic responses in literatures such
as resource dependency theory (e.g. Oliver, 1991). In the latter, responses are directly geared
towards one or more competitors, thereby enacting a competitive strategy. In the former, the
competitive position is important as well but plays a less direct role. Instead, the goal of strategic
responses in the context of this thesis can be understood as actions oriented towards putting the
organization in a better position than the current one. From that improved position, it can then
pursue its competitive strategy in the longer run. Complete divestiture or retrenchment is thus not
the only action available to parent firms when the subsidiary experiences unsatisfactory
performance for multiple periods. Specifically, a foreign parent in a joint venture may instead
assume a higher amount of control of the subsidiary and acquire more equity in the venture,
without turning it into a wholly-owned subsidiary altogether. The parent firm may also decide to
send more expatriates or withdraw expatriates as a means to adjust commitment and control. We
are not aware of any study which has examined responses such as these (and more) in
comparison to each other, in an international context, and over time. Given the stakes that are
involved for managers once a subsidiary generates subpar performance, the phenomenon
warrants closer examination.
Third, most of the studies have used samples from US-based (or otherwise withincountry samples) (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Wan, 2003; Benito, 2005). Thus, the complexities arising
from headquarters-subsidiary relationships and the international context have been somewhat
neglected. In an international context, not only may the types of responses differ from domestic
contexts (e.g. deploying more expatriates) but also determinants may be important that are not
relevant in a domestic context. Specifically, the concept of distance between a headquarters and
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its foreign subsidiary has been shown to be a key construct in international business strategies
(Berry, Guillén & Zhou, 2010) which may affect how fast a response is administered given
subpar performance. Also, the response may depend on the role of the foreign subsidiary in the
wider MNE network, such as being a regional headquarters. Thus, several mechanisms to turn
around ailing domestic corporations may not be immediately transferable to the international
context and in fact, the latter may be influenced by a wider set of variables that need to be
considered.
Finally, the mushrooming number of studies on subpar performance in different domains
has led to a lack of theory-development - across but also within domains (e.g. Trahms et al.,
2013; Sleesman et al., 2012). We are not aware of any theory of decline/turnaround explicitly
focused on subsidiaries in foreign locations. While some aspects of existing frameworks could be
relevant for the international context as well, it remains to be tested and a larger number of
determinants and responses need to be considered.
In sum, while many studies have addressed the question of what to do in response to
subpar performance, there is rather little integration across domains, causing there to be several
gaps. As a result, multiple calls exist that highlight the importance of moving towards a
theoretical integration, shifting focus from identifying more determinants to other key
mechanisms, and turning towards other levels of analysis such as the subsidiary-level. The
objective of this thesis is thus to respond to these calls by adding new insights by focusing on
subpar performing foreign subsidiaries and turnaround strategies employed as a remedy for such
a situation. This objective will be elaborated further in the next section.
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1.2 Objective
Given the motivation of the thesis, the following overarching research questions will be
explored: When a foreign subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what
determines which specific type of response is chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if
any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects? What factors determine
the timing of a response and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of
the chosen response in increasing recovery and survival prospects?1
Trahms et al. (2013: 1297) note that achieving turnaround in situations of subpar
performance is a “complex process” which requires investigation much beyond the current state
of research. This thesis approaches the task of generating a deeper understanding of responses to
subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries in three steps. First, the current state of knowledge
about responses to subpar performance is reviewed in order to clearly locate the current gap
regarding subsidiary-level turnarounds. This also leads to a revisiting of the definition of subpar
performance sequences which will be understood as annual consecutive occurrences of poor
performance (using several performance measures) which ends with either a recovery to predecline levels, exit, or the end of the observation period. Second, a theoretical framework
grounded in a resource orchestration framework (Trahms et al., 2013) is developed to guide the
analysis of key mechanisms within the phenomenon of subpar performance at foreign
subsidiaries. The key parts of the framework differentiate between “Identifying” (whether/what),
“Responding” (how effective), and “Synchronizing” (when) mechanisms. Third, given the focus
on subpar performing foreign subsidiaries, additional responses to subpar performance and
influencing factors that were not usually considered in conventional corporate-level or business1

The terms “responses”, “actions”, and “moves” are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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level studies, are now assessed in more depth. For instance, factors such as GDP growth, the
assigned role of a regional headquarters, MNE-level performance, and similar aspects are found
to have an important influence. Finally, the research questions are assessed using multinomial
logit regressions, gap time competing-risk event history analyses, and estimations of curvilinear
effects, thereby moving towards the simultaneous consideration of more than just one type of
response (conventionally divestment (“yes”/”no”) or retrenchment (“yes”/”no”)) and an explicit
inclusion of the time concept.
With this premise, this study aims to contribute to the literature on subpar performance in
foreign subsidiaries in the following ways. First, by examining the phenomenon using a nearpopulation dataset of Japanese foreign direct investment, this study offers an overarching threedimensional framework of subpar performance responses and their effectiveness at the level of
foreign subsidiaries. The framework combines antecedents of responses (“Identifying”) with
their outcomes (“Responding”) and their relationship with time (“Synchronizing”). Grounded in
the resource orchestration perspective, this framework offers a theoretical premise, rather than
being purely phenomenon-driven. The objective and intended contribution is thus to offer a
starting point from which future studies of subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries can be
explored.
Second, studies on the subpar performance phenomenon have had different emphases
regarding appropriate responses. For instance, while the literatures on de-internationalization and
turnaround have focused on retracting commitment, the literatures on escalation of commitment
and prospect theory emphasized the effects of increasing commitment, and the literatures on
organizational inertia and commitment theory have focused on non-action. This study takes a
more encompassing stance by comparing all of these options to each other. As such, we partially
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apply the corporate-level/business-level decline and turnaround literature but, more importantly,
expand it to an international context.
Third, viewing the subpar performance phenomenon in a holistic perspective responds to
several calls in the literature. For instance, in the escalation of commitment literature, most
studies have focused on the individual/psychological level, with studies conducted in laboratory
or classroom settings (Shapira, 1997; a few exceptions exist: cf. Barton, Duchon & Dunegan,
1989). Sleesman et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis reveals that the majority of studies focused on
project-related determinants and psychological determinants, while social determinants and
structural determinants were largely neglected (Shapira, 1997; a few exceptions exist: cf. Hsieh,
Tsai & Chen, 2015). As Staw (1997: 206) puts it: "Perhaps because it is easier to study people
than organizations, the field has concentrated on escalation as a product of individual decision
making rather than organizational action". Furthermore, Sleesman et al. (2012) demonstrate that
the plethora of determinants identified in the literature reflects a multi-determinism which allows
for multiple theories (see also: Brockner, 1992). However, rather than identifying even more
determinants of escalation, the field is in dire need of an integration of relationships and
neighboring concepts into coherent theoretical models (Sleesman et al., 2012; Staw, 1997). This
notion is reflected in the other literatures as well (e.g. Trahms et al., 2013). In this thesis, we
explore both the determinants and antecedents of responses to subpar performance, thus aiming
to generate a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon.
The domain of the intended contribution among existing literatures on the phenomenon
of subpar performance, different predominant levels of analysis, and the focus on decreases,
continuance, or increases in costs and assets is depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Key findings that arise from this thesis are that (i) hundreds of subsidiaries experience 10 or
more consecutive years of subpar performance; (ii) the most frequent sequences are those during
which no particular discernible response occurs; (iii) determinants across the country-level,
MNE-level, and subsidiary-level predict whether and which type of response is chosen, (iv)
performing any action is preferable over performing no action, especially when it comes to
improving the survival prospects of the subsidiary. Due to a period of adjustment following a
response, the short-term effect may be that the number of consecutive years of subpar
performance may increase; (iv) increases in commitment tend to have a more favorable outcome
than decreases in commitment, especially with regards to survival prospects; (vi) some
determinants that imply a higher communication channel frequency help reduce the time to first
response; (vii) the relationship between the timing of the first response and the probability of
recovery (versus exit) is curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) such that very early and very late first
responses dampen recovery prospects. This relationship is amplified when the response in
question is a decrease in headquarter commitment (as opposed to an increase in headquarter
commitment), suggesting that there is a time-sensitivity aspect to decreases in commitments; and
(ix) the effectiveness of a general manager (GM) replacement may depend on the timing of this
response. If the GM is replaced within two years of the decline, recovery prospects are enhanced.
After this time, GM replacement may be less effective than not replacing the GM.
The findings are also intended to hold value for practitioners. The analysis of antecedents
of responses and the effectiveness of responses, especially considering the impact of time is
hoped to offer some guidance in the all-too-familiar dilemma: “Do they persist and risk
becoming caught up in a spiral of escalating commitment, or ‘apply the brakes’ when they may
be within an ace of success?” (Drummond, 2014: 430).
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Figure 1.1. The Positioning of the Contribution among Relevant Literatures.

Predominant
level of analysis

Domain

International
Strategic
Management

Strategic
Management

Domain of the intended contribution

De-internationalization/
divestiture
adaptive
perspective
(SARFIT model)

Real options
Organizational
decline/turnaround

Real options
Organizational
inertia

adaptive
perspective
(SARFIT model)
Turnaround theory

Manager level and
organizational level
in the international
context

Manager level and
organizational level

Commitment theory
Behavioral
Decisionmaking

Premature
abandonment

Decreases in costs/assets

Prospect
theory

Continuance of costs/assets
(non-action)
Emphasis on responses to subpar performance

Escalation of
commitment

Increases in costs/assets

Manager level
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The subsequent chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant
literatures across three research domains, focusing on the definition and operationalization of
subpar performance sequences, responses to subpar performance, and their effectiveness. This
leads to a clear definition of subpar performance sequences and an identification of the research
gap. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework based on a resource orchestration perspective
which allows for an integration of the lenses reviewed in Chapter 2, by reviewing the resourcebased view, dynamic capabilities, resource orchestration, and associated theoretical constructs.
Hypotheses are developed in Chapter 4 which builds on the theoretical foundation from Chapter
3. Chapter 5 reviews the sample and research design. Chapter 6 summarizes the results from the
sequence analysis, multinomial logit regression, gap time competing-risk event history analysis,
and the estimation of (in part curvilinear) time effects. The findings are discussed, implications
are reviewed, and future research directions are laid out in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, the literatures addressing the subpar performance phenomenon are
reviewed and discussed critically. Before we go into more detail regarding existing findings in
the literatures on responses to subpar performance, however, it is worthwhile to clearly define
two key concepts in this thesis: subpar performance and responses.

2.1 Defining the Subpar Performance Phenomenon and Response Sequences
2.1.1 Review of Definitions
The subpar performance phenomenon has been examined from the perspective of several
different research domains. This has led to a smorgasbord of definitions of what constitutes a
situation of subpar performance that requires some response. However, even within domains,
there is a limited degree of consensus on the definition of the phenomenon. Table 2.1 offers an
overview of the key studies across three research domains, including their definition and
operationalization of subpar performance, samples, and key findings. Pearce & Robbins (1993:
634), for instance, coined the phenomenon turnaround situations, defined as “[t]he period of
time the troubled firm should be engaged in turnaround efforts”. Staw and Ross (1989: 216) have
described the phenomenon as an escalation situation, thereby terming "situations in which losses
have resulted from an original course of action, but where there is the possibility of turning the
situation around by investing further time, money, or effort”. Even others have referred to the
subpar performance phenomenon as the occurrence of financial distress (e.g. Bruton, Oviatt &
White, 1994), substandard performance (Bolton, 1993), organizational decline (e.g. Bruton et
al., 2003; Trahms et al., 2013; McKinley, Latham & Braun, 2014), or even failure (e.g. Boyne &
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Meier, 2009). Some of these definitions were categorized further, such as in the case of
organizational decline in terms of its severity: survival threatening (e.g. Barker & Duhaime,
1997; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Tangpong et al., 2015) and not necessarily survival threatening
(e.g. McKinley et al., 2014; Trahms et al., 2013; Bruton et al., 2003). Similarly, Chen &
Hambrick (2012: 230) note that “Some have stipulated that declining performance, regardless of
absolute level, constitutes a turnaround situation (e.g., Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), whereas
others have argued that performance needs to be below some absolute threshold (e.g. Barker and
Mone, 1994; Hambrick and Schecter 1983).” A further categorization of the definition of
organizational decline can be made in terms of the reason for it: erosion of resources (e.g.
Francis & Desai, 2005; Trahms et al., 2013), misfit within the niche (e.g. Lamberg & Pajunen,
2005), or environmental factors besides internal ones (e.g. Gowen & Tallon, 2002).
Similarly, the operationalisations of the subpar performance phenomenon have differed,
from objective measures such as Barker and Duhaime’s (1997) four financially-focused criteria
of decline (used also by e.g. Tangpong et al., 2015) to more perceptual measures such as survey
items (e.g. Gowen & Tallon, 2002; Jas & Skelcher, 2005; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Lamberg &
Pajunen, 2005). Moreover, the perspectives contrast on the lengths of time that is required for the
minimum threshold for constituting a subpar performance phenomenon, ranging from
instantaneous loss situations (e.g. Chen & Hambrick, 2012) to 2 years (e.g. Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Barker & Mone, 1994; McKinley et al., 2014) to 3 or
more years (e.g. Barker & Duhaime, 1997).
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Table 2.1. Definitions and Operationalizations of the Subpar Performance Phenomenon.

Domain/
Literature
International
strategy

International
divestment

International
divestment

International
divestment

Authors
(publication
year)

Definition of the subpar
performance
phenomenon

Operationalization of the
subpar performance
phenomenon

Sample

“subsidiaries’ internal
problems including low
performance” (p. 50)

“return on asset” (p. 55)

“1,560 foreign
manufacturing
subsidiaries of 101
Korean MNCs in 31
host countries” (p. 53)
from the Korean stock
exchange; (1990-2008);
subsidiary-level

Berry
(2013)

“poor performance is a
signal that firms need to
make changes to their
subsidiary operation
because the existing
approach has not proven
successful (Hoskisson and
Turk 1990)” (p. 247)

“measure that the BEA has calculated
for each foreign affiliate. This
measure (which the BEA terms
“profit-type return”) is based on
reported net income, but it is gross of
foreign income taxes, excludes
capital gains and losses and income
from equity investments, and reflects
certain other adjustments needed to
convert profits from a financial
accounting basis to an economic
accounting basis.” (p. 251)

12,430 manufacturing
subsidiaries from the
BEA benchmark and
annual surveys of U.S.
direct investment
abroad; (1989-2004);
subsidiary-level

Benito
(2005)

“poor performers, but
Weston (1989) points out
that operations might be
divested for other reasons
than poor performance per
se” (p. 238)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article); subsidiarylevel

Song (2014)

Key finding(s)

Using a multinational flexibility
perspective, the authors find that some
subsidiaries are not divested despite
rising host-country labor costs. Intrafirm product shifts, greater cross-country
labor cost differentials and more country
options decrease the risk of divestment,
while poorly performing, smaller, standalone subsidiaries in riskier countries are
more likely to be divested.
This paper assesses interactions between
firm-level and environment-level factors
and their effect on divestment;
surprisingly, only 1/3 of the divested
subsidiaries were performing poorly;
growth opportunities and the fact that
poorly performing ventures may be hard
to sell is preventing them to be divested;
there are significant differences across
the divestment decisions of firms for
their related and unrelated foreign
operations. If the country growth rate is
high, divestments are less likely.
Divestments have been considered in at
least
three
literatures
(industrial
organization approach, financial studies,
and corporate strategy perspectives). The
author develops a framework that builds
on international business strategies and
suggests
that
subsidiaries
in
transnational MNEs are most likely to be
divested, followed by those in
multinational/international and global
MNEs.
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International
divestment

International
divestment

The determinants of closure and
divestiture differ from each other:
ownership
configuration
and
organizational
structure
predict
divestments, while the entry mode
predicts
closure.
Only
human
endowments predict both outcomes, such
that higher human endowments decrease
the likelihood for both divestiture and
closure.
The authors review three fields
(economics, strategic management,
international management) to assess how
the de-internationalization phenomenon
was addressed in them; then they
propose a conceptual framework that
relates “commitment to international
operations” to partial/full withdrawal.

Mata &
Portugal
(2000)

“exit [may be associated]
with the failure of the
foreign subsidiary.
However, exit may be due
to reasons other than
failure.”

not measured in this study:
“Measuring the performance of
subsidiaries of foreign companies is
tricky, not least because pf the
problems associated with transfer
pricing.” (p. 561) and identify this as
room for future studies

Benito &
Welch
(1997)

“severe problems may have
emerged in managing the
company’s foreign
subsidiaries at the same
time as the external
environment of these
subsidiaries has become
less favorable” (p. 19)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article); subsidiarylevel

“firms that meet the following criteria
[from Barker & Duhaime (1997)]
were considered turnaround: (1)
return on investment (ROI) above the
risk-free rate of return for two
consecutive years before decline; (2)
during decline, ROI below both the
risk-free rate of return and industryaverage ROI for at least three
consecutive years, and a Z-score
below 3 for at least one year
(indicating bankruptcy risk; Altman,
1983); (3) during recovery, ROI
above the risk-free rate of return and
industry-average ROI for at least
three consecutive years; and (4)
performance fluctuation allowed for
up to three years between the decline
and recovery periods.” (p. 655)

48 matched pairs of
firms from Compustat
North American
Database (1993-2008);
corporate-level/
business-level

Early retrenchment (divestments and
geographic market exits, not layoffs)
improves turnaround success, when
compared to late retrenchment.

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article); corporatelevel/business-level

Organizations can respond to decline
through rigidity or innovation. Whether
this leads to turnaround or a downward
spiral depends on the flexibility of the

1033 foreign firms in
Portugal from the
Portuguese Ministry of
Employment survey
(1983-1989);
subsidiary-level

Strategic
Management

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Tangpong,
Abebe & Li
(2015)

“survival-threatening
performance decline (Lim
et al., 2013; Morrow et al.,
2004; O’Neill, 1986).” (p.
647)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

McKinley,
Latham &
Braun
(2014)

“successive, year-after-year
decrease in an
organization’s resource base
that lasts for at least two
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years” (p. 90)

post-retrenchment
performance (performance
is the dependent variable,
not a sample selection
variable)

“industry adjusted return on sales
(ROS) (i.e., firm ROS minus industry
average ROS at the three-digit SIC
code level). […] We measured
performance three years after a
retrenchment event to account for a
potential recovery period.” (pp. 4748)

2,406 large nondiversified Japanese
firms from NEEDS
tapes (1991-2000);
corporate-level/
business-level

Schmitt &
Raisch
(2013)

“an existence-threatening
decline situation (Hofer,
1980; Lohrke et al., 2012).”
(p. 1216)

Identification of turnaround cases by
turnaround consultants; the sample
was also characterized by the
following: ”Prior research suggests
that turnaround initiatives should be
selected by following a four-year
period comprising two years of
positive return on investment (ROI)
and two years of an average pre-tax
ROI below 10 per cent (Barker and
Mone, 1994). While these selection
criteria were reflected in our sample,
we also ensured that the firms had
experienced negative return on assets
(ROA), as well as an absolute and a
relative-to-industry decline over two
years.” (p. 1227)

107 out-of-court
turnaround initiatives
(27 Austrian, 64
German, and 16 Swiss)
from a questionnaire
sent to 12 Austrian, 14
German, and 7 Swiss
consulting firms;
(2003-2004); corporatelevel/business-level

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Trahms,
Ndofor &
Sirmon
(2013)

“Organizational decline
occurs when a firm’s
performance or resource
base deteriorates
over a sustained period of
time (Bruton, Oviatt, &
White, 1994; Weitzel &
Jonsson, 1989).” (p. 1278)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Chen &
Hambrick
(2012)

Turnaround situations:
“established firms that once
performed satisfactorily,

“those that had operating returns on
equity (ROE, before extraordinary
items) greater than their cost of

223 organizations in
turnaround situations
from the Standard and

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Lim, Celly,
Morse &
Rowe
(2013)

innovation, the nature of power,
controllability of causes, and the degree
of permanence of the causes.
Firms commonly choose between cost
retrenchment and asset retrenchment. If a
firm’s core rent creation mechanism is
Schumpetarian
(exploration),
cost
retrenchment can be detrimental especially in a Schumpetarian industry.
If a firm’s core rent creation mechanism
is Richardian (exploitation), asset
retrenchment can have a negative impact
in less asset-intensive industries and a
positive impact in more asset-intensive
industries.

Retrenchment
and
recovery
are
contradictory and complementary at the
same time. Successful turnarounds are
achieved by combining efficiencyenhancing initiatives with innovationstimulating ones.

The
authors
review
the
decline/turnaround
literature
since
Pearce & Robbins's review in 1993
(whose model they expand); the
literature is still fragmented, conflicting,
and much more needs to be studied;
assuming the lenses of resource
orchestration, strategic leadership, and
stakeholder issues may help.
CEO replacements during decline have
commonly been regarded as a necessity.
This study suggests that CEO
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specifically in terms of
profitability, but no longer
do.” (p. 225)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Boyne &
Meier
(2009)

Francis &
Desai
(2005)

equity (COE) for at least two
consecutive years in our sample
period, immediately followed by a
year of operating losses (again,
before extraordinary items).” (p.
230)

Poor’s 1500 index;
(1990-2003); corporatelevel/business-level

“period of organizational
failure (Pearce and Robbins,
1993).” (p. 835)

“performing in the lowest quartile on
their primary assessment criterion in
1995.” (p. 845)

140 Texas school
districts (1995-2002);
corporatelevel/business-level
(public sector)

“decline as a result of
erosion of productive
resources” (p. 1204)

“Two consecutive years of return on
investment (ROI) above the risk-free
rate of return. […] At least three
consecutive years of ROI below the
risk-free rate during the decline. […]
At least one year within the three
years of decline with a negative net
income.” (p. 1209-1210)

97 firms from Standard
& Poor’s Compustat
database; (1980-1997);
corporatelevel/business-level

Interviews with ~20
staff members from 5
English local
authorities (councils)
and a broader sample of
15 councils drawn from
the Comprehensive
Performance
Assessment results (3
years); corporatelevel/business-level
(public sector).

Enso-Gutzeit (Finnish
paper and pulp
company); mainly
(1945-1990)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Jas &
Skelcher
(2005)

“poor performance” (p.
196)

Categorization of councils into a
“‘poor’ category and […] ‘weak’
category having a very low capacity
to improve [thereby] identified by
central government as ‘poorly
performing’” (p. 198)

Folktale theory

Lamberg &
Pajunen
(2005)

Organizational decline:
“deterioration in an
organization’s adaptation to
its microniche and the
associated reduction in
resources within the

Case study of the Finnish company
Enso-Gutzeit: “several problems as
regards
profitability
and
organizational performance […and]
multiple problems in decisionmaking
and
organizational

replacement as such does not have an
effect on subsequent performance.
Instead, only if a better fitting CEO
replaces a less well fitting one is
subsequent performance improved.
Recovery from decline is not only
determined by retrenchment and
repositioning but also changes in the task
environment
(munificence
and
complexity) and human resources
(internal
succession
being
more
beneficial than external succession).
Retrenchment contributes to decline
while repositioning appears to support
turnaround success.
Managerially controllable factors (such
as managing slack resources, increasing
productivity,
and
cost/asset
retrenchment) are more effective for
turnaround success than environmental
factors (such as munificence). Regarding
the nature of decline, the severity of it is
more impactful than its suddenness.
“The […] typical performance of public
organizations over time is cyclical.
Where
cognition
and
leadership
capability are absent, organizations fail
to self-initiate turnaround. In this
situation
authoritative
external
intervention is necessary. The strategies
applied are principally concerned with
building a leadership capability that
engages senior politicians and managers
in order to overcome inertia and
collective action problems. The theory is
presented in the form of seven
propositions” (p. 195)
The authors use an organizational
storytelling technique to illustrate how
Enso-Gutzeit went through seven stages
during the decline: “interregnum,
institutionalization,
complication,
counteraction/ reaction, external catalyst,
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organization (Cameron et
al., 1987, 1988; McKinley,
1993; Mentzer & Near,
1992; Whetten, 1980).” (p.
549)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Kow (2004)

Morrow,
Johnson &
Busenitz
(2004)

performance” (p. 954)

open battle, and harmonization” (p. 969)

“organizations that, for a
variety of reasons, are not
demonstrating performance
that is acceptable to
stockholders, analysts,
vendors and employees” (p.
229)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

The author identifies six key elements of
a successful turnaround strategy: “(1) an
appropriate strategic vision; (2) an
organizational structure; (3) a set of
business processes; (4) a human resource
architecture that will support the vision;
(5) technological innovation that will
nourish the organization as well as
enhances the product ranges; and (6) an
organizational culture that will accept
and commit to the effort.” (p. 229)

“declining financial
performance” (p. 189)

“(1) The firm had to experience at
least three years of declining
performance (ROI) preceded by two
years of successive increases in firm
performance, and (2) the firm had to
engage in some form of cost or asset
retrenchment. [The] firm [also] had to
announce the use of retrenchment
techniques such as cost cutting, plant
closings, asset sales, employee
layoffs etc. in order to be sure
decreases in costs and assets were
due to retrenchment.” (p. 197)

412 single-business
manufacturing firms
from Compustat tapes;
(1980-1995); businesslevel

The effects of cost and asset
retrenchment depend on whether the
business is situated in a growth industry
(asset retrenchment has a positive effect)
or
a
declining
industry
(cost
retrenchment has a positive effect: asset
retrenchment has a negative effect).

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Bruton,
Ahlstrom &
Wan (2003)

“pattern of performance
decline (Schendel, Patton,
and Riggs, 1976)” (p. 522)

“all sample firms suffered a decline
in ROI for 3 consecutive years, with
those ROIs being below the risk-free
rate of return, and with an accounting
loss in the last year of the 3-year
decline cycle.” (p. 527)

Organizational
decline/

Gowen &
Tallon

“declining internal or
environmental business

Survey; “The six antecedents to
turnaround items were: (1) decreasing

90 overseas Chinese
firms in decline (44
from Hong Kong, 31
from Singapore, and 15
from Taiwan); from the
Pacific-Basin Capital
Markets databases and
annual reports;
interviews with 19
leading turnaround
practitioners and 5
firms undergoing a
turnaround (1979-1998)
65 surveys from
American electronics

Turnaround is usually a US-based
concept and cannot be assumed to apply
to other contexts; some parts may be
applicable though, which supports
Robbins & Pearce (1992); reducing sales
is beneficial to prune to the core business
but other actions may not be as
productive.

“significant
differences
[between
American and US subsidiaries of
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turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

(2002)

Barker &
Duhaime
(1997)

Daily &
Dalton
(1995)

situation (Barker &
Duhaime, 1997; DeWitt,
1998; McKinley, 1993;
Pearce & Robbins, 1994;
Shook, 1998).” (p. 226)

“survival-threatening
performance decline over a
period of years” (p. 18)

“5-year period prior to
corporate bankruptcy” (p.
393)

product line profitability; (2)
decreasing account profitability; (3)
fluctuating foreign currency rates; (4)
increasing financial expenses; (5)
increasing
production/operations
costs;
and
(6)
increasing
unproductive assets.” (p. 234)

firms and 65 surveys
from Japanese
electronics firms’
subsidiaries in the US;
(cross-sectional);
corporate/business- and
subsidiary-level

Japanese electronics firms] exist among
levels of strategy implementation in
assessing the need for a turnaround
strategy, the actions taken to reverse an
adverse situation, and the relative
success of the actions. In addition to
greater
capacity
utilization,
low
turnaround plans are generally enacted
by redesigning the product or process,
but successful high turnaround plans are
implemented most often by gain sharing
or profit sharing, as well as by
eliminating
unprofitable
products.
American firms achieve greater return on
investment, operating profit margin, and
cash flow, but lower sales growth and
less unit labor cost improvement than
Japanese corporations.” (p. 225)

All four criteria must be fulfilled: “At
least three (3) consecutive years of
return on invested capital (net
income/total investment) below the
risk-free rate of return. […] An
Altman’s (1968, 1983) bankruptcy
prediction Z-score of less than 3.00
for at least 1 year during this
downturn. […] A performance
recovery characterized by at least 3
years of return on invested capital
above the risk-free rate of return,
continuing to and including the latest
fiscal year (FY 1988) before the
Chief Executives of the sample firms
were surveyed in late 1989 and early
1990. [...] Up to 3 years of fluctuating
performance above and below the
risk-free rate of return was allowed
between downturn and upturn.” (p.
21-22)

120 successful
turnaround
manufacturing firms
from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat (19741988); corporatelevel/business-level

The authors address the discrepancy
between early turnaround scholars and
large sample studies. They provide
support for the contingency approach
developed by early turnaround scholars
by suggesting that firm-based causes of
decline are best met with strategic
turnaround actions. Large-sample studies
may have been in contradiction to this
approach because they did not account
for the cause of the decline and may
have been subject to a sample selection
bias.

“5-year period prior to corporate
bankruptcy” (p. 393)

Sample 1: 57 bankrupt
firms and 57 matched
control firms (19731982); Sample 2: 50
bankrupt and 50
matched control firms

Although the CEO and director turnover
rates may be higher in failing firms, the
changes are often not in the direction
that would be recommended (e.g. more
independent boards, separation of CEO
and chairperson positions).
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from Predicast’s F&S
Index of Companies;
corporatelevel/business-level

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Lindsley,
Brass, &
Thomas
(1995)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Bruton,
Oviatt &
White
(1994)

Efficacy-performance
spirals: “a pattern of
consecutive increases (or
decreases) in both perceived
efficacy and performance
over a minimum of three
task attempts” (p. 650)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

“distressed [,,.] poorly
performing firm” (p. 973)

“Selected
firms
suffered
simultaneous declines in net income
and ROI.” (p. 976)

51 distressed and 46
nondistressed
acquisitions from
Standard & Poor’s
Compustat database;
(1979-1987)

32 U.S. textile mill
companies with data
from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat database;
(1976-1985); corporatelevel/business-level

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Barker &
Mone
(1994)

“steep performance decline
during which a firm’s
financial performance is
extremely poor” (p. 395).

“minimum of at least two successive
years of performance decline during
1976-85, measured by reductions in
ROI. This decline had to follow at
least 2 years of successive increases
in positive ROI. Within each firm's
period of decline, the year of sharpest
performance decline (SPD) was
identified by selecting the year with
the largest absolute ROI decrease.
If more than one period of decline
occurred, the first period was used in
the analyses.” (p. 398)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Pearce &
Robbins
(1994)

none (response to Barker &
Mone, 1994)

none (response to Barker & Mone,
1994)

none (response to
Barker & Mone, 1994)

Organizational
decline/

Pearce &
Robbins

Turnaround situation: “The
period of time the troubled

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

The authors build a conceptual
foundation for explaining why some
firms
would
experience
minor
fluctuations in performance (selfcorrecting cycles), while others continue
to decline until their performance
becomes survival threatening (downward
spirals). Spirals can interact with all
levels in an organization (individuals,
groups, and the entire organization).
“In 51 acquisitions of financially
distressed firms, related business
combinations in which the acquirers had
prior acquisition experience performed
best. However, business relatedness and
acquisition experience
had no effect on performance in a
control group of 46 acquisitions of firms
that were not distressed. The results
imply that tacit knowledge about the
acquisition process” (p. 972)

The authors criticize Robbins & Pearce’s
(1992) findings by suggesting that
retrenchment can be a result of decline,
rather than a cause of turnaround
performance. They replicate the 1992
study and the dominant role of
retrenchment in turnaround success may
need to be viewed more carefully.

The authors criticise that the replication
of their study by Barker and Mone
(1994) was not sufficient and that the
original findings still hold.
Previous research can be summarized as
having four implications regarding
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turnaround

(1993)

firm should be engaged in
turnaround efforts.” (p. 634)

“To have experienced a turnaround
situation the firm had to satisfy each
of the following qualifications: two
successive years of increasing ROI
and ROS followed by: (1) absolute,
simultaneous declines in ROI and
ROS for a minimum of 2 years, and
(2) a rate of decline in ROI and ROS
greater than the industry average over
this 2-year period.” (p. 295)

causes, severity, recovery strategies, and
multistage perspectives. This led to the
authors condensing them into one model
and suggesting aspects to keep in mind
for future research on turnaround.
Cost retrenchment (mostly inventory and
interest expenses) occurred in many
cases and appeared to achieve a higher
level of subsequent ROI than other
actions. In severe cases, asset
retrenchment was necessary as well.
Both together achieved the highest level
of turnaround success. Retrenchment
occurred less often if the cause of the
decline was suspected to be due to
external factors.

Robbins &
Pearce
(1992)

Turnaround situation:
“Firms experience
turnaround situations
when performance criteria
are sufficiently depressed to
warrant turnaround efforts”
(p. 307)

Weitzel &
Jonsson
(1989)

“Organizations enter the
state of decline when they
fail to anticipate, recognize,
avoid, neutralize, or adapt
to external or internal
pressures that threaten the
organization’s long-term
survival” (p. 94)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

Decline in organizations may occur in
several stages: blinded, inaction, faulty
action, crisis, and dissolution. Recovery
from the decline may occur at each stage
(except for the dissolution stage) if an
appropriate response is administered.

Thietart
(1988)

“I used two main criteria to
identify the businesses
performing poorly: (1) low
profitability and (2)
declining market share.” (p.
36)

“I considered a business to be
performing poorly if (1) the ROI for
the first two years under study was
less than half the group's average
ROI; and (2) if the real sales growth
for the first two years under study
was lower than the real market
growth, meaning that the business
was losing market share” (p. 36)

217 businesses from the
PIMS (Profit Impact of
Market Strategy)
database; corporatelevel/business-level

The effectiveness of strategies depends
on whether the firm is pursuing a growth
or profitability objective. Also, the
competitive characteristics of the
industry and the strategic posture of the
business impose contingency effects.

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Hofer
(1980)

Turnaround situations
involve “declines in
organizational profitability,
with those involving
declines in sales or market
share not far behind. […]”

Assessment of current operating
health (financial condition, market
position, technological stance,
production capabilities) and current
strategic health (product/market
matrix, technological and production
capabilities, financial capabilities)

12 turnaround
situations in 10
companies; (19511978); corporatelevel/business-level

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Whetten
(1980)

“decline-as-stagnation and
decline-as cutback” (p. 582)

none (conceptual article), but notes
that in “the past, decline has been
operationalized as decrease in the

none (conceptual
article)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

32 U.S. textile mill
companies with data
from the company’s
annual reports; (19761985); corporatelevel/business-level

The author offers guidelines to assess
operating and strategic health and tests
this on a case-based sample of 12
turnaround situations. He finds that
many firms that did not achieve
turnaround performed an operating
response when a strategic response
would have been more fitting.
Organizational
decline
is
an
understudied subject in organizational
science, probably due to the bias towards
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number of staff, profitability, budget,
or demand for products or services”
(p. 583)

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

Organizational
decline/
turnaround

studying growth. Studying decline is
important, however, especially since
more firms are starting to have to cut
back. The author proposes an agenda for
addressing decline.

Schendel &
Patton
(1976)

“The performance pattern
of interest has two distinct
parts: one, an initial, decline
phase of sub-GNP growth
in income; and two, a
second, upturn phase of
greater-than-GNP income
growth. Our interest is in
firms that experience the
second phase matched
against similar firms in
similar circumstances that
do not recover and do not
enjoy the second phase” (p.
236)

“average percent change in net
income, normalized to reflect growth
in gross national product (GNP)” (p.
236)

36 matched pairs of
firms from Standard &
Poor's Compustat
dataset (1952-1971);
corporatelevel/business-level

Through a combination of quantitative
and qualitative analysis, this exploratory
study reveals that there are differences
between those firms that turn around and
those that do not in terms of increases in
sales, market share, types and
effectiveness of investments, execution
and/or timing of strategy, type of growth
strategy, culture, and uncontrollable
environmental aspects.

Schendel,
Patton, &
Riggs
(1979)

Turnaround situation:
“decline and recovery in
performance. Because profit
is one of the main
objectives of business firms,
performance is measured in
terms of net income
earned.” (p. 3)

“Downturn Phase: Four years of
uninterrupted decline in net income
as normalized by Gross National
Product (GNP) growth. Upturn
Phase: Four years of increase in net
income with allowance for a two year
deviation between the downturn and
upturn phase. Again, net income was
normalized by GNP growth.” (p. 3)

54 domestic
manufacturing firms
from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat database;
(1952-71); domestic
corporate level/
business-level

Downturn phases seem to occur due to
efficiency declines while upturn phases
are often triggered by strategic changes.
Turnarounds appear to be attributable to
management
action,
rather
than
uncontrollable
external
events.
Significant responses are required to
break inertia and affect a turnaround.

Behavioral
decisionmaking

Escalation of
commitment

Hsieh, Tsai
& Chen
(2015)

“scenarios in which a firm
had been operating at a loss
ever since its initial entry
into a location” (p. 45)

“scenarios in which a firm had been
operating at a loss ever since its
initial entry into a location” (p. 45)

1,595 actions taken by
51 Taiwanese IT
companies in China,
(1998-2011);
subsidiary-level

Escalation of
commitment

Sleesman,
Conlon,

“One of the most robust and
costly decision errors

none (meta-analysis)

meta-analysis of 166
articles on escalation of

Firms engage in more escalating
behavior when they receive specific cues
(e.g. large competitors having a high
volume of strategic action, small
competitors having been operating
profitably) or less escalating behavior if
they receive other specific cues (e.g.
larger competitor having been operating
at a loss in the same location) from the
environment.
There has been 35 years of research in
the escalation of commitment literature -
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McNamara
& Miles
(2012)

Organizational
risk-taking

Escalation of
commitment

Escalation of
commitment

addressed in the
organizational sciences has
been the proclivity for
decision makers to maintain
commitment to losing
courses of action, even in
the face of quite negative
news” (p. 541).

commitment

“return on equity (ROE), return on
assets (ROA), and return on sales
(ROS). […] Performance measures
are evaluated against aspiration
levels, which [were calculated] by
taking an exponentially weighted
average of past values on the
performance variable” (p. 87)

11 shipbuilders from
the Tokyo and Osaka
Stock exchanges;
(1974-1995); corporatelevel/business-level

however, most of it has focused on
psychological and project related
determinants; much fewer have focused
on
the
organizational
level,
social/structural
determinants,
longitudinal studies, and field settings
(non-lab). The authors develop 16
hypotheses from existing studies and
develop 4 more (including moderation
effects) to refine/qualify the knowledge
and advice about existing relationships.
The findings show that when
performance fell below the aspiration
level, risk-taking behavior (regarding
factory expansion) was reduced in small
firms, which are contrary to the
predictions of prospect theory. However,
in larger firms, risk-taking behavior was
either not affected or increased.

Audia &
Greve
(2006)

performance below a
specific aspiration level

Staw &
Ross (1989)

Escalation situation:
“situations in which losses
have resulted from an
original course of action,
but where there is the
possibility of turning the
situation around by
investing further time,
money, or effort.” (p. 216)

none (conceptual article)

none (conceptual
article)

The authors propose a three-stage model
of the escalation process. Determinants
of escalation (project, psychological,
social, and organizational) have different
degrees of influence at different stages of
the model.

“negative consequences” (p.
27) of decisions and
behavior

In a case-based experiment: “subjects
in the negative consequences
condition received financial data
which showed a deepening decline in
the profitability of the chosen
division but an improvement in the
unchosen division.” (p. 32)

240 business
undergraduates from
the University of
Illinois; individuallevel

This study is the first to show that "the
primary effect of responsibility and
consequences was that individuals
invested a substantially greater amount
of resources when they were personally
responsible for negative consequences."
(p. 39).

Staw (1976)
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Given that there is a wide array of definitions and operationalisations of the subpar
performance phenomenon in the extant literature, a clear demarcation of the concept is needed.
The following sections narrow the concept down to its specific use in the context of this thesis.

2.1.2 Scope of the Subpar Performance Definition
For the purpose of this thesis, the subpar performance phenomenon is understood in the
spirit of Robbins and Pearce (1992: 307), who offered the following definition: “Firms
experience turnaround situations when performance criteria are sufficiently depressed to warrant
turnaround efforts”. This definition encompasses all subpar performance situations that require a
response, not just those that are directional (organizational decline) or potentially terminal
(failure, survival-threatening). Moreover, we take a softer approach than Chen and Hambrick
(2012: 230) who included only “genuinely troubled firms rather than simply stagnant or slowly
deteriorating firms” in their sample. Since those stagnant or slowly deteriorating firms generally
also require a managerial response in a typically global, competitive, and growth-oriented
environment, they are included into the sample of this thesis.

2.1.3 Operationalizations of Subpar Performance in the Extant Literature
As Trahms et al. (2013: 1302) note, “[t]here are currently no set standards for measuring
decline or turnaround.” Since the level of analysis in this study is the foreign subsidiary, some
measures that are commonly used to assess corporate-level or business-level decline are not
available or are not easily comparable due to transfer pricing. Moreover, past research has
highlighted the multidimensionality of the performance construct (Combs, Crook & Shook,
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2005), suggesting that ideally, research should “use at least two of the three measures (market,
accounting, and subjective)” of performance (Rowe & Morrow, 1999: 69). In order to build a
foundation for devising a clear definition of the subpar performance sequence phenomenon,
different ways of measuring performance have been used. This thesis incorporates two types of
measures: accounting measures (change in subsidiary-level sales, change in employee
productivity) and a perceptual measure of financial performance (gain vs. break-even vs. loss).
The focus, however, is on sales as will be elaborated in Chapter 5.
Various studies have suggested that subjective measures of firm financial performance
are an important component of the overarching performance construct (Rowe & Morrow, 1999).
Anderson (1990) suggests that the use of subjective measures can be useful when subsidiaries are
compared that have very different purposes and thus different performance indicators. The
perceptual measure of financial performance used as a robustness check in this thesis is based on
an assessment of the subsidiary’s performance by managers. Thus, any performance perception
is likely to encompass not only a valuation of the financial performance of the subsidiary but also
other, less tangible performance criteria such as effectiveness of processes, quality of
collaboration (in the case of joint ventures), or prospects of the venture.
We argue that excluding market-based measures of firm financial performance does not
jeopardize the soundness of the subsidiary-level measurement of performance for two reasons: 1)
Rowe and Morrow (1999) found that market measures showed the lowest loadings with the
higher-order firm financial performance construct, suggesting that the accounting dimension and
subjective dimension are stronger indicators of firm financial performance, and 2) market-based
measures of firm performance are generally not available for the subsidiary-level. Thus, we aim
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to build on existing literature by focusing on the most useful measure of performance in this
context (sales) but test our hypotheses using alternative operationalizations, too.

2.1.4 Minimum Length of the Subpar Performance Phenomenon
With regards to the minimum length of the subpar performance phenomenon, this thesis
emphasizes the sequential nature of the phenomenon (e.g. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Lamberg &
Pajunen, 2005). While a single occurrence of a subpar performance period may happen by
chance and be an isolated occurrence, a multi-year occurrence is indicative of a more structurally
embedded concern that requires a strategic response. Therefore, the minimum length of the
subpar performance phenomenon is defined in this study to be two years. This approach has been
used in comparable studies, such as Tangpong et al. (2015).

2.1.5 Defining the Unit of Analysis: Response Sequences
The patterns of subpar performance as described above are the context in which strategic
action (or non-action) is observed. The observations are made for each period of the subpar
performance phenomenon and all the observations together form a sequence with a length of at
least two years. Brzinsky-Fay, Kohler, and Luniak (2006: 435) define a sequence “as an ordered
list of elements”. Figure 2.1 offers a schematic illustration of two response sequences.
In Figure 2.1, Subsidiary A experiences a subpar performance sequence that lasts seven
years. Per definition, the first two years are not included in the analysis time and any responses
are recorded thereafter. In the case of Subsidiary A, the response sequence consists of three
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strategic actions taken and two years of no action being taken (=five elements), until recovery to
pre-decline levels is attained. In comparison, Subsidiary B’s subpar performance sequence lasts
for six years and encompasses four response elements: one workforce reduction response in Year
3 and no responses thereafter. The response sequence ends with the exit of the subsidiary. This
perspective on the unit of analysis being response sequences is somewhat similar to Tangpong et
al. (2015) and Hsieh et al.’s (2015: 58) construction of firm histories which includes events
(actions), spells, and gap times. In contrast to the latter, however, the subpar performance and the
associated response sequence do not necessarily have to start with the firm’s initial entry but may
occur at any point during the subsidiary’s observed life span.
In sum, response sequences are defined in this study as an ordered list of strategic
responses (or non-responses) against the background of subpar performance criteria which have
occurred over at least two consecutive years. These do not necessarily start from the firm’s
foundation and are not necessarily increasing in severity or posing an immediate threat to
survival. The sequence typically ends with either recovery to pre-decline levels of the subpar
performance measure or the exit of the foreign subsidiary2.
Having thus generated a definition of the subpar performance phenomenon employed in
this thesis, we now turn towards a broader review of the literature.

2

Note that there are also cases of right censoring, whereby some sequences will end because no further observations
are available (before any of the two events have occurred).
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of Response Sequences.

SUBSIDIARY A

(Year 1)

(Year 2)

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Year 7

Year 8

Unit of analysis: response sequence
No
response

Switch
to WOS

Subsidiary age
Pre-decline phase

SUBSIDIARY B

Decline phase

(Year 1)

(Year 2)

Year 3

More
expatriates

No
More
response employees

Upturn phase

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Unit of analysis: response sequence

Subsidiary age
Pre-decline phase
Note: This figure is adapted from Figure 2 in Tangpong et al. (2015).

Fewer
employees

No
No
No
response response response

Decline phase

Exit

Recovery
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2.2 Overview of the Literature on Subpar Performance, Responses, and Turnarounds
In general, research in the field of business and strategy has been heavily skewed towards
studying successful firms and identifying factors that lead to the further enhancement of various
measures of performance such as profitability, financial performance, or degree of
internationalization (Ghemawat, 1991; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 2009). Scholars have
discussed several reasons for this observation, from the inconvenience of obtaining suitable
(longitudinal) data to the undesirability of addressing negative subjects such as poor performance
and failure (Turcan, 2013). Thus, the fixation on growth and expansion resulted in much less
scholarly attention on the phenomenon of poorly performing businesses, contracting industries,
and organizational decline (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Nonetheless, some literature streams have emerged that share the common denominator
of focusing on experiences of subpar performance. One notable aspect of the subpar performance
phenomenon is that it has been examined at multiple levels of analysis: the individual (manager)
level, the domestic (single-country) firm level, and the international firm level. While the first
level of analysis is generally examined in the domain of behavioral decision-making, the latter
two levels are typically associated with strategic management and international strategy
respectively. Studies have mushroomed in each of these domains but not to the point at which a
unified theory of turnarounds has emerged (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 614; Trahms et al., 2013) neither within nor across domains.
In the following sections, the studies in each domain are surveyed in depth. The literature
review was conducted by first exploring major reviews and meta-analysis, followed by
considering the journal articles contained in each of them. References to relevant articles within
each article were drawn from as well. Moreover, searches in several databases (ProQuest,
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ABI/INFORM, Google Scholar), using key words such as subpar performance, poor
performance, organizational decline, organizational distress, and turnaround were conducted to
add any other relevant article3.
In general, there is some degree of overlap between domains but only in certain areas.
Given the focus of this thesis’ research questions, which aim at understanding responses to
subpar performance at the foreign subsidiary level, the literature review will begin with an
assessment of relevant studies in the international strategy domain, then expand to the strategic
management domain more generally, and conclude with an evaluation of the behavioral
decision-making domain.

2.2.1 International Firm-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (International
Strategy Domain)
Research in the international strategic (ISM) management domain has grown
considerably over the past decades (for reviews, see Lu, 2003; Bruton, Lohrke & Lu, 2004).
Bruton et al. (2004: 422) define the main question to be answered in ISM as ‘‘to what extent do
various environmental and organizational factors impact an MNE’s ability to outperform its
competitors over time?’’ Poor performance at the subsidiary-level is an important phenomenon
to be investigated in this realm since it can affect the MNE’s overall competitive position. In the
ISM stream, poor performance is understood to be “a signal that firms need to make changes to
their subsidiary operation because the existing approach has not proven successful (Hoskisson

3

Given the vastness of the organizational decline/turnaround and escalation of commitment literatures in particular
(both have a body of research of about 40 years), we focused on including the articles that are most informative to
this thesis.
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and Turk 1990)” (Berry, 2013: 247), assuming that the subsidiary has grown beyond its initial
years during which performance may often and expectedly be subpar.
Notably little research has hitherto been conducted in this area. Lu (2003) identified 393
articles in the ISM realm, out of which only four fell into the subcategory of
turnarounds/declines. Most of these examine the concept of de-internationalization (other terms
include divestment, divestiture, retrenchment, and downsizing) (Benito & Welch, 1997; Mata &
Portugal, 2000; Benito, 2005) which has evolved into a slowly growing field of investigation (cf.
also Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Harrigan, 1981; Calof & Beamish, 1995; Benito, 2005, Turcan,
2013). Indeed, most divestment studies were conducted in other fields like the industrial
organization approach, financial studies, and corporate strategy perspectives (Benito, 2005). Real
options logic also extends into this domain. Cuypers and Martin (2010: 49) define real options as
"strategies of organizations, since the capabilities and assets of an organization can be seen as a
bundle of options for future strategic choices. These options are called "real options" and can be
defined as contingent investment commitments in an asset or capability, rather than in a financial
contract, which secure decision.” The key notion of this lens is that making an investment
(financial or otherwise) contains a certain element of flexibility such that it opens the door to
future possibilities (Adner & Levinthal, 2004). Such flexibility can be a competitive advantage,
as Kogut and Kulatika (1994) illustrate in their study of MNE decision-making regarding global
manufacturing and production shifting in light of environmental uncertainty such as exchange
rate fluctuations. Signals from the environment can suggest that the venture’s value has risen or
fallen. A signal of increased value tends to lead to a subsequent acquisition, while a signal of
decreased value will only lead to dissolution if further investment would be required and
operating costs are at a substantive level (Kogut, 1991: 20). Since Kogut’s (1991) study on joint
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ventures, real options logic has become an important lens in both strategic management and ISM,
as mirrored by Eden’s (2009: 357) comment that real options logic constitutes an "important lens
for understanding MNE strategic decision-making”.
Note that the literature on internationalization, on the other hand, does not predominantly
fit into the scope of this literature review since even though there are conceptualizations of
changes in commitment to a foreign venture (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 2009), these do not
take negative performance signals as the starting point of the investigation. However, the
retracting of commitment as suggested in that stream is very closely mirrored by the deinternationalization literature.
Since Lu’s (2003) review, more studies on de-internationalization have emerged and have
refined the relationship between poor performance and international divestments (c.f. Berry,
2013; Turcan, 2013; Celly, 2008). For instance, Benito (2005) argues that subsidiaries in a
transnational MNE may be more prone to failure due to the inherent complexity of the strategy.
He thus offers a theoretical framework which suggests that foreign subsidiaries which are part of
a transnational MNE are most likely to be divested, followed by those in a multinational MNE,
international MNE, and subsidiaries in a global MNE having the lowest likelihood of being
divested. Berry (2013: 258) found that the negative relationship between performance and
divestments only holds for subsidiaries in countries with “low growth, policy stability, and
exchange rate stability” and may differ for related and unrelated subsidiaries. Moreover, Celly
(2008) examined both the antecedents and the consequences of downsizing in an international
sample of Japanese subsidiaries, thus offering a more comprehensive assessment of the
phenomenon compared to previous studies.
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However, despite its promising trajectory, this line of research falls short of a
comprehensive analysis of response sequences to subpar performance for two reasons. First, as
scholars in this realm have repeatedly asserted (e.g. Weston, 1989; Mata & Portugal, 2000;
Benito, 2005), divestments of foreign operations may occur in response to subpar performance but not necessarily so. An alternative reason for divestments may be a strategic reorientation of
the parent firm and the decision that the subsidiary does not fit into the corporate portfolio any
longer (Mata & Portugal, 2000: 561; Benito, 2005: 245). Indeed, as Hamilton & Chow (1993:
484) suggest, the reasons for divestment are manifold, ranging from a refocusing on core
activities, meeting corporate liquidity requirements, to shifting resources into units with greater
opportunities and many others (their study lists 30 different motives). Similarly, Berry (2013:
246) noted that in their sample of US-based multinational enterprises, “only about one-third of
the divested foreign operations […] were poorly performing”.
Second, the literature on de-internationalization/divestitures has typically focused on
complete withdrawal from the respective foreign location. For instance, Mata and Portugal
(2000: 554) consider foreign firm divestiture as the case “where the firm continues to operate,
but no longer with foreign capital participation.” Hamilton and Chow (1993: 480) found in their
sample of New Zealand companies that 78 percent of divestments occurred in the form of
complete sell-offs. Few exceptions of investigations into partial divestments exist, such as
Celly’s (2008: 190) finding that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of
downsizing and subsidiary performance.
Third, alternative lenses such as the real options lens are rather restrictive in their
applicability. Specific parameters must be present in order for real options logic to be an
appropriate lens - such as the level of uncertainty and irreversibility of an investment, as well as
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the degree of flexibility in the target market choice and technical agenda (Adner & Levinthal,
2004). As such, the real options lens may mostly apply to decisions of a rather binary nature
(dissolution versus continuance, moving of operations versus not moving operations) given
certain signals from the environment, rather than finer-grained differentiations between a larger
number of different responses to subpar performance.
Thus, while the de-internationalization and divestment literature in the ISM domain has
generated valuable insights, to our knowledge no comprehensive assessment exists that focuses
specifically on responses to subpar performance at the foreign subsidiary level per se. The
stream on de-internationalization has focused on predicting the likelihood of divestments, for
which poor performance is but one predictor (Berry, 2013). However, moving poor performance
into the centre of attention opens the inquiry up for the exploration of new avenues in terms of
appropriate responses, not solely in the direction of a decrease in commitment. Such a somewhat
broader investigation of responses to the subpar performance phenomenon can be found in the
turnover/organizational decline literature in the strategic management domain though, which is
where this review turns to next.

2.2.2 Single-Country Firm-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (Strategic
Management Domain)
The strategic management domain has been described as dealing “with the major
intended and emergent initiatives taken by general managers on behalf of owners, involving
utilization of resources, to enhance the performance of firms in their external environments.”
(Nag, Hambrick & Chen, 2007; italicization removed). Thus, a key difference to international
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strategy research is a much lower emphasis on issues related to the operation of multinational
enterprises, foreign subsidiaries, and their interactions with a global environment.
The largest literature within the strategic management domain which concerns itself with
responses to subpar performance is that of turnaround/organizational decline (for a review, see
Trahms et al., 2013). This literature emerged from the seminal work by Schendel and Hofer and
Hedberg and Starbuck in the 1970s (see Barker & Duhaime, 1997, for a review) and investigates
the “[e]fforts of a financially troubled firm to pursue a return-to-growth strategy” (Pearce &
Robbins, 1993: 634).
Barker and Duhaime (1997: 14) discuss two distinct streams within the literature which
emerged in the late 1970s that have shaped the literature to date. The first stream examines
performance declines in terms of “a strategic decision problem to be solved by a turnaround
strategy”. Any responses undertaken in this regard aim to address the core problems of the firm
which are either operational (subpar efficiency) or strategic (weak competitive position) in nature
(cf. also Trahms et al.’s review, 2013). The second stream views performance declines as
indications of firm-level stagnation, caused by a misfit between the organization’s strategy,
structure, ideology and the constantly changing environment. These approaches are based on
contingency models, whereby the appropriate strategic response depends on the cause of the
performance decline, with weak strategic positioning being the primary cause and inertia being a
strong force against implementing strategic change. As pointed out by Barker and Duhaime
(1997), however, some large sample studies have failed to confirm the validity of strategic
change for turnaround success.
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Several theoretical frameworks were offered, such as Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989) stage
model, whereby organizational decline occurs in five stages of blindness, inaction, faulty action,
crisis, and dissolution. Appropriate responses at any of these stages (except the dissolution stage)
can turn the organization around (see Figure 2.2).
Another framework was offered by Pearce and Robbins (1993) who conceptualized
organizational decline as a sequential process of a turnaround situation and turnaround
responses. Their focus lies on retrenchment activities that could take the form of cost reductions
or asset reductions, depending on the severity of the decline, see Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.2 Five-Stage Model Of Organizational Decline (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989: 102).
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Figure 2.3. Turnaround Process Model (Pearce & Robbins, 1993: 624; Recreated).
Turnaround Situation
Cause

Turnaround Response

Severity

Retrenchment Phase

declining
sales or
margins

Cost
Reduction

Recovery Phase

(operating)
Internal
Factors

Efficiency
Maintenance

low
Stability

Recovery

high
External
Factors

imminent
bankruptcy

Asset
Reduction

Entrepreneurial
Reconfiguration
(strategic)

A more recent categorization of studies in the literature was provided by Trahms et al.
(2013) who built on Pearce and Robbins’ (1993) two-stage model of decline and turnaround.
Trahms et al. (2013) divide the investigation of the phenomemon into internal and external
causes of decline, response factors (managerial cognition, strategic leadership, stakeholder
management), strategic and operational firm actions, and several types of outcomes (in terms of
their severity). The resulting framework is depicted in Figure 2.4
Despite these advances, Trahms et al. (2013) note that there is much more to be
investigated about the subpar performance phenomenon. For instance, while there are a number
of studies focusing on the causes of decline and the predictions of response factors, there are
much fewer studies on the outcomes of such turnaround actions. In fact, Trahms et al. (2013)

40

Figure 2.4. Turnaround Process Model (Trahms et al., 2013: 1288).

only list one such study (Moulton & Thomas, 1993), although others exist (e.g. Markides, 1992;
Morrow, Johnson & Busenitz, 2004).
Further, similar to the de-internationalization literature in the ISM domain, most studies
have focused on actions of retrenchment which Pearce and Robbins (1993: 634) refer to as
“reductions of costs (advertising, R&D, direct labor, and materials) and assets (receivables, cash,
plant and equipment).” Cost retrenchment is generally deemed a stronger response and the
choice depends on the severity of the decline (Pearce & Robbins, 1993) or the degree of growth
in the competitive environment (Morrow et al., 2004). However, although several studies have
identified a list of possible strategic responses (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Tangpong et al., 2015),
those that are not geared towards a decrease in commitment have received much less attention.
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Moreover, a coherent conceptualization of strategic responses has yet to emerge. Pearce
and Robbins (1993) remarked that no unifying theory of business level turnaround exists and to
date, many gaps exist in the literature. Trahms et al. (2013: 1278) advocate for the increased
utilization of three theoretical lenses (resource orchestration, strategic leadership, and
stakeholder theory) to apply within the literature, “thereby assuaging a key criticism of
turnaround research: that this stream is largely phenomenon driven.” A symptom of this lack of
theory-driven approaches may also be the observation that findings with regards to the
effectiveness of responses have been fragmented and somewhat inconsistent, which Trahms et al.
(2013) attribute to operationalization issues as well as the notion that the response might have
been in reaction to the depth rather than the cause of the decline.
In addition, the turnaround literature has largely focused on domestic (single-country)
samples. For instance, Barker and Duhaime (1997) used a sample of 120 US-based
manufacturing firms. Jas and Skelcher (2005) chose a sample of 15 English local authorities.
Boyne and Meier (2009) relied on a sample of school districts in Texas. Bruton et al. (2003) is
one of the few exceptions where turnaround theory was considered in an international context,
with consideration to cultural implications (East Asian firms). However, taking the international
context into account brings about new contingency aspects. For instance, the distance
(geographic, cultural, or otherwise; cf. Berry et al., 2010) to the subsidiary is likely going to
affect the level of strategic response inertia on the side of the foreign parent firm: the farther
away a subsidiary is, the less headquarters attention it might enjoy (Hansen & Løvås, 2004;
Monteiro, Arvidsson & Birkinshaw, 2007). Further, deciding on a strategic action may not be as
straightforward if more stakeholders are involved. For instance, in a joint venture, selling off
equity shares in a retrenchment effort may simply not be feasible due to contractual constraints
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or desirable due to the resulting loss in reputation and participation in future market growth. In a
similar vein, retrenchment may not always be the most appropriate strategic response if several
stakeholders are involved. If the decline in performance is due to conditions internal to the
subsidiary (cf. the literature relating conflict within international joint ventures to performance,
e.g. Fey & Beamish, 2000), an increase in equity by one parent firm for the purpose of assuming
greater control may actually be the more appropriate response. In fact, Barker and Duhaime’s
(1997: 25) list of strategic responses to subpar performance suggests that 50 percent of the firms
in their sample responded that “Contracting, expanding or simultaneously contracting and
expanding the scope of the corporation’s foreign operations” is an action that has been taken
before. However, this category focuses on the unit (foreign operations) itself, not on the direction
of the response. Thus, much is yet to be explored in the turnaround literature within strategic
management that illuminates the specificities of subpar performance periods in foreign
subsidiaries.
Related to the above, most empirical analyses of the subpar performance phenomenon
within the turnaround/organizational decline literature have focused on the core business unit,
much more so than on other parts of the business’ network (Celly, 2008). Multinational
enterprises with their often vast network of subsidiaries have largely been ignored by turnaround
researchers.
The next section reviews the subpar performance phenomenon in the behavioral decisionmaking domain, where it is mostly contained in the escalation of commitment literature.
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2.2.3 Individual-Level Studies of Responses to Subpar Performance (Behavioral DecisionMaking Domain)
Observing responses to subpar performance signals at the individual level of analysis has
been a subject of research within the behavioral decision-making domain for several decades
(Sleesman et al., 2012). The largest stream is within the escalation of commitment literature
(Shapira, 1997), with the Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, and Administrative Science Quarterly publishing the largest output of
studies on the subject.
The foundation for the literature was laid by Staw (1976) who conducted a case study
containing repeated investment decisions using a sample of 240 undergraduate students. The
rather surprising observation was that individuals often invest more into a losing venture, even if
this is deemed economically irrational - and especially if they felt personally responsible for the
initial investment decision. Staw (1997: 192) later defined situations which are prone to such
potentially detrimental behavior as those “where losses have been suffered, where there is an
opportunity to persist or withdraw, and where the consequences of these actions are uncertain”,
thus falling into the definition of subpar performance.
Since then, several studies have ventured to identify the boundaries of the phenomenon
and explore other predictors of escalating behavior. Indeed, soon a classification scheme
emerged which categorized the identified independent variables into project determinants,
psychological determinants, social determinants, organizational determinants, and contextual
effects (Staw & Ross, 1989; Staw 1997). Sleesman et al. (2012) applied the same classification
scheme to conduct a meta-analysis and found that the vast majority of determinants within these
categories prove to be significant predictors of escalating behavior.
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For instance, one important factor which is generally presumed to enhance the likelihood
of escalating behavior is that of sunk costs. Northcraft and Wolf (1984) were among the first to
address the question of whether more resources should be invested into a project which has
generated negative feedback by focusing particularly on sunk costs. Sunk costs in this regard
accrue when “a decision has been made and resources irretrievably expanded following from that
decision. […] Sunk costs are the negative cash flows experienced in anticipation of future
compensating cash flows […,thereby going beyond] a single decision or time period” (p. 226).
While the objectively rational decision is to decide on “resource commitments […] only by
comparing future revenues to future costs” (p. 233-234), studies in the escalation of commitment
literature have found that individuals often deviate from this prescription. Instead of de-investing
in light of subpar performance, they are worried that their initial resource commitments may be
perceived as wasteful and subsequently invest more to justify their decisions (Arkes & Blumer,
1985). Later studies have refined the understanding of the sunk costs effect e.g. in terms of the
amount of sunk costs (Heng, Tan & Wei, 2003), or the degree of ambiguity surrounding the
negative feedback information (Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990).
Staw and Ross (1987: 70) remark with an emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon context that “we
associate persistence—‘staying the course,’ ‘sticking to your guns,’ and ‘weathering the
storm’—with strong leadership.” Thus, to explain the difference between rationally expected and
actually observed responses to subpar performance, a variety of theoretical lenses were utilized:
self-justification (e.g. Staw, 1976; Brockner, 1992), prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), decision dilemma theory (e.g. Brockner, 1992), goal substitution effect (e.g. Conlon &
Garland, 1993; Sleesman et al., 2012), self-presentation theory (Jones & Pittman, 1982;
Sleesman et al., 2012) and agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
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Sleesman et al., 2012). More recent empirical advancements have placed a bigger emphasis on
emotions such as regret (e.g. Ku, 2008; Wong & Kwong, 2007) and the factors that facilitate decommitment (e.g. Heath, 1995; Moser, Wolff & Kraft, 2013).
All of these studies have in common the perception that the additional commitment to a
venture that is performing below expectations is an irrational bias that is to be avoided. However,
despite decades of research and many useful insights, several important questions are unresolved.
First, as Drummond (2014: 430) noted, although “[e]scalation of commitment is thought to be a
ubiquitous and costly mistake [, …] sometimes organizations should ‘press on the accelerator’
and stay the course despite adversity.” This suggests that the cognitive bias may unfold in either
direction: leaving the venture too late (while committing too much to it) or too early (while
committing too little to it). The result is the need for more research to resolve the managerial
dilemma: “Do they persist and risk becoming caught up in a spiral of escalating commitment, or
‘apply the brakes’ when they may be within an ace of success?” (Drummond, 2014: 430).
Second, most studies have focused on psychological and project determinants of
escalating behavior while neglecting structural factors (Staw & Ross, 1989; Sleesman et al.,
2012; few exceptions exist, e.g. Hsieh et al., 2015; Barton et al., 1989). In particular, “[l]ittle to
no research to date has examined factors such as whether and how escalation is a consequence of
overall organizational performance […]. This scarcity may in part be due to the difficulty of
studying such factors." (Sleesman et al., 2012: 545). Indeed, most existing studies have been
conducted in laboratory settings or with convenience samples from classroom experiments.
Third, although theoretical models such as a temporal model of escalation (Staw & Ross,
1989; Staw 1997) and an aggregate model of escalation (Staw, 1997) have been proposed, little
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overall theoretical integration has occurred in this area. As Sleesman et al. (2012: 558) note:
there is a “need to de-emphasize efforts to continue identifying determinant ‘effects’ and instead
give attention to integrating and exploring more deeply the core theories driving escalation.”.
Some of these shortcomings can be overcome by shifting scholarly attention towards
“linking micro research on psychological biases with macro research on firm behavior” (Hsieh et
al., 2015: 53) in an effort to create multi-level explanations for the subpar performance
phenomenon. Moreover, rather than identifying more predictors of escalating behavior, the
impact of the chosen response should be further investigated, in order to allow for a juxtaposition
of available choices, a better grasp of the dilemma described by Drummond (2014), and an
integration of perspectives for the purpose of developing theoretical advancement.

2.3 Overall Assessment of the Literatures across Domains
As the review of the literatures and domains addressing the subpar performance
phenomenon and appropriate responses to it reveals, each domain has its own lens. Like in the
famous Indian fable of the six blind men drawing different conclusions about the same object (an
elephant) from their subjective angles, the literature domains exploring the subpar performance
phenomenon have emphasized different aspects to the detriment of others, and drawn different
(sometimes divergent) inferences. For instance, while the de-internationalization and
turnover/organizational decline literatures emphasize actual divestment decisions in light of
subpar performance, the escalation of commitment literature focuses on a normative perspective
on divestment decisions. Furthermore, each domain focuses on a rather specific level of analysis
and by neglecting the others, several responses (such as increasing control in a JV by investing
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more equity; sending or withdrawing expatriates) are not taken into consideration. A multilevel
analysis of the phenomenon would be desirable.
At the same time, these domains do have some commonalities. Specifically, the focus on
phenomena-driven studies while neglecting theory-building has been a rather constant concern.
Moreover, the emphasis appeared to have been placed more on identifying the determinants of
escalating behavior or the choice of strategic response, rather than the outcomes of it. Finally,
only a few studies exist which specifically focus on the longitudinal, sequence-based nature of
the phenomenon itself, the responses, and its outcomes (a few exceptions exist, e.g. Tangpong et
al., 2015).
In sum, although taken together there are a rather substantive number of studies on the
subpar performance phenomenon, it is not obvious how they fit together. It appears, however,
that the domains may inform each other, such that the international strategy domain might
benefit from an inclusion of a broader variety of responses and outcomes, while the strategic
management and behavioral decision-making domains may gain from the broadening of the
context. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the areas of relative emphasis and neglect per
domain.
Chapter 3 will offer a conceptual framework which aims at addressing some of the
shortcomings of the existing and fragmented body of studies that address the subpar performance
phenomenon.
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Table 2.2. Comparison of Emphases in the Examination of the Subpar Performance
Phenomenon across Domains.
Domain

International Strategy

Strategic Management

Behavioral DecisionMaking

Relatively emphasized
De-internationalization
Complete retracting from
foreign operations

Causes of decline
Predictions of response actions
Phenomena-driven
Retrenchment
Single-country context
Corporate or business level
Avoidance of undue persistence
Psychological/project
determinants
Laboratory studies, convenience
samples
Prediction of determinants

Relatively neglected
Other responses to subpar
performance
Responses to subpar performance
per se
Degrees of divestments and other
responses
Outcomes of response actions
Theory-building
Other responses to subpar
performance
International context
Subsidiary level
Avoidance of premature
abandonment
organizational/contextual
determinants
Real (non-experimental) samples
Theory-building, integration of
theory
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As the preceding review of the literatures addressing the subpar performance
phenomenon reveals, multiple perspectives have emerged at three different levels of analysis. A
consensus across domains is, however, that the exploration of the phenomenon has been rather
phenomenon-driven to this point (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013, Sleesman et al.,
2012), while underemphasizing theoretical perspectives to explain the observed incidences.
Therefore, in an effort to advance the understanding of the occurrence of and responses to subpar
performance in foreign subsidiaries, a theoretical framework will be developed.

3.1 Towards a Resource Orchestration Framework of Responses to Subpar Performance in
Foreign Subsidiaries
Resources play a central role during organizational decline and turnaround. Managers
must conserve resources to ensure survival, jettison resources that are not critical for value
creation, and invest the remaining resources in ways that facilitate turnaround (Sirmon, Hitt,
Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). Thus, a theoretical lens that considers resources a key element to
describe decline and turnaround is imperative.
The resource-based view (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) describes resources as
“all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc.
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its
efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991: 101). In this lens, firms are conceptualized as
bundles of resources, thereby emphasizing the internal organization of firms to attain an
advantage relative to its competitors (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
A particular resource contributes to the firm’s sustained competitive advantage if it possesses the
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characteristics of value, rarity, inimitability, and non-substitutability. A competitive advantage
occurs when a firm is able to “create more economic value than the marginal (breakeven)
competitor in its product market” (Peteraf & Barney (2003: 314). Since its introduction, the RBV
has also contributed to the IB literature, where it has been applied to topic areas such as MNE
management, market entries, strategic alliances, international entrepreneurship, and emerging
markets (Peng, 2001).
Although the RBV has received considerable empirical support, it has not remained
without criticism. Several scholars have noted that the RBV is too static in nature, both with
reference to the external environment and the processes internal to the firm. First, Priem and
Butler (2001) criticize the RBV for not having reached the stage of a theory of competitive
advantage yet, due to a need for more formalization, an integration with an environmental
demand model, and a closer consideration of the exogeneity of the value concept (i.e. resource
value is defined by the customer, thus outside of the RBV - an aspect refined in Priem, Butler,
and Li, 2013). Second, as Priem and Butler (2001) further note, the RBV requires the
incorporation of the temporal component into its conceptual makeup, in order to strengthen its
aspiration of reaching the status of a theory. This was mirrored by other scholars, who also
suggest that the RBV “misses the strategic role of time” and breaks down under conditions of
high environmental dynamism (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1118). Second, it focuses on the
mere possession of resources which is a necessary but insufficient condition for explaining a
firm’s competitive advantage (Newbert, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Rather, resources
will unfold their value-creating potential only when put to proper use through the application and
leverage of organizational capabilities (Mahoney & Pandain, 1992: 365; Peteraf, 1993). While
Barney (1991) initially conceptualized resources as an umbrella term for assets and capabilities,
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later refinements clarified that capabilities are a firm’s capacity to deploy resources for a desired
purpose. “They are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and
are developed over time” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993: 35; italicizations removed). This criticism
has been mirrored in the IB literature, where Peng (2001: 821) notes that “future RBV work
needs to pay more attention to process- and implementation-related issues.”
Such criticisms have led to a bifurcation of the literature, moving away from Barney’s
(1991) original heterogeneity approach towards a dynamic capabilities approach and an
organizing approach (Newbert, 2007: 140). The dynamic capabilities approach has gained much
traction among scholars, devised to describe “situations […that can be understood as dynamic in
the sense that] there is rapid change in technology and market forces” (Teece et al., 1997: 512),
Teece et al. initially (1997: 516) defined dynamic capabilities “as the firm's ability to integrate,
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments.” Since then, studies have emerged that suggest that the concept of dynamic
capabilities also applies to moderately changing environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) or
even relatively stable environments (Zahra, Sapienza & Davidson, 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002)
(Barreto, 2010). Based on this, a revised definition of dynamic capabilities was offered, wherein
they describe “the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to
sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its
resource base.” (Barreto, 2010: 271).
What emerged from this development is the suggestion of an ‘orchestrating’ function of
dynamic capabilities: the notion that dynamic capabilities work as a tool that helps managers
transform the firm’s existing resource base towards an improvement of the firm’s competitive
advantage prospects (Teece, 2007). Specifically, Teece (2007) notes that dynamic capabilities
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may take the form of sensing, seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming (see Figure 4 in
Teece, 2007). Together with their micro-foundations (embedded in organizational and
managerial processes of coordination/integration, learning, and reconfiguring) and the overlaying
dynamic capabilities, they make what “might be thought of as asset ‘orchestration’ processes."
(Teece, 2007: 1341). This notion was developed further by Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf,
Singh, Teece, & Winter, (2007) who describe asset orchestration as a type of dynamic
managerial capability, consisting of two interrelated action categories. First, search/selection
encompasses the design of the “business model, select configurations of co-specialized assets,
select investments (e.g. R&D, M&A) […and] select organization, governance, and incentive
structures”. Second, configuration/deployment means to “orchestrate and coordinate cospecialized assets [and] nurture change and innovation processes” (Helfat et al., 2007: 28).
The other stream of the literature that the RBV has bifurcated into could be termed the
organizing approach. An influential contribution in this realm is Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland’s
(2007) resource management framework. In an attempt to hone in even closer on the “black box”
of how resources are put to use, the authors offer a perspective on three processes (with three
sub-processes each) by which resources can be managed within firms to create value for
customers and owners. These processes are: 1) structuring (acquiring, accumulating, divesting),
bundling (stabilizing, enriching, pioneering), and leveraging (mobilizing, coordinating,
deploying). While structuring “refers to the management of the firm’s resource portfolio”,
bundling “refers to the combining of firm resources to construct or alter capabilities”, and
leveraging “refers to the application of a firm’s capabilities to create value for customers and
wealth for owners” (Sirmon et al., 2007: 277).
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Realizing the similarity both in objective and structure between the asset orchestration
and resource management frameworks, Sirmon et al. (2011) ventured to integrate them into one
resource orchestration framework. By way of clarifying how this new framework connects to its
intellectual roots, Sirmon et al. (2011: 1394) note: “resource management draws on [the
resource-based theory] RBT and has been explicitly linked with RBT’s primary logic, while
asset orchestration draws from the dynamic capabilities concept. However, dynamic capabilities
have been linked to RBT (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), thereby providing an indirect linkage
between asset orchestration and resource management.” Resource orchestration thus offers an
integration of aspects from the RBV with those from the dynamic capabilities perspective. Figure
3.1 illustrates how asset orchestration and resource management fit together to form the resource
orchestration framework.

Figure 3.1. The General Resource Orchestration Framework (Figure 1 in Sirmon et al., 2011).
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Sirmon et al. (2011) further elaborate that resource orchestration can be explored in three
dimensions: breadth (scope of the firm), depth (levels within the firm), and life cycles (i.e. time).
While the breadth dimension of resource orchestration encompasses corporate strategy (product
diversification, international diversification), business strategy (differentiation vs. cost
leadership), and competitive dynamics (strong vs. modest competitive rivalry), the depth
dimension of resource orientation considers different configurations on the continuum of topdown and bottom-up strategies, and the life cycle dimension of resource orchestration covers the
start-up stage, growth stage, mature stage, and decline stage of a firm.
The resource orchestration framework has been applied to topic areas such as
commitment-based HR systems (Chadwick, Super, & Kwon, 2015) and family firms (Chirico,
Sirmon, Sciascia, & Mazzola, 2011), but no study has used the framework on the phenomenon of
subpar performing organizations and/or subsidiaries yet. This is not because applicability is
limited. In fact, Sirmon et al. (2011) describe in broad strokes what a study of organizational
decline using a resource orchestration framework might look like. Trahms et al. (2013: 1299)
also note the potential the resource orchestration framework might hold as “a theoretical lens
through which numerous unresolved issues in turnaround research can be examined”. Indeed,
they note that “it is surprising that so little turnaround research has examined how the
management of a firm’s resources during decline […] and their leveraging in new competitive
actions influence performance turnaround.” Moreover, the resource orchestration lens places a
strong emphasis on the construct of time, offering itself as applicable to research questions such
as: “Does the timing of retrenchment and strategic actions affect the success of turnaround
attempts?” (Trahms et al., 2013: 1298).
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In this thesis, we apply the resource orchestration framework to the phenomenon of
subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries by combining models of turnaround as reviewed in
Chapter 2 (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013) with the
resource orchestration framework offered by Sirmon et al. (2011). This approach leads us to
introduce three central and overarching orchestration processes: Identifying, Responding, and
Synchronizing.
The orchestration process of Identifying (of the appropriate response to subpar
performance by the MNE headquarters) connects the likely causes of decline to the responses
taken as a result of suspected causal attributions. This aspect is closely linked to the
search/selection part of the resource orchestration framework. Moreover, Pearce and Robbins
(1993) note that organizational decline may have causes that are due to internal factors (e.g.
inefficiencies within the organization, unsuited strategic orientation) and causes that may be due
to external factors (e.g. industry decline). In the context of foreign subsidiaries within MNEs, the
cause for decline may also be found within the MNE itself, whereby e.g. an MNE that declines
overall may not be able to provide sufficient firm-specific advantages and other resources to the
foreign subsidiary anymore. In such a scenario, the MNE would have lost its inherent
competitive advantage by using the flexibility available through its international production
network (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). This is closely linked to Sirmon et al.’s (2011: 1394)
assertion that the notion of fit with the environment is a foundational aspect of the resource
orchestration lens. Decline at both the MNE-level and the subsidiary level could indicate a
misfit. Once the likely cause of the decline has been identified, a choice is made for the type of
response that is best suited to mitigate the situation and regain environmental fit. As we will
argue in more detail in the next chapter, Identifying also implies that a specific situation needs to
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receive headquarter attention before it can be addressed with a response. Note that attention can
thereby be structured by institutional logics, which are “supraorganizational patterns, both
symbolic and material, that order reality and provide meaning to actions and structure conflicts”
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 803). Thus, decision-makers will focus their attention on issues that
are consistent with a predominant institutional logic. Moreover, some determinants may impede
the process of Identifying and will be assessed in the analysis.
This leads to the orchestration process of Responding, whereby the effectiveness of the
chosen response in terms of the rate of recovery and the rate of exit is assessed. Responding
hereby corresponds most closely to structuring, leveraging (especially mobilizing), and
deploying in the resource orchestration framework. While Pearce and Robbins (1993) focused on
retrenchment as the main way to respond to declines, other studies such as Barker and Duhaime
(1997) and Trahms et al. (2013) recognize a larger number of responses in their model. Since
MNEs can respond in more ways than through cost retrenchment or asset retrenchment, the
model in this thesis also encompasses a larger number of strategic and operational responses to
subpar performance at the respective foreign subsidiary.
As has been highlighted before, the notion of time plays an integral role in the resource
orchestration framework, leading us to conceptualize an orchestration process of Synchronizing
resources in light of subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries. Responses to subpar
performance are typically time-critical (Hofer, 1980) and can make the difference between a
turnaround and bankruptcy. The timing of a response is thus a key concept that needs to be
assessed specifically and not just as a latent variable. In the resource orchestration framework as
presented by Sirmon et al. (2011), the aspect of time is perhaps best captured by the notion of
coordinating. In conventional turnaround models (e.g. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al.,
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2013), time is mostly inherent in the cause-response-outcome process model. What has mostly
been overlooked, however, is the time it takes to respond to an adverse situation. This is
particularly salient in the context of an MNE-subsidiary relationship, where the response to a
subpar performing foreign subsidiary may be delayed by several factors (e.g. cultural and
geographic distance or conditions at the home country) and expedited by others (e.g. existence of
a regional headquarters). As we will argue in the next chapter, some factors enhance the
frequency in communication channels, thereby allowing for more headquarters attention to be
drawn to the respective subsidiary. Tangpong et al. (2015: 647) provide a first stance at assessing
the impact of the timing of responses, finding that earlier divestments and geographic market exit
contribute to successful turnarounds (while early layoffs do not). However, the factors that
determine the timing of a response in the first place have been relatively neglected (Tangpong et
al., 2015: 673) but are especially important in international contexts where spatial and temporal
barriers play an important role. Several internal mechanisms are at play in order to synchronize
action to express a first response. Since the first response is likely to be the most impactful, it
warrants further examination. Thus, the resource orchestration framework can help shed light on
factors that may determine how resources are synchronized throughout the MNE network and
the impact this aspect of time-to-respond has on selected outcomes.
In sum, there are several advantages to assessing the phenomenon of subpar performance
at the subsidiary level through a resource orchestration lens. First, it allows for an overarching
theoretical perspective on how an MNE can address the challenge of turning around an ailing
foreign subsidiary. This encompasses an assessment of a variety of causes, a longer list of
responses than suggested in most retrenchment-focused studies, and a selection of different
outcomes. Second, it presents a way of thinking about connections between the MNE-
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headquarters’ level of analysis and the foreign subsidiary’s level of analysis. Since conventional
studies of turnaround have mostly focused on corporate-level or business-level decline and
turnarounds, a new theoretical lens that connects the two levels promises to offer valuable
insights. Third and perhaps most importantly, it offers a time-focused perspective on turnarounds
in foreign subsidiaries. As Trahms et al. (2013: 1299) note, “[a]lthough each action is important,
it is in synchronizing or orchestrating the leadership’s resources management actions that value
is added in positive firm outcomes.” Thus, it is not one type of resource (e.g. equity) or action
which is important but the combination and timing of resources. This alleviates a key concern
expressed towards the RBV (where the resource orchestration perspective has some of its roots),
such that tautology is reduced when there is a clear time differential between the determinants
(e.g. identified causes, deployed resources) and the outcomes (e.g. chosen responses,
recovery/exit) (Peng, 2001).
In sum, the resource orchestration lens is particularly suited to attempt the creation of a
unifying framework of responses to subpar performance, as many scholars have repeatedly
called for (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013, Sleesman et al., 2012). Such a
framework that applies to the context of an ailing subsidiary within an MNE network is
presented in Figure 3.2. Please note that in the interest of better readability, the framework in
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Figure 3.2. A Resource Orchestration Framework of Responding to Subpar Performance in Foreign Subsidiaries.
DIMENSION 1: IDENTIFYING
“whether/what”

DIMENSION 2: RESPONDING
“how effective”

No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses
decreases in commitment
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

(

Rate of

Environment-level factors
(e.g. population, GDP growth
geographic distance, cultural
distance)

Operational responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

MNE-level factors

Combination responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment

(e.g. poor profits, size of the
MNE network)

Subsidiary-level factors
(e.g. regional HQ/R&D role,
industry similarity, age, number
of employees, number of
expatriates)

Subsidiary-level
communication facilitating
mechanisms

influence

Recovery
Exit

moderates
GM replacement

enhance
Time to first response

DIMENSION 3: SYNCHRONIZING
“when”
Notes: The outcome of recovery versus exit is to be understood as “eventual recovery” and “eventual exit”, since responses can at first be followed by continued subpar
performance. Separate models with specific hypotheses for each dimension will be presented in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.2 contains only the connections between broad categories. In Chapter 4, each dimension
of the framework (“Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”) will be analyzed in depth
and three separate models for each dimension will be offered, each with an inherent set of
hypotheses.
Within this overarching resource orchestration framework, several other theoretical
concepts can be embedded to inform the hypotheses. These will be presented next.

3.2 The Attention-Based View
Within the resource orchestration framework presented in Figure 3.2, especially in the
“Identifying” dimension, lays the notion of attention. Attention is a key yet mostly implicit
construct underlying many studies on responses to subpar performance, particularly the ones in
the international business realm. Broadly defined as taking notice of something and acting upon
it (Oxford Dictionaries, N/A), attention can be understood as a resource that is scarce and critical
to organizational success (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008).
Although attention has been studied in many different ways, Ocasio (1997) was the first to
explicitly combine attention with strategy, leading to an attention-based view (ABV) of the firm
(for an extension, see Ocasio, 2011). Within this view, attention is understood to be a
multifaceted concept which can be defined “to encompass the noticing, encoding, interpreting,
and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers on both (a) issues; [i.e.]
problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the available repertoire of action
alternatives” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). The ABV is thus designed to provide an explanatory
framework for understanding whether and how firms respond to changing internal and external

61

contexts, as well as the contingencies that may underlie these occurrences. As such, the key
dependent variable within the ABV is that of organizational moves which Ocasio (1997: 201)
defines as “the myriad of actions undertaken by the firm and its decision-makers in response to
or in anticipation of change in its external and internal environment.” He differentiates the
organizational moves concept from that of decisions by emphasizing that moves imply that the
action is not only planned but also performed. The concept of organizational moves is thus very
similar to the concept of responses to subpar performance as it is used in this thesis. The
theoretical framework developed by Ocasio (1997: 192) is replicated in Figure 3.3.
The ABV is different from related theories within the cognition realm in that it “focuses
on the structural determinants that lead to strategic action” (Ocasio, 2011: 1292) and acts as a
meta-theory which provides a background for detailing mechanisms. Individual-level cognition
studies, in contrast, focus more on directly observing attention patterns as they unfold within a
specific person. As a result of this difference, the ABV can be expanded across different levels of
analysis, rather than being tied to the individual-level. Moreover, the ABV emphasizes less the
performance implications of an action and more the determinants that lead to the confronting of
an issue with an action or the ignoring of it through non-action (Ocasio, 1997: 194) in the first
place.
Very few studies within the organizational turnaround literature have made the concept of
attention explicit. One example is D’Aveni and MacMillan’s (1990) study of crises of demand
decline in a matched sample of 57 bankrupt firms and 57 turnaround firms. The results suggest
that those firms that did not survive the crisis practically ignored the external (output)
environment and focused their attention on the internal (input) environment, supporting the
threat-rigidity perspective (McKinley, 1993). Another example is Musteen, Liang, and Barker’s
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Figure 3.3. A Model of Predicting Organizational Moves through an Attention-based View
(Ocasio, 1997: 192; Recreated).

Issues and
Answers

Environment
of Decision

Procedural
and
Communication
Channels

Decision
Makers

Organizational
Moves

Attention
Structures

Note: The Figure was recreated to exclude references to specific hypotheses, for the purpose of better readability.

(2011) study using a sample of 110 MBA and Executive MBA students in a case-study setting.
The objective of that research was to explore the individual-level determinants of decisionmakers’ attention/perception of organizational decline severity and its impact on the extent of
retrenchment activity. More mature decision-makers with a background in throughput functions
(Accounting & Finance, Production, Production/ Operation), and an external locus of control
perceived the decline to be stronger, leading to more pronounced retrenchment decisions.
The interest in exploring the role attention plays in an MNE headquarters’ resource
allocation process has grown though (Campbell, 1989; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ambos &
Birkinshaw, 2010). Headquarter attention is a rare and valuable resource; a notion which
emphasizes the headquarters’ orchestration role (as opposed to its planning role). The objective
is to initiate action under certain contingencies (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). Most
headquarters-subsidiary studies drawing from the attention construct focused on a top-down
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process of attention structures and decision-making (what Ocasio (2011) calls attentional
perspective). However, combinations of top-down and bottom-up processes of attention (what
Ocasio (2011) terms attentional engagement) have also found consideration. For instance,
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) suggest that the weight (strategic or operational importance) and
the voice (initiatives) a subsidiary possesses within an MNE can influence the amount of
headquarter attention it receives.
We are aware of no studies which focus specifically on the role of attention in a
headquarter-subsidiary relationship when the foreign subsidiary’s performance is at subpar
levels. What the discussion of the literature has revealed so far is that the chances for a
successful turnaround increase when a response is offered. Responses require that topmanagement attention is allocated in a way that allows for the initiation of such a response in the
first place. The turnaround literature has recognized the implications of this relationship between
attention and response for situations of organizational decline. In the international business
context, the allocation of top-management attention is even more salient, where the “distinctive
features of MNEs are high levels of geographical and cultural diversity coupled with complex
portfolios of businesses, functions, and markets.” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 577). The
spatial, temporal, and cultural barriers put an even higher strain on the information processing
and attention allocation capabilities of the organization than in smaller and or purely domestic
firms. As a result, attention (and by implication, action) is often unevenly spread across
subsidiaries and may thus help explain differences between subpar performing subsidiaries with
regards to whether they experience a response from their headquarters and if so, which one.
Thus, a stronger focus on attention may be a useful extension of the existing studies on
headquarters-subsidiary relationships in situations of subpar performance.
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3.3 Inertia, Hysteresis, and Time Compression Diseconomies
While the attention-based view aims to predict organizational moves, it can also offer an
explanation for why firms do not respond to internal or external changes. The concept of inertial
forces has received most traction within the strategic management literature. Organizational
inertia theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) offers a dominant and detailed perspective in this
regard. Organizational inertia theory suggests that organizations frequently act in pursuit of
reliability and accountability which, however, are only attainable if the organization moves
toward a stable and reproducible structure. By standardizing patterns of activity, the organization
is able to exhibit a relatively consistent structure over time. Unfortunately, such an approach also
leads to more rigid structures, more complexity, less efficiency, and ultimately organizational
inertia, which manifests itself as an aversion to change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991).
Core capabilities (those that are not necessarily dynamic yet still relevant to the firm’s
competitive advantage) can exert some inertial forces. Ghemawat (2002: 69) notes that such core
capabilities are path dependent, subject to time lags, and embedded in organizations. This also
applies to dynamic capabilities, as Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1113) remark, particularly when
the environment is not characterized by very rapid change. In such a context, dynamic
capabilities resemble routines which “are complicated, predictable, analytic processes that rely
extensively on existing knowledge, linear execution and slow evolution over time. As managers
continue to gain experience with these routines, they groove the processes more deeply such that
they become easily sustained and even inertial.” This means that some companies experience
inertial forces which may affect the firm’s ability to sense changes in the environment and
translate this into appropriate responses. The outcome of a lack of dynamic capabilities is that the
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firm may continue to make competitive returns in the short run - but will fail to remain viable in
the longer run (Teece, 2007: 1342).
In the turnaround/organizational decline literature, a lack of managerial action has been
explained within the “threat-rigidity camp”. As Ketchen and Palmer (1999: 683) note, “poor
performers are expected to rely on previous actions to reverse their poor outcomes.” This
reaction was explained by the impact that threat (as signaled by poor performance) may have on
managerial decision-making: a behavior of retreat during which information processing,
centralization of control, and conservation of resources are most dominant (Staw, Sandelands &
Dutton, 1981). As a result, adaptation to the changes in the internal or external environment may
be inhibited - a notion McKinley (1993: 3) describes as “’necessity is the mother of rigidity’
school” which stands in contrast to the “’necessity is the mother of invention” school. The latter
draws from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1976) and describes how managers become
more risk-seeking in light of negative signals, which in the best scenario provides a catalyst for
adaptation and innovation (McKinley, 1993).
Related to these notions is the concept of hysteresis which generally describes a situation
in which the effect lags behind a change in the cause of the effect. In the (international) strategic
management literature, causes of hysteresis have been identified which include high switching
costs and uncertainty (e.g. Belderbos & Zou, 2009). For instance, if the signals from a foreign
subsidiary switch from being positive to being negative, a response may be delayed because of
partial irreversibility of the initial decision (e.g. related to equity investments) or uncertainty
about the appropriate path of action (e.g. commit more or less?). As a result, even though
capabilities to sense and seize may exist, the ability to act upon what has been sensed may be
delayed.
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While the hysteresis effect can impede a timely reconfiguration of resources that are in
need of transformation, the construct of time compression diseconomies (TCD) presents an
alternative perspective. First introduced by Dierickx and Cool (1989), TCDs suggest that ceteris
paribus, a faster pace of change leads to more adverse outcomes as the organization faces a
trade-off between time and costs (Jiang, Beamish & Makino, 2014: 116). For instance, as Celly
(2008) observes, Vermeulen & Barkema (2002) argue for the effect of TCDs on the relationship
between international expansion and performance: the faster the rate of internationalization, the
lower the positive effect on performance becomes. The diseconomy of this time compression
arises from costs associated with incomplete search, imperfect decision-making, and little
available time and attention devoted to the screening of, reaction to, and integration of
information regarding subsidiaries (Jiang et al., 2014: 115). Similarly, Jiang et al. (2014: 119)
use the concept of TCDs to connect RBV with the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977;
2009), showing that “speed of expansion has a direct and negative effect” on subsidiary survival,
while “[f]or subsidiary profitability, no main effect was found and the negative influence on
subsidiary performance was significant only when combined with timing of entry.” These
findings are relevant for this thesis in at least three ways. First, the concept of TCDs is closely
connected to the dynamic capabilities/resource orchestration perspective, since it introduces the
element of time to the notion that “[r]esource and capability development cannot be rushed”
(Jiang et al., 2014: 114). As such, the concept is closely related to what Tan and Mahoney (2005:
114) term dynamic adjustment costs, defined there as “the inability of a firm to adjust its
managerial resources to the desired level in a timely way to match adaptively to a change in the
market”. Second, TCDs appear to play an important role at the foreign subsidiary-level and,
although Jiang et al. (2014: 115) view them as “the limit to firm growth discussed by Penrose
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(1959)”, they may equally apply to other types of adjustments, such as de-internationalization.
Third, Jiang et al. (2014) show that the timeliness of actions may have different effects for
shorter-term outcomes (performance), compared to longer-term outcomes (survival) - a
differentiation that is important and also made in this thesis.
Taken together, the discussion around inertia, hysteresis, and TCDs suggests that a
balance needs to be struck between change that is too slow and too fast and/or often (Chung &
Beamish, 2010).

3.4 The Patterns and Outcomes of Organizational Change
Somewhat related to the constructs of hysteresis and time compression diseconomies is
that of organizational change per se. In the conceptual system of dynamic capabilities,
organizational change relates to managing threats and/or transforming which is expressed in its
micro-foundation pertaining to “[c]ontinuous alignment and realignment of specific tangible and
intangible assets” (Teece, 2007: 1340). In the broader organizational change literature, two
competing models have been proposed. First, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Romanelli and
Tushman (1994) introduced the conceptualization of change as the punctuation of equilibria. As
such, long periods of stability are interrupted by rather short periods of rapid change. The periods
of stability tend to be longer than those of change due to the aforementioned self-reinforcing
pressures towards reliability and reproducibility which can lead to inertia. In contrast, the
relatively shorter periods of rapid change allow for a combined effort (an orchestration of
resources) from many parts of the organization which can enable change to be implemented
more easily than if the change stretched out over longer periods of time.
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An alternative perspective on change processes stems from the evolutionary perspective,
in which business units are conceptualized as changing slowly over time (Miller & Friesen,
1984; Cyert & March, 1963), as each subunit goes about its related but relatively independent
operations. Over time, in incremental steps, and without a concerted effort, the corporation as a
whole becomes transformed.
When change is implemented, there can be short-term and long-term repercussions
arising from it. As Celly (2008: 46) remarks, “while some changes can ultimately be positive for
some individuals, change tends to be disturbing and disruptive for employees, at least until it has
fully normalized.” Fedor, Caldwell and Herold (2006: 21), for instance, observe in a sample of
32 organizations from a number of industries, that change (good or bad) entails adjustments that
need to be made by the workforce. This adjustment may take time and have an impact on the
level of commitment the employee offers to the organization. Specifically, their study revealed
that “Even “good” change is not always good for certain employees if they need to do most of
the adjusting. […] if the change was seen as being unfavorable for the work unit, changes in
organizational commitment were largely neutral to negative.” Therefore, while “good” change
may be beneficial to a subsidiary’s performance and the workforce’s satisfaction in the long-run,
the effects may be quite the opposite in the short-run.
Commitment in the sense it is mentioned above is an individual-level construct but it can
also occur at the organizational level. This is relevant to the concepts reviewed next.
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3.5 Organizational-Level Commitment to Foreign Subsidiaries
Although the construct of organizational commitment has typically been understood as an
employees’ commitment to an organization, this study uses the concept to mean commitment of
the headquartering organization to its subsidiaries. As such, it denotes an organizational-level
relationship which can be defined in terms of Morgan and Hunt’s (1994: 23) notion of
relationship commitment, with “an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with
another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it”. Lenses such as
commitment-trust theory (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), social exchange theory (Isidor, Schwens,
Hornung & Kabst, 2014; Das & Teng, 2002), or cyclical processes in inter-organizational
relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) view continued commitment as a necessary ingredient
for subsidiary longevity. In the dynamic capabilities perspective, Teece (2007: 1235) notes that
“commitment of (financial) resources to investment opportunities can lead to enterprise growth
and profitability.” and resource orchestration efforts encompass such resource commitments or
changes thereof.
However, not all perspectives in the literature agree that high and/or increasing
commitment is a beneficial approach. For instance, Ghemawat (1991: 15) describes
“commitment [as] the tendency of strategies to persist over time”. Depending on the context,
such persistence or non-response may be more promising than changes in the level of
commitment, since the continuation of a proven strategy over a longer period of time may reduce
the degree of strategic “flip-flops” (Ghemawat, 1991: 15) and enhance the stability and
predictability within the organization. Contrary to this view, several streams of the literature
warn about refraining from strategic responses. In the turnaround literature, Pearce and Robbins
(1993: 615) note that “that patience and perseverance by the firm are rarely sufficient to produce
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profitable performance for the firm”. In the escalation of commitment literature, Staw and Ross
(1989) and Staw (1997: 204) note that: “there is […] a very loose coupling between
organizational goals and action (March & Olsen, 1976). […] organizations are often slow to
respond. Thus, even when the need for change is recognized, it may not occur”. These two
perspectives are somewhat opposing because while the first recommends continuation of past
action paths, the second advises against it.
Similarly, there seems to be no consensus over which direction the commitment change
should take, if the decision towards a change is made. For instance, Lane and Beamish (1990:
99) cite an executive from their sample as stating “Commitment is probably the single most
critical factor for successful entry into foreign markets” and note that commitment is especially
important once hurdles such as subpar performance are encountered. This may hint at the notion
that commitment is especially vital in times of distress and an increase in commitment may be
beneficial.
This stands in contrast to the escalation of commitment literature (Staw, 1976; Sleesman,
et al., 2012) which suggests that persistence to a path of action is not only adhered to but indeed
commitment is raised to a higher level when performance is low. Since this may be due to
economically irrational behavior (as described in Chapter 2), such escalation of commitment
(Barton et al., 1989) is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Thus, within this lens, commitment is
seen more sceptically and as potentially dangerous.
While the escalation of commitment literature specifically focuses on the risk of investing
more into a losing venture, other streams emphasize downsizing as the most rational option (also
in comparison to persisting). One stream in which this is an important aspect is the real options
perspective. Kogut (1991) was the first to connect real options logic to foreign subsidiaries (joint
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ventures (JV) in particular) and argued that JVs represent initial investments with a subsequent
flexibility to contract, maintain, or expand the investment once more has been learned about the
venture’s development over time. Adner and Levinthal (2004) proposed a two-stage model in
which the initial investment is revised based on whether subsequently favorable or unfavorable
news were received. Following the logic, subpar performance would constitute unfavorable
news, causing the investor to withdraw the option and retract their investment if certain
conditions are met. Indeed, as noted before, real options logic can only be applied when strict
parameters are present. For instance, the logic is not applicable when a decision point could
result in a smorgasbord of different decisions. The failure of an option investment must be
clearly identifiable, in order to initiate timely abandonment. As Adner and Levinthal (2004: 77)
suggest, for instance, if the target market of a subsidiary is flexible, failure may be difficult to
determine, since “if a new product fails to win acceptance in a given target market, it may still be
successful in other possible target markets”. Thus, real options logic as a special case of pathdependent investments applies to rather specific decision situations.
Further, while some literatures make relatively straightforward recommendations and/or
predictions, there are indications of a more differentiated perspective. For instance, even though
most studies in the de-internationalization literature describe decreases in commitment, Benito
and Welch (1997) suggest that international divestments become more unlikely the longer the
subsidiary has been in existence. Similarly, a new stream of literature has recently emerged in
the behavioral decision-making domain, where Drummond (2014) suggests that premature
abandonment of a venture may also be detrimental, thereby tempering the warnings regarding
“abandoning too late” issues by most studies in the escalation of commitment study.
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In sum, the recommendations and predictions arising out of studies that focus on
organizational-level commitment have not been equivocal. Thus, the constructs and their relative
importance within a comprehensive perspective will be weighed carefully when developing the
hypotheses. In the following section, the arguments bought forward by this diversity of
theoretical lenses will be incorporated into the development of specific hypotheses. The resource
orchestration perspective will thereby be used as an overarching framework which allows for a
comprehensive consideration of the subpar performance phenomenon of foreign subsidiaries.
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Following the overarching resource orchestration framework developed in Chapter 3, the
sets of hypotheses in this chapter are organized around “Identifying”, “Responding”, and
“Synchronizing” processes when responding to subpar performance in foreign subsidiaries. Each
set of hypotheses is preceded by a more detailed excerpt of the resource orchestration framework
offered in Figure 3.2.

4.1 Hypotheses Regarding “Identifying”
When a foreign subsidiary is performing poorly for at least two years, action is usually
required to facilitate turnaround (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976). While some factors that
influence the choice of a response to poor performance level have been identified for corporatelevel or business-level turnarounds, much deeper understanding of the phenomenon is warranted.
On the one hand, the main focus within the turnaround literature has been on corporate-level and
business-level turnarounds. This focus has led to a relative neglecting of responses that go
beyond asset or cost retrenchment, exits, or strategic reorientations, as well as determinants that
encompass more than a domestic market. An international business perspective can add insights
regarding alternative responses in this regard. On the other hand, within the international
business perspective, predicting whether and how MNE headquarters respond to subpar
performing foreign subsidiary and what factors may determine the choice has been a relatively
neglected area of research. Perhaps the largest related stream of research is that of international
divestments (Benito, 2005; Berry, 2013), wherein determinants of divestitures are explored.
However, as Berry (2013) notes, not all divestitures necessarily result from poor subsidiary-level
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performance. Moreover, the option of not responding to subpar performance is vastly underresearched within both the turnaround literature and the international divestitures literature.
Nonetheless, there are some studies in the organizational turnaround literature that aimed
to predict the factors that may impact whether and how an organization responds to subpar
performance. For instance, Hofer (1980) noted that unfortunate positions in a declining industry
phase or in a market with little fit can (and, in all likelihood, should) lead to strategic actions.
When, however, slack is high and short-term performance improvement is the goal, a response
aimed at improving operations is likely going to be more beneficial (Hofer, 1980; Love &
Nohria, 2005). A few studies within the international business domain have also emphasized
determinants of responses, specifically international divestments. For example, Mata and
Portugal (2004) find that foreign firms that enter a market with an acquisition, new firms with a
larger human capital endowment, joint ventures, and minority holdings are more likely to be
divested. Benito (2005) notes that overdiversification can also predict divestments. These studies
have in common that subpar performance at the subsidiary-level is but another predictor of a
response (divestment), while it is the key contextual variable in this thesis. Thus, all subsidiaries
in the study are already performing poorly, causing subsequent responses likely to have been
made in reaction to the undesirable situation.
Consequently, the first set of hypotheses aims to fill this gap by addressing the first
research question raised in Chapter 1: When a foreign subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar
performance, what determines which specific type of response is chosen (if any at all)? An
attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997, 2011) is employed since it provides a framework designed
to predict the occurrence and type of an organizational move (a concept very similar to that of
responses) given specific contingencies. The framework also offers a useful perspective on
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headquarter-subsidiary relationships (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ambos & Birkinshaw,
2010). An emphasis was laid on examining those factors which may prevent or facilitate a
response in the first place, before examining how each type of response is influenced by
idiosyncratic sets of determinants.

4.1.1 Hypotheses 1a-1c (No Response)
The causes for a non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary can be
manifold and span all levels of analysis. In this part of the analysis, we assume an ABV
perspective and suggest that geographic distance, MNE-level poor performance, and the number
of expatriates at the ailing subsidiary are factors that may influence whether a response is
administered. The choice of these variables is based on their representativeness regarding
influences at different levels of analysis (following the notion that subpar performance can span
multiple levels of analysis) and their importance in the extant literature. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
hypothesized relationships.
The ABV suggests that the meta-concept of attention can help explain why some firms
would respond to issues while others do not. Attention, while ultimately an individual-level
process, is “situated in the context of the firm’s activities and procedures, and these situational
contexts, and the decision-makers, issues, and answers they are linked to, are distributed
throughout the firm (March & Olsen, 1976).” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). This dispersion of attention
structures can manifest in differences with respect to how much attention is allocated to each unit
across spatial, temporal, and procedural dimensions (see Mechanism 3 in Ocasio, 1997). In
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MNEs, these dimensions are especially salient, since the headquarters must allocate its attention
across different country borders, time zones, language barriers, and cultural differences.
Figure 4.1. Model With Hypotheses For Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 1 - Predicting No
Response.
Environment-level factors
H1a (+)
GDP growth
Geographic distance

H1b (+)

MNE-level factors
H1c (-)
Poor performance
Subsidiary-level factors
Regional headquarters
R&D role
Joint venture/WOS
Subsidiary age
Number of employees
Number of expatriates

No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Operational responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Combination responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment

Note: The underlined variables are the ones in focus for the respective set of hypotheses.

An important factor that may thus affect whether or not a subsidiary will experience a
response to its subpar performance is its geographic distance to the headquarters. A foreign
subsidiary that is further away from its headquarters is likely going to be less connected to the
processes and key decision-makers at the headquarters (Helliwell, 2002). Greater geographic
distance can also come with greater travel time and higher travel costs, which in turn may affect
the number of visits executives pay to the foreign subsidiary (Boeh & Beamish, 2012). Similarly,
Dunning (1998) suggests that geographic distance can incur spatial transaction costs which can
result from the friction of coordinating a dispersed network of subsidiaries, managing country
differences, or alleviating information asymmetries. Geographic distance may also result in
language barriers that can lead to misunderstandings, conflict, and parallel communication
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channels (Harzing & Pudelko, 2014). All these challenges can raise temporal transaction costs,
since greater geographic distance can result in delays due to longer travel times, translations, and
time zone differentials.
Taken together, greater geographic distance can make it more likely that an MNE is
paying less attention to the distant foreign subsidiary. Moreover, even if the headquarters does
receive signals about the subsidiary’s subpar performance, it may be more difficult to process
this information and interpret it accordingly when geographic distance is greater. For instance,
the causes for subpar performance in a geographically proximate subsidiary may be more
intuitively understood than the causes for subpar performance in a geographically distant
subsidiary, where many headquarter-based heuristics may not be applicable.
Moreover, insights from the literature on networks suggest that a diverse network may
increase the degree of novelty of information received through the network. However, this
diversity may come with an overall reduction in information flow. Thus, if an MNE has built a
widespread network of foreign subsidiaries, it may be able to obtain novel information from such
far-flung subsidiaries (e.g. about local preferences and innovations). The trade-off in this setting
is, however, that the headquarters may receive less information from those foreign subsidiaries,
increasing the risk of a non-response when subpar performance occurs. In sum, the following
hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 1a: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to
occur with higher geographic distance between the headquarters and that foreign subsidiary.
A similar attention-based argument can be made for the situation in which the loss
situation is not restricted to the foreign subsidiary but concerns the MNE as a whole. It is
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possible that the foreign subsidiary is ailing precisely as a result of the corporate-level or
business-level decline. In a situation of decline for the entire organization, attention may be
focused on salvaging the domestic market first, before rescuing a particular foreign subsidiary.
The problem in the headquarters’ own backyard needs to be resolved before it can direct its
attention elsewhere. Further, even if the headquarters did note the subpar performance situation
at the foreign subsidiary, it may not be able to prioritize resources to be allocated to the foreign
location. Such resources include top management time, leading to a higher level of inertia
regarding the headquarters’-subsidiary relationship. In sum, the following hypothesis is
proposed:
Hypothesis 1b: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to
occur when the MNE as a whole is experiencing profit losses.
During situations with high levels of uncertainty, such as subpar performance, an MNE
headquarters has several options through which it can exercise control, channel support, and
receive information in order to enhance its ability to pay attention to a subsidiary-level situation.
One such way is the practice of temporarily deploying parent-country nationals as expatriates to
those foreign locations for purposes of knowledge transfer, organizational development, or
coordination and control (Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Takeuchi, Shay, & Li, 2008). Japanese
MNEs regularly deploy expatriates to their foreign locations for these purposes (Gong, 2003;
Peterson, Napier & Shim, 1996). Expatriates can thereby play a two-directional role: first, they
can direct subsidiary-level attention to measures required by the headquarters. Choi and Beamish
(2004) also note that control mechanisms act as a conduit for firm-specific advantages and
expatriates could be such a control mechanism. Second, they can report back to the headquarters
regarding the subsidiary-level situation. Thus, expatriates can play an active role in directing
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headquarter attention channels - with the result that a higher number of expatriates at a subpar
performing subsidiary is expected to decrease the probability of not receiving a headquarter
response.
Moreover, Riaz, Rowe, and Beamish (2014) note the importance of expatriate
deployment levels with regards to future growth. They find that a higher number of expatriates at
the foreign subsidiary’s foundation and a slower decrease of this number over time lead to
improved growth prospects. Riaz et al. (2014) suggest that expatriates can facilitate knowledge
transfer, coordination and control. If their number is higher at founding, path dependency unfolds
a positive effect, whereby subsequent capabilities development and growth is enabled. The
second part of their argument suggests that when the decrease in the number of expatriates is
slower in a subsidiary than in its counterparts, it incurs lower dynamic adjustments costs. These
costs arise when new members replace the function of the expatriate and the organization needs
to adjust to incorporate these individuals. During times of subpar performance, both a higher
number of expatriates at foundation and over time may thus allow for more efficient
communication and coordination. As a result, the following hypothesis is provided:
Hypothesis 1c: A non-response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to
occur when there are a fewer expatriates in the subsidiary.

4.1.2 Hypotheses 2a-2c (Increases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment)
If a subsidiary does receive a response, the type of response may be affected by different
predictors. In this section, the predictors of increases in commitment are assessed (see Figure
4.2), based on an argument of environmental fit.
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Figure 4.2. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 2 - Predicting Increases
in Commitment.
Environment-level factors
GDP growth
Geographic distance

H2a (+)
H2b (+)

MNE-level factors
Poor performance

H2c (+)

Subsidiary-level factors
Regional headquarters
R&D role
Joint venture/WOS
Subsidiary age
Number of employees
Number of expatriates

No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Operational responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Combination responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment

When the foreign subsidiary is performing poorly while the overall market is growing, an
indication of misalignment of fit with the external environment may be present. Various ways
exist to effectuate realignment through increased strategic commitment. In this thesis, these
include enhancing control through switching to a higher equity ownership mode, and deploying
more expatriates. Within an MNE, strong reasons are likely to be necessary to justify a strategic
response associated with a considerable amount of investment. Such a justification could be the
market potential at the foreign subsidiary’s host country location. Berry (2013) identified market
growth as a key factor that deterred MNEs from divesting their relatedly diversified subsidiaries.
Here, this argument is extended to the effect that increases in strategic commitment is
hypothesized to be the response that MNE headquarters choose in light of an ailing subsidiary in
a promising market. This leads to the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2a: An increase in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates.
The arguments for an increase in operational commitment to the subpar performing
subsidiary are similar to those for an increase in strategic commitment. Operational measures
such as increasing the workforce or investing in equity without effecting a mode change can
enhance the fit with the environment, e.g. by increasing customer-orientation through a larger
sales team. However, the probability of an increase in operational commitment is expected to be
stronger than the probability of an increase in strategic commitment. The risk associated with
investing more resources into an ailing subsidiary in a promising host country is smaller for the
operational commitment and thus more probable. The resulting hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2b: An increase in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates.
Finally, when GDP growth rates are particularly high, the abovementioned arguments are
expected to converge to a combination of increases in commitment through both strategic and
operational measures. Thus, the following hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 2c: An increase in both strategic and operational commitment is more likely to occur
when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth
rates.
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4.1.3 Hypotheses 3a-3f (Decreases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment)
Much of the organizational decline and turnaround literature has emphasized the
importance of retrenching, following a “necessity is the mother of rigidity” school (McKinley,
1993). In this set of hypotheses, the conventional efficiency arguments are investigated along
with IB-context specific aspects. Figure 4.3 illustrates the set of hypotheses.
In the context of MNE headquarters attention, the strategic role of the subsidiary plays an
important part in the decision to respond to subpar performance. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008:
577) suggest that subsidiaries with sufficient “weight”, i.e. central “structural positions that
subsidiary units occupy within a corporate system” receive more headquarter attention. For
instance, if the ailing foreign subsidiary serves as a regional headquarters, it has an important
strategic role that connects it to other subsidiaries in the region. Lasserre (1996: 31) lists five key
tasks performed by the regional headquarters. They 1) scout the region for opportunities, 2) offer
Figure 4.3. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 3 - Predicting
Decreases in Commitment.
Environment-level factors

No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses

GDP growth
Geographic distance

increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

MNE-level factors
H3a/c (-)

Poor performance
Subsidiary-level factors

H3b/d(-)
Regional headquarters
R&D role
Joint venture/WOS
Subsidiary age
Number of employees
Number of expatriates

Operational responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Combination responses

H3e (+)
H3f(+)

increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment
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strategic guidance to units in the region, 3) demonstrate internal and external commitment to the
region, 4) coordinate the units in the region and create synergies, and 5) pool resources across
units in the region. Due to this “switchboard” function, the regional headquarters is thus very
important as an information and attention channel for the headquarters - it has “weight”. A
similar argument is made by Alfondi, Clegg, and McGaughey (2012) who identify 10 functions
of regional headquarters4. They also note that in some countries, a full regional headquarters may
not be feasible. MNE headquarters then assign a regional management mandate, which includes
many of the functions of a regional headquarters but at a lower level of investment. As such,
both regional headquarters and subsidiaries with a regional management mandate fulfill
important roles. In comparison, the regional management mandate may be a more cost-efficient
approach in smaller markets than regional headquarters but regional headquarters are the most
effective way for an MNE headquarters to signal attention and commitment to a specific region.
Thus, a divestment of a regional headquarter would not only indicate a retreat from that
particular investment but from the region as a whole.
Moreover, Nell, Ambos, and Schlegelmilch (2011) discuss the concept of overlaps in the
networks of MNE headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries (“embeddedness overlaps”). If a
subsidiary has an important role in the MNE’s network that links it to many other subsidiaries, it
possesses a certain degree of power which demands headquarter attention. By creating
embeddedness overlaps, a MNE can tap into the information flows that are connected to that
subsidiary, thereby acting to overcome the diversity-bandwidth trade-off described by Aral &
Van Alstyne (2011).
4

1) Strategic leadership, planning, and direction, 2) resource development, acquisition, and deployment, 3) seeking
and exploiting new opportunities, 4) driving organisational adaptation, 5) attention and signalling, 6) monitoring,
control, and governance, 7) resource and knowledge management, 8) representation and mediation, 9) coordination
and harmonisation, 10) integration and facilitation of inter-unit linkages.
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Thus, if such a powerful regional headquarter subsidiary is performing poorly, it is
expected to be highly unlikely that it will experience any decrease in strategic or operational
commitment. Instead, if a decrease in strategic and/or operational commitment occurs, it is
expected to materialize only for those subsidiaries that do not fulfill a regional headquarters role.
The following hypotheses results:
Hypothesis 3a: A decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters.
Hypothesis 3b: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters.
A similar argument as for regional headquarters can be made for subsidiaries which
fulfill another specific purpose in the MNE network. As Feinberg and Gupta (2004) note, foreign
subsidiaries being assigned a research and development (R&D) role have become an increasingly
common phenomenon. Extant literature has noted the importance of subsidiaries with an R&D
role with regards to the generation of learning within the MNE and the transfer of this new
knowledge from the host country to the home country. As a result, such subsidiaries with an
R&D function gain “weight” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) within the MNE network. Over
time, a subsidiary which has been assigned an R&D role may thus evolve from a “starter” role
(establishing a newly started laboratory) to an “innovator” (enhancing capabilities within the
laboratory) to a “contributor” role (diffusing knowledge within the MNE network) (Asakawa,
2001). Moreover, research projects within MNEs often represent important and capital-intensive
investments into future product lines or process improvements within the organization. The time
horizon of performance expectations may thus be significantly longer than it would be for
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foreign subsidiaries with other purposes. With such an important node position within the
MNE’s network, it is thus unlikely for subsidiaries fulfilling an R&D function to be divested, be
it strategically or operationally. Thus, similar to regional headquarter subsidiaries, we propose
the following:
Hypothesis 3c: A decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose.
Hypothesis 3d: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose.
Decreases in operational commitment such as downsizing and retrenchment have
arguably been the most dominant types of responses in the turnaround literature (Robbins &
Pearce, 1992; Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce & Robbins, 1993, 1994). While there has been some
criticism regarding the efficacy of retrenchment actions (Barker & Mone, 1994), much evidence
seems to suggest that most firms retreat to downsizing by way of reducing slack when
performance is poor. For instance, Love and Nohria (2005) find that downsizing by way of
reducing slack is most beneficial when slack is high. While most studies in this regard have
aimed to investigate the question of whether downsizing is an appropriate measure for the
facilitation of turnaround, much fewer have empirically explored the factors that may determine
whether downsizing is chosen as the response. Within the context of an MNE, two factors stand
out as having explanatory potential in this regard: subsidiary age and size. Both age and size can
come with path dependencies that build up slack over time. Building up slack can be a conscious
decision, considering that it has been shown to contribute to firm performance and especially
innovation, at least within certain ranges (for a review, see Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner,
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2004). However, during poor performance, slack exerts a counterproductive effect, representing
bound resources that are not used for the achievement of a turnaround until they are capitalized
through downsizing.
These arguments fit into the “necessity is the mother of rigidity” (McKinley, 1993)
stream of the organizational turnaround literature. Its main tenet is that turnaround can be
achieved by cutting costly innovations and pursuing a strategy of risk avoidance by cutting costs
and focusing only on the core of the business (McKinley et al., 2014). Following Love and
Nohria (2005), it can be expected that firms choose to downsize by way of reducing slack only
when slack is already high. This is likely to be the case in 1) older and 2) larger subsidiaries
which are likely to have accumulated excess resources over time.
Moreover, age and size also affect the degree of attention the headquarters allocates
towards the ailing subsidiary. If a subsidiary is older and larger, it is more likely that the
executives at the MNE-level will have had contact with executives from that subsidiary. Thus, it
is likely that larger and older subsidiaries will indeed experience a response to its subpar
performance situation. Consequently, the following two hypotheses are developed:
Hypothesis 3e: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is older.
Hypothesis 3f: A decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is larger (in terms of the number of employees).
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4.1.4 Hypothesis 4 (Combination Response)
Hofer (1980) pointed out the advantages of using responses to subpar performance that
point in a clear direction. Combination responses that contain both strategic and operational
increases and decreases in commitment can bring about heightened managerial complexity and
confusion among employees. What may nonetheless affect the decision in favor of a combination
response is depicted in Figure 4.4.
The degree of complexity of attention and control structures within MNEs versus purely
domestic firms becomes apparent when considering that subsidiaries may be managed by more
than just one parent firm from more than one country (i.e. in the case of an international joint
venture). A stream of literature within the international business domain has
Figure 4.4. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 1: “Identifying”: Part 4 - Predicting
Combination Responses.
Environment-level factors

No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses

GDP growth
Geographic distance

increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

MNE-level factors

Operational responses

Poor performance

increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

Subsidiary-level factors
Regional headquarters
R&D role
Joint venture/WOS
Subsidiary age
Number of employees
Number of expatriates

Combination responses

H4 (-)

increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment
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explored the effect that the number of parent firms in a subsidiary may have on outcomes.
Regarding performance, for instance, the perspectives on how the number of parent firms matters
have diverged. Beamish and Kachra (2004) juxtapose the TCE perspective (more parent firms
lead to higher transaction costs and thus lower performance) with the RBV perspective (more
parent firms lead to more diverse complementary resources and thus higher performance) and
find that the number of parent firms is not significantly associated with performance. However,
there appears to be consensus that having more than one parent firm in a foreign subsidiary does
increase managerial complexity, especially when the parent firms originate from different home
country locations. This in turn may affect how attention is allocated and whether the subpar
performing subsidiary experiences a response.
Managerial complexity in a strategic alliance stems from multiple sources. Yan and Zeng
(1999) offer a list of factors that add complexity (and potentially lead to instability) which
includes disagreements regarding co-management, conflicts due to cross-cultural differences,
issues related to control and ownership structures, clashes resulting from idiosyncratic
characteristics of parents, and the navigation of external environments. Subsidiaries that are
owned by more than just one parent firm are thus required to manage a higher degree of
complexity and ambiguity.
This notion becomes especially salient when the subsidiary is performing poorly. In such
a situation, many firms “will blame their local partner [or, more generally,] almost anyone or
anything except themselves” (Lane & Beamish, 1990: 100). Naturally, this reaction is likely to
lead to conflict among the parent firms of the subpar performing subsidiary. Even if the parent
firms genuinely try to search for the true cause, it may be very difficult to identify a causal
mechanism of subpar performance and this ambiguity may result in disagreements about the best
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way to move forward. These disagreements are not necessarily detrimental - however, they are
likely going to lead to more cases in which a subsidiary may experience a more diverse (perhaps
even uncoordinated) response. For instance, the local partner may wish to increase the number of
employees (operational increase) while the foreign partner may wish to decrease their equity
position to a portfolio mode (strategic decrease). Thus, since different entities may initiate
different responses which are at risk of not being well coordinated, combination responses are
hypothesized to occur more often in joint ventures than in WOS:
Hypothesis 4: A combination response is more likely to occur when the subpar performing
subsidiary is a joint venture.
This concludes the hypothesis development section for the “identifying” dimension of the
resource orchestration framework. The next set of hypotheses will be developed around the
“responding” dimension.

4.2 Hypotheses Regarding “Responding”
This subsection assesses the second part (“Responding”) of the overarching resource
orchestration framework (“Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”). In particular, the
effects of chosen responses on outcome variables (recovery, exit, and continued subpar
performance) are explored.
This notion of the efficacy of responding is an important area of research at the
intersection of the organizational turnaround literature (Trahms et al., 2013) and international
divestiture literature (Benito & Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005). On the one hand, the turnaround
literature has mainly focused on responses to poor performance at the corporate-level or
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business-level within domestic markets, thereby neglecting scenarios in which MNE
headquarters are called upon to respond to their poorly performing subsidiaries in foreign
locations. The number and types of responses available in such a situation can be quite different
from the number and types of responses available at the corporate-level or business-level of
analysis in a domestic context. For instance, the adjustment of control (e.g. via expatriates or
equity) are not commonly available in the latter scenario. Moreover, many studies in this stream
of literature focused on samples of firms that successfully performed a turnaround (McKinley et
al., 2014), leading to a limited picture of the efficacy of responses to subpar performance.
On the other hand, the international divestiture literature has mostly been concerned with
divestitures as the dependent variable, rather than as an independent variable like in the
organizational turnaround literature. This leads to a slight shift in focus, whereby divestitures are
found to occur in response to subpar performance - but also in response to other aspects such as
corporate-level or business-level strategic reorientation (Berry, 2013; Benito, 2005). The
appropriate response to subpar performance at the subsidiary-level as the defining criterion of the
context has thus been underexplored.
The investigation of the efficacy of each response (i.e. the response being the
independent variable) is thus important to investigate in terms of the chances for recovery versus
the risk of exit. Thus, this study explores the following research question: Which type of response
(if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects?
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4.2.1 Hypotheses 5a-5b (No Response versus Any Response)
There appears to be consensus in the literature that a subpar performance sequence that
lasts for more than two years requires an active response in order to facilitate turnaround. What
this means with regards to the rate of recovery versus exit (as opposed to the mere likelihood of
each outcome), has remained underexplored. Figure 4.5 illustrates the proposed relationships.
Drawing from the resource orchestration framework (especially its roots in the dynamic
capabilities perspective), a response to subpar performance can be the result of an efficient
process of sensing, seizing, and subsequently managing threats and/or transforming. The
Figure 4.5. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 2: “Responding”: Part 1 - Predicting the
Efficacy of No Response versus Any Response.
No response
increases in commitment
Strategic responses
decreases in commitment
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
Operational responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment

Rate of
H5a(-)

Recovery
Exit

H5b(-)

Combination responses
increases in commitment
decreases in commitment
mixed change in commitment

assumption made in this study is that subsidiaries that exhibit subpar performance for at least two
years in a row experience a structurally embedded situation that requires a response in order to
be overcome. As Schendel and Patton (1976: 240) note, initiating such a response may not come
easy, since strong inertial forces may be at work. However, “turnaround usually requires
substantial changes in the business”.
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There are many conditions that may cause subsidiary-level subpar performance to remain
unanswered. Ghemawat (1991) argues that the causes for refraining from any strategic response
to a new situation may be related to lock-in, lock-out, lags, and inertia. Lock-in and lock-out are
reflections of adverse path-dependency, where either leaving a particular path of action or
embarking on a particular path of action is more costly than persisting with the current strategic
path. Lags are based on the logic of hysteresis and time compression diseconomies, whereby
accelerated responses to negative performance signals can be very unlikely and/or costly (this
aspect will be explored in more depth in Chapter 7 (“synchronizing”)). Moreover, if a nonresponse to subpar performance signals is due to organizational inertia (which can be caused by a
structurally and psychologically embedded resistance to change), the effectiveness of sensing,
seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming may also be dampened. As a result, no (or a
significantly delayed) response occurs in reaction to the subpar performance situation.
Moreover, the occurrence of a response may be related to the concept of dynamic
capabilities itself. The basic notion of dynamic capabilities is that they are a contributing factor
to the firm’s competitive advantage. As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1111) note, the benefits of
dynamic capabilities come from them being “valuable, somewhat rare, equifinal, substitutable,
and fungible5”. One source that leads to these benefits and ultimately the desired superior
competitive positioning is the notion that dynamic capabilities such as resource orchestration are
difficult and time-consuming to develop. Moreover, “[s]ometimes even the managers themselves
do not know why their dynamic capabilities are successful.” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1114),
suggesting a certain degree of causal ambiguity inherent in the process. This causes the

5

Fungible refers to mutually interchangeable subjects that are identical (e.g. cash for cash), while substitutable
subjects are subjects that can act in place of each other (e.g. cash for purchased good).
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capability to be less imitable by competitors and therefore in turn allows for a superior
competitive positioning.
On the flipside, the implication from this is also that not all companies possess such
superior dynamic capabilities. This would become especially apparent in the international
context, where sensing, seizing, and managing threats and/or transforming is especially made
more difficult by geographic and cultural distance between the headquarters and the foreign
subsidiaries. If an MNE is able to respond to a subpar performance situation at the subsidiary
level rather quickly and decidedly, this may indicate the existence of a dynamic resource
orchestration capability. On the other hand, if a response is non-apparent or considerably
delayed, there may be processes, structures, and other factors hindering the MNE from
responding effectively.
Thus, if subpar performance is likely to be structurally embedded and a response hints at
a dynamic capability which would constitute a competitive advantage, a response (as opposed to
no response) may be necessary to help the subsidiary turn around. The occurrence of a response
in general can have a different impact in the short-term and the longer-term. In the short-term, a
response may bring about a certain degree of disruption, as described in Chapter 3: even change
that is known to be ultimately beneficial to the business unit may cause demotivation, confusion,
and dissatisfaction in the short-run, causing performance (subjective and/or objective) to remain
negative for a longer period of time. Moreover, as Chung and Beamish (2010: 1000) note,
“Time, attention, and energy spent on renegotiating [international equity joint venture (IEJV)]
agreements divert partners from tasks that generate revenue and from activities that help the
IEJV deal with competition (Inkpen and Beamish 1997, Yan 1998).” This is also in line with Tan
and Mahoney’s (2005: 114) observation of dynamic adjustment costs, which arise when

94

responses to changes in the internal or external environment of the foreign subsidiary disrupt its
ongoing operations. Thus, in the shorter run, a response may cause a delay in the recovery rate at
the subsidiary level, compared to not responding at all (which may indicate the impact of
contextual volatilities).
In the longer run however, a response is likely going to lead to improvements in the
efficacy of the subsidiary’s strategic orientation and/or efficiency in the subsidiary’s operations.
This implies that this improvement in fit caused by a response (or responses) should generally
lead to better survival prospects in the longer run. Moreover, the fact that a response is enacted
implies that the subsidiary is considered worth saving (Hofer, 1980) which can lead to higher
levels of motivation after the initial disruptive phase. Finally, the notion that the subsidiary has
experienced a response may hint at the existence of dynamic resource orchestration capabilities
(“Responding”) in the subsidiary, which will likely continue to be beneficial when applied
sensibly to any future threats and opportunities as well. Thus, the subsidiary’s longer-term
survival prospects are likely going to be improved when a response is triggered, compared to not
responding at all.
Thus, responding at all, though perhaps somewhat disruptive in the shorter term, may
lead to improved survival prospects in the longer run. We thus propose that a response is
generally preferable to not responding:
Hypothesis 5a: Compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar
performance increases recovery prospects.
Hypothesis 5b: Compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar
performance increases survival prospects.
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4.2.2 Hypotheses 6a-6d (No Response versus Specific Types of Responses)
Once it has been established that any response is better than no response, the next step is
to unravel the aggregated response variable and assess the impact of each of the responses to
subpar performance on recovery and exit. We categorize responses based on two dimensions: 1)
strategic versus operational and 2) increase versus decrease in commitment. Figure 4.6
summarizes how the two dimensions are proposed to interact, as will be described in more detail
below. Rather than a similar figure as the preceding ones, except with many more lines since
each hypothesis in the set should be represented, Figure 4.6 depicts the set of hypotheses in a
more readable 2x2 matrix.
Table 4.6. Model with Hypotheses for Dimension 2: “Responding”: Part 2 - Predicting the
Efficacy of Specific Types of Responses.

Strategic
response

Operational
response

Increase in
commitment
worsens rate of
recovery
improves survival
prospects
improves rate of
recovery
improves survival
prospects

Decrease in
commitment
worsens rate of
recovery
worsens survival
prospects
worsens rate of
recovery
worsens survival
prospects

First, as early turnaround scholars note (Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 1976;
Hofer, 1980), firms can respond in a number of ways to subpar performance but the main
differentiating criterion is whether the response is of a strategic or operational nature. While
most scholars in the turnaround literature have followed these terms, other (very similar) ways to
describe them exist as well. For instance, invention and rigidity (McKinley et al., 2014; Whetten,
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1980) are related constructs in that the first addresses the initiatives of efficacy, while the latter
addresses initiatives of efficiency.
Although the differentiation between these two broad categories of responses can at times
be blurry, the main aspect is that strategic responses are geared less towards short-term
performance improvements and more towards longer term improvements of market positioning
from which enhanced performance follows. Examples include the reorganization of control
structures, investing in long-term innovation, and changing the market positioning, among
others. Operational responses on the other hand are the opposite in the sense that they are aimed
at bettering short-term performance. Examples include reducing the size of the workforce,
eliminating any inefficiency in products, materials, equipment, and services, and streamlining
operational processes, among others. Hence, the long-term perspective on performance is less of
a consideration (Hofer, 1980: 20). Combinations of strategic and operational responses can also
occur.
Strategic and operational responses may have different degrees of impact on recovery and
survival prospects. Since strategic responses are mostly geared towards improving long-term
survival of the subsidiary through focusing on efficacy, their impact may be most visible in a
lower rate of exit compared to operational responses. In the shorter run, strategic responses may
come with higher managerial complexities, related to the formulation of the strategy itself, the
adjustment of organizational structures and budgets, the modification of positions, and more.
Operational responses on the other hand are mostly geared towards improving shorter-term
performance of the subsidiary through focusing on efficiency. Thus, their impact is likely going
to be more visible in a better rate of recovery compared to strategic responses. In the longer run,
efficiency improvements may not be sufficient to optimize the subsidiary’s survival prospects.
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Indeed, as Hofer (1980) notes, most corporations utilize an operational response, even though
sometimes strategic responses would have helped them to remain in business in the longer run.
Whether or not retrenchment action is actually an effective response to subpar performance (and
not also a cause for further decline) has been a topic of debate (Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce &
Robbins, 1994; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013).
Second, apart from assessing the impact of the occurrence of a strategic or operational
response, the direction of the response may also have an important impact on a subsidiary’s
recovery and survival rates. In particular, the direction of response is understood here as either an
increase or a decrease in investment. As such, this distinction is salient at the subsidiary-level of
subpar performance because the direction of response can carry information about the MNEsubsidiary relationship and the degree of commitment the MNE’s headquarters is willing to
invest. A fitting definition of such a relational commitment is offered by Hebert (1994) who
defines commitment in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship as the degree to which a parent
feels bound to the stability and success of the JV. This concept of relational commitment is
comparably less salient when addressing subpar performance at the corporate-level or businesslevel (which was the level of analysis in most turnaround studies), leading to a situation in which
the different types of relational commitment have been understudied.
Moreover, much of the turnaround literature has emphasized the importance of
downsizing and retrenching in times of subpar performance (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; 1994).
Despite some criticisms of this heavy emphasis on retrenchment (Barker & Mone, 1994), it is
still seen as the foundation of turnaround (Pearce & Robbins, 1994, Trahms et al, 2013).
Generally, retrenchment is differentiated into cost retrenchment (e.g. laying off employees) and
asset retrenchment (e.g. jettisoning an inefficient business unit). However, such an approach of
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“tightening the belt” may have an additional layer in the context of the MNE-subsidiary
relationship. The efficiency gains arising from retrenchment may at least partially be offset by
the disruptive effects associated with perceived decrease in commitment from the MNE
headquarters. This may be an important difference that can have an effect on the impact of
retrenchment in the shorter run: instead of a “we’re all in this together” approach when the entire
corporation is declining, employees in a foreign subsidiary that experiences a decrease in
headquarter commitment when performance is subpar may experience a notion of “we’ve been
abandoned”. Thus, the short-term effect of retrenchment in the foreign subsidiary may be not
only a lower number of employees and tighter budgets but also disappointment, low morale, and
a wave of additional talented employees leaving the subsidiary.
When the MNE headquarters increases its investments to the foreign subsidiary during
subpar performance, however, a strong signal is sent that it is committed to the foreign
subsidiary. While this way of responding may still be somewhat disruptive in the shorter term, it
is likely going to infuse the ailing subsidiary with new prospects and morale, and prevent a
higher degree of “brain drain” from the subsidiary. Moreover, if increased commitment is
expressed by deploying more expatriates to the foreign subsidiary, they can become a conduit for
firm-specific advantages (Choi & Beamish, 2004), leading to a strengthening of the subsidiary’s
resource and capability base. Thus, while retrenchment may be a very valuable approach in
corporate-level or business-level turnarounds, the additional layer of an MNE’s relational
commitment to a foreign subsidiary may cause increases in investment to be more effective at
subsidiary-level turnarounds. The following hypotheses are offered:
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Hypothesis 6a: Compared to not responding, increases in commitment affect the rate of recovery
such that strategic increases worsen the rate of recovery while operational increases improve
the rate of recovery.
Hypothesis 6b: Compared to not responding, decreases in commitment affect the rate of recovery
such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of recovery, however
strategic decreases more so than operational decreases.
Hypothesis 6c: Compared to not responding, increases in commitment improve survival
prospects, such that both strategic and operational increases in commitment improve survival
prospects, however strategic increases more so than operational increases.
Hypothesis 6d: Compared to not responding, decreases in commitment affect the rate of recovery
such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of recovery, however
strategic decreases more so than operational decreases.

This concludes the section on the “responding” dimension of the resource orchestration
framework. Next, hypotheses will be developed regarding the “synchronizing” dimension of the
framework.

4.3 Hypotheses Regarding “Synchronizing”
The concept of time has always played an important role in organizational
decline/turnaround studies, as process models such as by Pearce and Robbins (1993) and Weitzel
and Jonsson (1989) suggest. However, rarely was the time concept modelled explicitly. One
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exception is Tangpong et al. (2015: 669) who examined the earliness versus lateness of
retrenchment responses (layoffs, divestments, geographic market exit). They found that “Early
Retrenchment is positively related to Turnaround Success (p<0.05), but Late Retrenchment is
negatively related to it (p<0.05)”. Two sets of analyses can be built on this study. First,
Tangpong et al. (2015) examine the efficacy of the timing of responses but do not investigate the
determinants of the time-to-response. They do, however, explicitly call for a deeper examination
of such issues (p. 673). We will address this call in the first part of assessing the “Synchronizing”
dimension in this study. Second, the efficacy of the timing of the response warrants a deeper
analysis with regards to the shape of the relationship and the impact of selected moderating
influences. Thus, the guiding research question in this regard is What factors determine the
timing of a response and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the
chosen response in increasing recovery and survival prospects?

4.3.1 Hypothesis 7 (Determinants of the Timing of the First Response)
As noted in the analyses regarding the “Identifying” dimension, headquarter attention
towards the foreign subsidiary’s subpar performance situation can help explain why some would
receive a response while others would not. In this section, we refine these arguments by
specifically assessing the time until the first response is administered. Since there seems to be
some evidence that a timely response improves recovery and survival outcomes (Tangpong et al.,
2015), the mechanisms that determine the timeliness warrant closer investigation. Figure 4.6
offers an overview of the proposed hypothesis.
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Figure 4.6. Model with Hypothesis for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 1 - Predicting the
Timing of the First Response.
Subsidiary-level factors
(Communication-enhancing
mechanisms)
Regional headquarters
R&D role
Higher number of expatriates
Japanese GM
No such communicationenhancing mechanims

H7 (-)

Time to first response

Several scholars have noted the difficulty that foreign subsidiaries may experience,
especially those at the periphery of the MNE’s network, with regards to receiving headquarter
attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). However, subsidiaries may possess distinct
communication enhancing mechanisms that allow them to increase their “weight” and “voice”
within the MNE network. This is an aspect which is especially salient during times of subpar
performance, where weight and voice may shorten the time until the first response is provided.
We suggest that such mechanisms could encompass 1) specific roles within the MNE network
(such as regional headquarter role, R&D function), 2) a higher number of expatriates, and 3) a
Japanese GM. All those mechanisms are proposed to enhance the communication frequency
between headquarters and the respective subsidiary, thereby allocating more of the scarce
resource of top management attention to the subsidiary. We consider each in more detail. First,
specific roles within the MNE network are generally associated with directives being passed to
the subsidiary which can then be passed along to other subsidiaries in the region. Likewise,
initiatives, innovations, and other aspects may be transferred from other local subsidiaries to the
subsidiary with a specific role, where they are bundled and passed on to the headquarters. As
such, the subsidiary gains a more amplified voice and weight within the MNE network and
communication will be more frequent. Second, a higher number of expatriates within a foreign
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subsidiary can help overcome barriers due to cultural distance to the headquarters (Wilkinson,
Peng, Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). This can occur in both directions, such that the expatriates
can facilitate the exchange of information from the headquarters to the subsidiary and vice versa.
Communication frequency is thus enhanced. Third, if the GM is of Japanese origin, there are
likely fewer language and cultural barriers between the subsidiary’s leadership (assuming they
are Japanese) and the Japanese parent firm which can administer a response. Fewer barriers
allow for an easier establishment of trust and thus, communication frequency may be enhanced.
When communication frequency is enhanced, adverse situations at the foreign subsidiary
level can be better assessed and decisions can be made faster and with more confidence. Thus,
we propose the following.
Hypothesis 7: Compared to having no such communication enhancing mechanisms, subsidiaries
that have mechanisms which facilitate more frequent communication with headquarters exhibit a
shorter time to the first response.

4.3.2 Hypotheses 8a-8b (Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit)
Building on the arguments from time compression diseconomies, we suspect that the
effectiveness of the timing of the response may be curvilinear. We visualize the proposed
relationship as a diagram, to aid interpretability (see Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.7. Schematic Model for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 2 - Shape of the
Relationship between the Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus
Exit.
1
Probability
(recovery
(versus exit))

0
1
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3
4
5
6
Timing of the first response

7

8

The main argument for differentiating between an early and a late response in Tangpong
et al. (2015) is the notion that decline can lead to a vicious cycle of stress and disruption, causing
further decline to occur (Tangpong et al., 2015; McKinley et al., 2014). If, however, the right
response is initiated at the right time, a virtuous cycle may unfold whereby decline is halted and
recovery sets in (Tangpong et al., 2015; McKinley et al., 2014; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).
On the other hand, the notion of time compression diseconomies suggests that too fast a
response may not be conducive to improved recovery rates after all. Organizations may respond
with a “knee-jerk” reaction (Hofer, 1980: 31) in order to exhibit fast action and avoid being
blamed for being stuck in inertia. Such a very fast reaction that lacks the appropriate amount of
due diligence may in fact be more counterproductive than a non-response would have been,
causing disruption, confusion, and frustration. As a result of these arguments, we suspect that the
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relationship between the timing of a response and the rate of recovery or exit is curvilinear rather
than linear as Tangpong et al. (2015) suggests. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8a: The effect of the time-to-first-response on the likelihood of recovery (as opposed
to exit) takes an inverted U-shape, such that the likelihood of recovery is highest at medium
levels of the time-to-first-response.
Further, we suspect that the curvilinar relationship is affected by the type of first response
that is provided. Specifically, we suspect that at the subsidiary level, increases in commitment
will generally be more welcomed (i.e. less disruptive) than decreases in commitment. As such,
increases in commitment are likely going to improve the likelihood of recovery. Furthermore, we
propose that decreases in commitment are more sensitive to the curvilinear time-effect. If
decreases in commitment are made very early on in the subpar performance sequence, the effect
may be a perception of a “knee-jerk” response. If the perception is that the retrenchment was
conducted merely as an end in itself, morale may sink and talent turnover may increase. If a
disruptive response such as a decrease in commitment, however, is provided towards the medium
range of the subpar performance sequence, the perception could be that at least due diligence was
conducted to support the necessity of the downsizing action. Towards later stages of the subpar
performance sequence, however, a decrease in commitment as the first response will likely add
to the intense degree of psychological stress decision-makers are already under (Whetten, 1980;
Tangpong et al., 2015). As a result, more faulty action may be conducted (Weitzel & Jonsson,
1989) and the likelihood for a recovery may fall again. By way of expressing the moderation
effect, we thus suggest that decreases in commitment exhibit a steeper inverted U-shape on the
probability of recovery (as opposed to exit) than increases in commitment. (Haans, Pieters, &
He, 2015). Figure 4.8 illustrates this proposition.
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Figure 4.8. Schematic Model for Dimension 3: “Synchronizing”: Part 2 - Shape of the
Relationship between the Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus
Exit, with the Moderating Effect of Response Type.
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Hypothesis 8b The effect of the inverted U-shape relationship between the timing of the first
response and the probability of a recovery (versus exit) is more pronounced for decreases in
commitment than for increases in commitment.

4.3.3 Hypothesis 9 (Effect of the Timing of a GM Replacement)
A specific type of response which has received attention within the turnaround literature
is that of the CEO and/or top management team replacement during a period of subpar
performance. Several researchers have suggested that the replacement of the CEO and/or top
management is an important factor in achieving turnaround success. The perspectives on the
efficacy of CEO and/or top management replacement responses, however, diverge in three
different directions. First, one camp views the replacement of the existing top management as a
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necessary “precondition for almost all successful turnarounds” (Hofer, 1980: 25). The main
rationale for this perspective is that the CEO and/or the members of the top management team
are responsible for the subpar performance and those new perspectives and management skills
are needed in order to turn the company around (Chen & Hambrick, 2012). The replacement of
the CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be positively correlated with the
rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments may also apply at
the subsidiary-level, where the replacement of the general manager may infuse the subsidiary
with new life and aid the subsidiary’s turnaround.
Second, other researchers have argued that the replacement of the top managers in a
company can lead to disruption and trauma (Haveman, 1993) which may indeed lead to worse
performance following a leadership succession. The main rationale for this perspective is that
CEO and/or top management team replacement in a subpar performance situation may be a form
of ritual scapegoating (Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005), whereby boards act in what
Hofer (1980: 31) calls a “’knee-jerk’ reaction” and Chen and Hambrick (2012: 225) call
“ceremonial purging”, with the objective to respond to decline as fast as possible. This response
for the sake of responding quickly and visibly may have adverse effects on talented managers in
other ranks who may become wary of their future in the company (Chen & Hambrick, 2012).
The replacement of the CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be negatively
correlated with the rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments
may also apply at the subsidiary-level, where the replacement of the GM could lead to
disruptions that may eventually hamper the subsidiary’s recovery prospects.
Third, researchers have noted that little empirical evidence exists to support either
perspective and the evidence that does exist has been mixed or even insignificant (Barker,
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Patterson, & Mueller, 2001; Chen & Hambrick, 2012). For instance, Daily and Dalton (1995)
find that while failing firms exhibited higher CEO and director turnover rates, the changes are
often not in the direction recommended by key stakeholders (i.e. towards more independent
boards, separation of CEO and chairperson positions). Further, Chen and Hambrick (2012) found
that leader successions in subpar performing firms only leads to the desired effects if the new
CEO creates a better fit with the conditions at hand (i.e. the severity of losses and industry
performance severity). CEO replacement without attention to these parameters of fit, however,
does not appear to have any effect on the companies’ recovery rates. The replacement of the
CEO and/or top management team is thus hypothesized to be contingently correlated with the
rate of recovery and survival in a turnaround situation. These same arguments may also apply at
the subsidiary-level, where the efficacy of the GM replacement response may depend on
contextual contingencies.
We follow this contingency perspective, suggesting that a GM replacement per se does
not improve performance. Rather, we aim to advance existing research by suggesting that the
concept of time plays an important role, whereby only an early GM replacement will generate
the desired beneficial outcomes. If the GM replacement occurs rather late, processes of decline
may already have become embedded themselves and too much talent may have left the company
already, leading to a downward spiral of decline. Thus, we hypothesize that the early
replacement of the GM will likely be beneficial for the rates of recovery and survival.
The rationale behind this is that a new leader at the foreign subsidiary will bring in new
ideas and will not be as embedded in inertial structures as the outgoing GM. Moreover, political
structures within the subsidiary will be broken by replacing the GM, thereby opening the doors
for new processes. Perhaps most importantly, however, a GM replacement is unlikely to occur as
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a reaction of public scapegoating since he or she generally has much less media coverage and
visibility (compared to a corporate-level CEO) to make this an effective move. Thus, the
following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 9: An earlier GM replacement during periods of subpar performance leads to better
rates of recovery and improved rates of exit than a later GM replacement.
This concludes the hypothesis development section. Next, the methodology with which
these hypotheses will be tested will be reviewed.
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CHAPTER 5: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
From a philosophical standpoint, we aim to approach the phenomenon of subpar
performance in foreign subsidiaries by making some assumptions about three central and
hierarchical questions: 1) “What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there
that can be known about it?” (the ontological question), 2) “What is the nature of the relationship
between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (the epistemological
question), and 3) “How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or
she believes can be known?” (the methodological question) (Guba & Lincoln, 1998: 201). To the
first question, we assume a post-positivist perspective in this thesis, whereby reality exists (i.e.
the goal is to approach the truth) but can only be imperfectly captured by the bounded rationality
of humans. Regarding the second question, we favor a perspective of objectivity and
falsifiability, whereby findings can potentially be tested and replicated. This leads to the third
question being focused on a quantitative approach with hypotheses and variables as the unit of
analysis, rather than a qualitative approach emphasising human verbal and nonverbal actions
(Rynes & Gephart, 2004).
This is not to say, however, that an interpretivist (qualitative) methodology or in fact
pragmatist (mixed methods) methodology would not lead to interesting and valuable outcomes as
well. Indeed, as we note in Chapter 7, a qualitative study would likely help deepen the insights
gained through the quantitative approach in this thesis by adding more context, offering a richer
account of human behavior, differentiating the individual case from the general case, and
emphasizing the process of discovery (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). The reason for our preference for
a quantitative approach at this point is that we believe the research gap regarding the
phenomenon of subpar performance at foreign subsidiaries requires a benchmarking of its
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prevalence to provide a foundation from which future studies, including interpretivist and
pragmatist studies, can be built.

5.1 Data Sources
Hypotheses were tested using subsidiary-level information from the Kaigai Shinshutsu
Kigyou Souran Kuni-Betsu dataset, issued annually by Toyo Keizai Inc. (Toyo Keizai, 2014),
and MNE-level information from the Nikkei NEEDS tapes. This combined dataset results in a
sample of Japanese overseas investments at near-population size, totaling 469,834 subsidiaryyear observations representing 49,616 subsidiaries in 160 countries. Collected through surveys at
each subsidiary, the observation period spans the years 1990-2013, allowing for a longitudinal
analysis and a reduced risk of capturing merely one-time effects.
Additional datasets were utilized to complement the main dataset with further
information. Specifically, country-level data was derived from The World Bank Group database
(2016), culture-level data was collected from the Cultural Dimensions dataset (Hofstede,
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) and from the geographic distance dataset by Berry et al. (2010).

5.2 Operationalizing Subpar Performance Sequences
As the review of the literature on corporate-level/business-level decline and turnaround in
Chapter 2 revealed, most studies used return on investment as the measure of subpar
performance (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Tangpong, Abebe, & Li, 2015, Schmitt & Raisch, 2013;
Francis & Desai, 2005; Bruton et al., 2003; Bruton et al., 1994, Robbins & Pearce, 1992),
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followed by return on assets (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013), return on equity (Chen & Hambrick,
2012), and return on sales (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). At the subsidiary-level, such measures are
often not readily available and practices such as transfer pricing may distort the image of how
much profit is actually generated at the foreign subsidiary.
With this in mind, subpar performance sequences as described in Table 5.1 were derived
using four different ways of operationalizing performance during both downturn and upturn
phases. This conceptualization is in line with Schendel et al.’s (1976) differentiation between
such phases during both of which performance has not yet recovered and actions may thus still
be required in order to fully restore pre-decline levels.
First, the downturn phase was identified by flagging each year in which sales were lower
than in the year before. We also calculated a labor productivity measure by dividing sales by the
number of employees in the subsidiary. Again, each year was flagged in which productivity was
lower than in the year before. Further, the Toyo Keizai dataset contains information about
perceptions of financial performance, containing three categories: gain, break-even, and loss. To
ease the calculation of subpar performance sequences based on this measure, we combined the
three categories into two. Two different ways of operationalizing this perceptual measure of
subpar performance thus resulted; one differentiating between 1) surplus and 2) breakeven/deficit and the other differentiating between 1) surplus/break-even and 2) deficit. More
specifically, the rationale behind this aggregation of this performance measure is to identify
subsidiaries that are currently in a turnaround situation and therefore in need of a managerial
response (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). As noted in Chapter 1, included are subsidiaries that are
clearly in distress and experiencing directional (organizational decline) problems, potential
termination (failure, survival-threatening), and those that are stagnant at a non-profitable level
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over a number of consecutive years. These latter types of subsidiaries may equally require a
response in order to continue to operate in a global, competitive, and growth-oriented
environment. Moreover, subsidiaries may first experience a loss, then improve to the point of a
break-even (not gain!), and then fall back into the loss situation. With a three-tiered
categorization, these occurrences would not be considered a string of consecutive years of subpar
performance and thus likely be dropped from the sample (or shorter pieces of the sequences
would be considered under the loss and the break-even categorizations respectively). As such,
this aggregated categorization (especially the first way to aggregate perceptual measures of
financial performance) is related to Jas and Skelcher’s (2005: 198) differentiation into a “‘poor’
category and […a] ‘weak’ category [which is characterized as] having a very low capacity to
improve’”.
Second, the upturn phase was identified by flagging the number of years in which the
respective subsidiary is recapturing sales again before it fully recovers to pre-decline levels,
exits, or the observation period ends (right censoring). Some subsidiaries experienced several
years of such upturn phases while others may undergo no such phase at all. The same approach
was taken for the labor productivity measure of performance. For the perceptual measures of
financial performance, such an approach was not necessary, since the end of the subpar
performance categorization automatically indicated the arrival of either a recovery or exit event
(or right censoring).
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5.3 Pre-Analysis Sample Preparation
After the identification of subpar performance sequences, the sample was prepared in the
following steps. First, as Mata and Portugal (2000: 555) note, large datasets like the Toyo Keizai
dataset, while very valuable in terms of explanatory power, may contain a higher absolute
number of coding errors than hand-picked small datasets. To alleviate this concern of coding
errors as best as possible, we scrutinized all the variables in the analysis. A variable that required
adjustment was subsidiary age. Subsidiary age was calculated by subtracting the year of
foundation from each year of observation. Subsidiaries that had a negative age value were
deleted since this suggested a coding/input error in the year of foundation variable. In total,
however, only about 0.18 percent of the dataset were affected, leading us to be confident in
deleting these subsidiaries without affecting any analysis outcomes.
Second, since this study is only concerned with subsidiaries that are experiencing subpar
performance sequences, the sample was cut to only include those sequences. Some subsidiaries
may experience a number of such sequences, interrupted by periods of better performance or
non-observance. Thus, there are likely going to be gaps (i.e. intervals) between the sequences of
subpar performance, if the subsidiary experiences more than one such sequence. Following
Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, and Marchenko (2008: 36), the observations during such gaps were
omitted. The same was done with observations that occurred before the first subpar performance
sequence (left censoring). Moreover, as will be described in section 5.8, the fact that subsidiaries
may encounter more than one subpar performance sequence was accounted for by creating
robust standard errors through clustering the analysis by each subsidiary.
Third, Inkpen and Beamish (1998: 38) recommended excluding subsidiaries from the
sample which contain fewer than 20 employees. This approach is a now common method to
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ensure generalizability to substantive operations, not merely agencies or sales offices. Since the
unit of analysis in this thesis is the subpar performance sequence, however, the application of
this criterion was not as straightforward as merely deleting these respective observations. For
instance, following the simple deletion method, a subsidiary that reported 40 employees at the
beginning of the subpar performance sequence and then retrenched to 18 employees would have
been included with an incomplete sequence. Similarly, a subsidiary which first reduced its
workforce to fewer than 20 employees during the downturn phase and increased it again to more
than 20 employees during the upturn phase would have been included into the sample with a
holey sequence. Therefore, in an effort to include as many sequences with as much complete and
continuous information as possible, we excluded only those sequences where the subsidiary
reported fewer than 20 employees for the entire duration of the subpar performance sequence.
Fourth, since the objective of this thesis is to assess responses to subpar performance
when such subpar performance does not occur by chance or due to short-term fluctuations, we
omitted the first two years of each sequence (unless otherwise specified). As described in
Chapter 2, this approach is in line with several decline/turnaround scholars, such as Tangpong et
al., (2015).
These steps led to final pre-analysis sample sizes and characteristics as illustrated per
performance measure in Table 5.1. As Table 5.1 shows, some subsidiaries may experience more
than one subpar performance sequence, indicated by the higher number of sequences than
subsidiaries. Moreover, given that labor productivity is a ratio of sales over the number of
employees, it may seem surprising that the number of observations is higher than for the sales
measure of performance. Upon closer inspection, however, the difference occurs when the level
of sales does not change but the number of employees does, thereby leading to a higher
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probability of being flagged as experiencing subpar performance compared to considering sales
only.
Table 5.1. Sample Sizes per Performance Measure.

Performance
measure

Sales
Labor productivity
Perceptual
measures of
financial
performance
A: (0=surplus,

Number of
observations

Number of
subsidiaries

Number of
sequences

Max
length

Mean
length

S.D.
length

Number
of
countries

17,982
21,860

5,669
6,307

7,406
8,744

18
22

4.41
4.45

1.84
1.85

94
87

11,847

3,196

3,360

24

5.24

2.38

73

1=break-even, deficit)
B: (0=surplus/break4,633
1,553
1,592
14
4.75
1.95
even, 1=deficit)
Note: Observations are subsidiary-year occurrences. Length refers to subpar performance sequences.
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In this thesis, the main operationalization of subpar performance sequences was based on
the sales differentials measure of performance. It was selected for three reasons. First, as
Weinzimmer, Nystrom, and Freeman (1998: 235) note, sales growth is the “most commonly
identified measure of overall organizational performance (Hubbard & Bromiley, 1995)” and any
decline in sales may thus indicate a decline in subsidiary growth. Moreover, sales may be a more
fitting measure than increases in employees or assets since “a firm can realize growth in sales
dollars without achieving any significant change in employees or assets” and thus, “sales data
may be more appropriate in studies including organizations” from different industries
(Weinzimmer et al., 1998: 252). Second, with a labor productivity measure, decreases in the
sales-vs-employees ratio may occur due to the hiring of more employees, with there being a time
lag until sales growth has caught up with the increased number of employees. Thus, a common
approach to growth by investing in human resources may be flagged as an indication of decline.
This can be especially salient in service subsidiaries which tend to be more labor-intensive. A

116

labor productivity measure may therefore be a more noisy measure of decline than using sales
differentials as the measure of performance, especially when including both manufacturing and
service subsidiaries into one sample (Weinzimmer et al., 1998: 252). Third, compared to
perceptual measures of financial performance, focusing on sales differentials offers a larger
sample size and reduces the risk of biases such as retrospective bias or social desirability bias.
Nonetheless, the other types of performance will be used as robustness checks in Chapter 6.

5.4 Response Variable
We identified several responses that could occur as a reaction to subpar performance at a
foreign subsidiary. Besides assessing each type of response individually, we also noted that the
number of observations per response category can become very small when control variables
with missing values are added to the regressions. As a result, some categories would fall below
the threshold of Roth and Morrison’s (1990) guideline for including at least 30-50 observations
per category. We thus decided to combine the types of responses into categories that indicate the
overarching type of response (strategic vs. operational vs. mixed) and the direction of the
response (increase vs. decrease vs. mixed). Such clustering is not uncommon in organizational
decline/turnaround studies (see Trahms et al., 2013; Hofer, 1980). Table 5.2 provides a list of
each type of response and clustering approach.
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5.5 Final Outcome Variable (Exit versus Recovery versus Right Censoring)
At each end of an observation year within the subpar performance sequence, several
possible outcomes were recorded. First, the subsidiary could still be performing at subpar levels,
a scenario which was indicated as “0”. Moreover, right-censored cases were also marked with
a“0”, following Hsieh et al. (2015). Censoring is defined as a situation in which an “event occurs
and the subject is not under observation” (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould & Marchenko, 2010, p. 29).
Thus, no inferences can be made about any recovery or exit events occurring during this period
of non-observation. In particular, since the observation span of the dataset reached from 1990
until 2013, all observations in 2013 were tagged with a “0”, assuming that they continue (the
alternative, assuming that all subsidiaries exit in 2013, is too strong an assumption). Second, the
subsidiary could have recovered to the levels of performance before the subpar performance
sequence which was tagged with a “1”. While the main analysis was conducted with subsidiarylevel sales as the measure of performance, robustness checks using subsidiary-level productivity
and perceptual measures of financial performance (two different ways of operationalizing) were
conducted and are reported in Chapter 6. Third, subsidiaries could exit the following year. The
last year they were observed in the dataset was thus marked with a “2”. This follows similar
studies of exit events, such as Mata and Portugal’s (2000) comparison between the determinants
of divestitures and closures of foreign subsidiaries. Fourth, based on this approach to
operationalizing possible outcomes, recovery and exit are not mutually exclusive events. A
subsidiary that recovers in one year could exit in the next year, thereby causing that year to be
tagged with both a “1” and a “2”. To account for such a situation, outcomes of such a scenario
were tagged as “3”. However, the reasons for such an occurrence are unclear and thus the focus
in the analysis was placed upon outcomes “1” (recovery) and “2” (exit).
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Table 5.2. Response Variable.

Type of response
No response
Increase equity to WOS (>80
percent)
Increase equity from even position
(> 50 percent)
Increase equity from portfolio
position (> 10 percent)
Increase in the number of
expatriates
Decrease equity from WOS (<80
percent)
Decrease equity from even
position (< 50 percent)
Decrease equity to portfolio
position (< 10 percent)
Decrease in the number of
expatriates
Increase in equity (not resulting in
a mode change)
Increase in the number of
employees
Increase in equity (not resulting in
a mode change)
Increase in the number of
employees
Combinations of the above
occurring in the same year

Combinations of the above
occurring in the same year

Combinations of the above
occurring in the same year

Total frequency of
response
occurrence
6,726

Frequency of
response
occurrence as a
first response
1,841

Increase in strategic
commitment (and
combinations thereof)

48

32

Decrease in strategic
commitment (and
combinations thereof)

205
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Increase in operational
commitment (and
combinations thereof)

2,838

1,450

Decrease in operational
commitment (and
combinations thereof)

2,633

1,265

1,387

695

1,566

739

2,579

1,268

17,982

7,406

Categorization
No response

Increase in strategic and
operational commitment
(and combinations
thereof)
Decrease in strategic and
operational commitment
(and combinations
thereof)
Combination response
(increase and decrease in
strategic and operational
commitment)
Total

119

5.6 Independent Variables
5.6.1 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Identifying”
At the country-level, two independent variables were used. GDP growth was derived
from The World Bank annual data (1990-2013) per country. Geographic distance is a measure
derived from online supplementary material from Berry et al., (2010) and coded as the distance
between Japan and each host country. At the MNE-level, one independent variable was
identified. A situation of negative profits at the MNE-level was indicated as a binary variable,
whereby “0” indicated positive (or break-even) profits and “1” indicated negative profits (i.e.
losses). At the subsidiary-level, five independent variables were used. A special strategic role of
the subsidiary was coded as 1) “1” for the subsidiary having a regional headquarters function (or
“0” otherwise). The R&D role of a subsidiary was derived from a purpose of investment variable
in the Toyo Keizai dataset and marked as “1” when the subsidiary fulfilled such a role and “0” if
other purposes of investment were predominant. Ownership modes were indicated as “0” for
joint ventures and “1” for wholly-owned subsidiaries and lagged by one year. Subsidiary age
was derived by subtracting the foundation year from each year of observation. The number of
employees was included to measure the size of the subsidiary. Finally, a variable indicating the
number of expatriates was included.

5.6.2 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Responding”
Based on the response variable, subsequent configurations of responses to subsidiarylevel subpar performance were devised. Specifically, all strategic responses, all operational
responses, and all combinations thereof were combined, respectively, based on Table 5.2.
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5.6.3 Independent Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Synchronizing”
For the first set of analyses regarding synchronizing, four independent variables were
employed to indicate a communication-channel enhancing mechanism. A special strategic role of
the subsidiary was coded as 1) “1” for the subsidiary having a regional headquarters function (or
“0” otherwise). The R&D role of a subsidiary was derived from a purpose of investment variable
in the Toyo Keizai dataset and marked as “1” when the subsidiary fulfilled such a role and “0” if
other purposes of investment were predominant. The number of expatriates was included directly
as it was provided by the Toyo Keizai dataset. The nationality of the GM was derived by
transforming the Toyo Keizai dataset (which contains some variables with Japanese characters as
strings) into Unicode, to make it readable in Stata. Then, we created a variable that indicated a
“1” when the name of the subsidiary representative was given in Chinese characters and a “0”
otherwise. We confirmed this approach with a Japanese-speaking expert6 on the dataset and
Japanese MNEs more generally, who noted that Japanese names are often spelled in Chinese
characters. He also noted that the GMs with names written in Chinese characters outside of
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea are likely going to be Japanese, while this may not be so
obvious within these selected countries. Following this logic, we added a robustness check to
Model 2a in Table 6.14, excluding these four countries (plus Singapore which has similar
characteristics) from the analysis. We also conducted a random search of such names and
confirmed that these individuals were indeed in leadership positions at the subsidiary.
In the second set of analyses, the timing of the first response variable becomes the
independent variable. This continuous variable was derived by marking the occurrence of the
first response to subpar performance and the year in which it occurred. In our sample, the first

6

Email correspondence with Professor Shige Makino available upon request.
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response occurred between the first and eighth year of a subpar performance. Those subsidiaries
that did not respond at all were not included in this part of the analysis. In order to capture the
proposed curvilinear effect of the time-to-first-response variable, we created the squared term of
it. Further information on the methodological approach can be found in section 5.8.4. Finally, we
created a GM replacement variable which assumed a value of “0” when the name of the GM was
the same as in the year before and a value of “1” if the name was different.

5.7 Control Variables
Several control variables were employed to reduce the omitted variable bias as best as
possible (Antonakis et al., 2010). Since the causes of subpar performance may stem from the
external and/or internal environment (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988), control variables were
included which reflect both aspects. The control variables are reviewed below per each
dimension regarding “Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”.

5.7.1 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Identifying”
Control variables were also included at three different levels of analysis. At the countrylevel, the host country’s market size was captured by including an annual population measure.
Cultural distance scores were calculated from Hofstede et al. (2010) most established cultural
value dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and
individualism-collectivism) using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) composite score equation. At the
level of the MNE, network size was determined by a cumulative count of the subsidiaries for the
dominant Japanese parent firm. Benito & Welch (1997: 18) suggest that as the MNE network
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size increases, the commitment to each individual subsidiary may decrease, potentially leading to
a higher probability of divestments. At the subsidiary-level, industry similarity was included
since studies have found that over-diversified MNEs are more likely to divest their unrelated
subsidiaries (Benito, 2005). In order to assess the relatedness between the Japanese headquarters
and its foreign subsidiary, a dummy variable was derived which assumes a value of “0” when the
two operate in different sectors and a value of “1” when they operate in the same industry and
“0” if it did not.

5.7.2 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Responding”
To account for environmental aspects (Berry, 2013), an annual population measure and
average GDP growth were included as control variables. Further, the geographic distance (Berry
et al, 2010) and cultural distance between the MNE headquarters and the foreign location could
affect the efficacy of the chosen response and the likelihood of being divested (Benito, 2005).
Cultural distance was derived from cultural values scores (Hofstede et al., 2010) and converted
into composite distance measures using Kogut & Singh’s (1988) operationalization. At the MNE,
level, network size was determined by a cumulative count of the subsidiaries for the dominant
Japanese parent firm and a binary variable indicating whether the MNE was performing poorly
(“1”) or not (“0”) was included. To assess the strategic importance the subsidiary may hold for
the MNE headquarters, a measure of industry similarity was included. Subsidiaries that are in a
different sector than the headquarters may be at a higher risk of being divested (Benito, 2005).
Further, MNE headquarters may be hesitant to divest larger subsidiaries, so a subsidiary size
measure was added by way of including the number of employees (Barker & Duhaime, 1997).
The number of expatriates was also included to account for the notion that the rate of recovery
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may be improved by the presence of expatriates. There may also be a difference in managerial
complexity and likelihood of exit or recovery between joint ventures and wholly-owned
subsidiaries, so these different configurations were controlled for. Following Dhanaraj and
Beamish (2004), joint ventures were defined as subsidiaries in which at least two parent firms
each own at least 20 percent equity and wholly-owned subsidiaries as those in which one parent
firm owns 80 percent or more of the equity. Finally, subsidiaries that function as regional
headquarters may be less likely to be divested and thus, a dummy variable flagging such
subsidiaries was included.

5.7.3 Control Variables for the Analysis Regarding “Synchronizing”
For the first set of analyses, we included several control variables which were described
above. In order to avoid redundancies, these variables will be mentioned here but not
reintroduced at length. We included population size, GDP growth, geographic and cultural
distance at the environmental level. Network size, MNE profit situation, and industry similarity
were included at the MNE-level. At the subsidiary level, we included the ownership mode, and
the number of subsidiary employees.
For the second set of analyses, we included population size, GDP growth, geographic
and cultural distance as well as regional headquarters, industry similarity, and subsidiary age,
number of employees, and the number of expatriates.

124

5.8 Methodological Approach
The overarching preparation of the dataset for the regression analyses (especially those
described in sections 5.8.2, 5.8.3, and 5.8.4 involved four further steps. First, all variables which
were time-variant were lagged by one year to allow for better causal inference between a
predictor and an outcome variable such as a response. This also ensured that the ownership mode
was not measured in the same year that a response in form of an ownership mode change
occurred. Second, continuous independent variables were mean-centered to avoid any concerns
of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). Third, all continuous variables were subjected to
Stata’s “ladder” command which tests whether the respective variable requires a transformation
to achieve a more normal distribution. No such transformation was required. Finally, since some
subsidiaries exhibited more than one subpar performance sequence and the observations were
thus not independent of each other, we clustered by the unique subsidiary identifier to create
robust standard errors.

5.8.1 Sequence Analysis
In order to gain more insights into the nature of the subpar performance sequences in this
thesis, sequence analysis lent itself as a suitable method. Brzinsky-Fay et al. (2006: 435) note
that in sequence analysis, “the positions in a sequence refer to the relative, not absolute, time
point. Moreover, sequences are generally seen as an entity of their own and the interest is in the
sequential character of all elements together”. In this method, sequences are conceptualized as
shown in Figure 5.1.
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Since this study is concerned with subpar performance sequences as the central unit of
analysis, this perspective on the data appears appropriate. Sequence analysis will be used to
identify subpar performance sequences and explore the nature of such sequences.

Figure 5.1. Sample Sequence from Brzinsky-Fay et al., (2006: 425).

5.8.2 Analytical Approach for “Identifying”
The dependent variable in this part of the analysis, regarding “Identifying”, was the
response that was observed as a reaction to the foreign subsidiary’s subpar performance. Of
particular interest at this point was thereby the first response (after the two initial years of subpar
performance), since we assumed it to best reflect the process of identifying an appropriate
response to a subpar performance situation at the subsidiary level. As a result, any subsequent
responses were ignored for this analysis, essentially creating a cross-sectional subsample.
Since the outcome variable in this study takes on discrete values, it is a nonlinear limited
dependent variable for which conventional OLS regression is inappropriate (Wiersema &
Bowen, 2009). This leads to the possibility of applying a multinomial logit model which allows
for the assessment of the influence that independent variables have on the choice for a specific
response relative to a base case (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010: 498; Berry, 2015). In this study, the
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base case is selected to be subsidiaries that never experience a response for the duration of their
subpar performance sequence. Thus, the coefficients indicate the probability of each response
category to be selected over not responding at all. Comparisons regarding the impact of predictor
variables across response categories can only be made with respect to the base category. This
notion of relative interpretation of coefficients means that the signs and coefficients in
multinomial logit models need to be assessed carefully - an aspect which has fallen short in much
strategy research (see criticisms by Bowen & Wiersema, 2004; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009;
Wulff, 2015). More analytical effort is required to derive absolute inferences (irrespective of the
base category) of the impact a predictor variable has on the probability of a certain outcome.
In this study, the best practice approach by Wulff (2015) is followed, which recommends
adherence to two steps: 1) the reporting of the regression results for each outcome category
relative to the base case and 2) the calculation and visualization of average marginal effects at
representative values of the predictor variable to assess the significance of each predictor
variable on outcome categories regardless of the base category. The latter step is especially
important to assess whether the continuous variable is significant over the entire data range.
Results from this analysis are reported in Chapter 6.

5.8.3 Analytical Approach for “Responding”
Given that the outcome of interest constitutes the rate of two types of events (recovery or
exit), a gap time competing-risk event history analysis was selected for testing the hypotheses.
This choice was based on several considerations. First, we were interested in the duration from
the start of the subpar performance sequence until a specific event (recovery or exit). Although
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the outcome variable is categorical, logistic or multinomial logit regression are not appropriate
because of the existence of right censoring (i.e. the end of the observation period) for some
subsidiaries. Thus, although we expect all subpar performance sequences to end in either a
recovery or exit, we cannot observe such an event for some subsidiaries and therefore cannot
make any inferences about any events that may occur during unobserved times. Event history
analysis techniques can account for this and thus provide unbiased estimates7 (Clark, Bradburn,
Love & Altman, 2003). Conventional event history analysis is often termed survival analysis and
finds much application in biostatistics, where the duration until death is estimated. The survival
probability can then be estimated as “the probability of being alive at time t j, S(tj), is calculated
from S(tj-1), the probability of being alive at tj-1, nj, the number of patients alive just before tj, and
dj, the number of events at tj, by

𝑆(𝑡𝑗 ) = 𝑆(𝑡𝑗−1 )(1 −

𝑑𝑗
)
𝑛𝑗

where t0=0 and S(0)=1.” The value of S(t) is constant between times of events, and therefore the
estimated probability is a step function that changes value only at the time of each event” (Clark
et al., 2003: 233). From this, the hazard rate can be determined, which indicates the event rate at
time t, conditional on the event not having occurred yet. Cox proportional hazard models are
among the most common ways of applying survival analysis, whereby the hazard rate is
estimated dependent on a set of covariates (Bradburn, Clark, Love, & Altman, 2003).

7

Note the difference to the application of the multinomial logit regression in the “Identifying” section. In the
“Identifying” section, the application of a multinomial logit regression was appropriate even though some
subsidiaries experienced a non-response (which may appear like a case of right censoring) because the non-response
was modeled as a specific outcome of interest. A nonresponse was thus inferred to be an outcome, rather than the
end of the observation period as in event history analysis.
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Second, in applying an event history analysis approach, several aspects related to the
structure of the data needed to be considered. While in conventional event history analyses
subjects experience the onset of risk8 at a certain time point (e.g. end of schooling, birth) and the
analysis time ends with an event (e.g. employment, death), the subsidiaries in this study could
have several onsets of risk (every time a subpar performance sequence begins) and each analysis
time could end with a different event (e.g. recovery, exit, or right censoring). Following Hsieh et
al., (2015), this condition was accounted for by applying a gap time model, in which each subpar
performance sequence was marked as a spell (see Table 5.3). Within each spell, the time between
the beginning and the end of the spell was indicated by the gap time. This approach leads to the
result that “the clock is reset to zero for a subject every time an event occurs” (Rabe-Hesketh &
Skrondal, 2012: 859), by setting the onset of risk to the beginning of each subpar performance
sequence. Thus, at the beginning of a subsidiary’s first subpar performance sequence, the
subsidiary starts to become at risk for recovery or performance-related exit. Once an event
occurs, the clock (i.e. the time of being at risk of recovery or performance-related exit) stops
until the subsidiary experiences another subpar performance sequence, which is when it restarts
from zero. This allows for each subpar performance sequence to have its own event-specific
baseline hazard (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). To account for similarities between
sequences within the same subsidiary, we clustered the standard errors by the unique subsidiary
identifier.

8

Note that the historical origins of event history analysis (otherwise known as survival analysis) cause it to come
with terminology that carries a rather negative connotation. For instance, a subject may be indicated as “failing”
whenever it exhibits an event of interest - regardless of whether such event is death, the acceptance of employment,
or getting married. Similarly, “onset of risk” demarcates the start of the period during which a subject could
potentially experience such an event, even if no one would conventionally speak of the “risk” of accepting
employment or getting married.
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Third, conventional survival analysis assumes that the event and censoring distribution
are independent of each other. For instance, if a subsidiary is right-censored due to the end of the
observation period, this fact is not going to affect the likelihood of the event (recovery or exit) to
occur. However, if the subsidiary is right-censored due to it exiting, it cannot experience the
recovery event any longer (Putter, Fiocco, & Geskus, 2007: 2394). These two aspects are thus
not independent of each other and a competing-risk event history analysis (Fine & Gray, 1999)
approach is employed. This methodology takes into account that a subsidiary may experience
multiple outcomes, whereby “the occurrence of either removes the subject from the risk of the
Table 5.3. Example of Subsidiary Histories to Illustrate the Structure of the Dataset.
Subsidiary
A
A
A

Begin time
span
1990
1991

End time
span
1991
1992

Event
0
0

Spell
#1
#1

Gap
time
1
2

Covariates
X(t)
X(t)

1992

1993

1

#1

3

X(t)

2001

2002

0

#2

1

X(t)

A
A
A
A

2002
2003
2004

2003
2004
2005

0
0
0

#2
#2
#2

2
3
4

X(t)
X(t)
X(t)

2005

2006

1

#2

5

X(t)

B
B

1998

1999

0

#1

1

X(t)

1999

2000

1

#1

2

X(t)

2010

2011

0

#2

1

X(t)

2011
2012

2012
2013

0
0

#2
#2

2
3

X(t)
X(t)

A

B
B
B

Remarks
Start of 1st subpar performance spell
Recovery at the end of the 3rd year
of subpar performance
Start of 2nd subpar performance
spell

Exit at the end of the 5th year of
subpar performance
Start of 1st subpar performance spell
Recovery occurs at the end of the
3rd year of subpar performance
Start of 2nd subpar performance
spell
Right censoring

other” (Cannella & Shen, 2001: 261). This does not imply that the events are mutually exclusive
but that they are allowed to rely on asymmetric mechanisms and thus have their own subhazards,
i.e. covariates may affect each outcome differently. For example, as the extant literature has
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shown, the determinants of subsidiary exits may be different from the determinants of other
outcomes, such as divestitures (Mata & Portugal, 2000). The same is assumed in this study,
suggesting that the determinants of the rate of recovery may be different from the determinants
of the rate of exit. Moreover, while conventional Cox proportional hazards regressions focus on
the survivor function, indicating “the probability of surviving beyond a given time”, competingrisks regressions center “on the cumulative incidence function, which indicates the probability of
the event of interest happening before a given time.” (Stata Competing-risks regression, N/A).
Thus, the choice for a gap time competing-risk event history analysis approach to testing
the proposed hypotheses has three key advantages (e.g. over using a multinomial logit regression
for this part of the analysis as well). First, the element of time is specifically modelled by way of
incorporating durations. Time is a crucial factor in this part of the analysis since the duration
between a response and an outcome allows for implications regarding the effectiveness of that
response. Second, this approach is able to account for the fact that subsidiaries experience subpar
performance sequences at different points in time and for different durations. Third, the
competing-risk event history analysis approach allows for the simultaneous assessment of one
event while controlling for the occurrence of the other. This leads to a more accurate adjustment
of hazard functions than other methods (including sequential Cox proportional hazard
regressions) would offer (Canella & Shen, 2001). Fourth, the method adjusts for right-censored
cases that have a spell end in neither recovery nor exit (but the end of the observation period).
An important assumption in event history analyses is the proportionality of hazards. This
implies that “the hazard of the event in any group is a constant multiple of the hazard in any
other” (Bradburn et al., 2003: 432). If the assumption holds, the hazard ratio (i.e. the event
probability) remains the same for any two observations across time. Often, this assumption can
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be violated, i.e. the hazard ratio can decrease or increase over time. An example for a hazard
ratio that decreases over the analysis time would be a case where the rate of recovery is
estimated (i.e. the outcome) and the concentration of a specific drug decreases in the blood
stream over time (i.e. a time-variant predictor of recovery). An example for a hazard ratio that
increases over the analysis time would be a case where the rate of survival is estimated (i.e. the
outcome) and the patient’s age increases over time (i.e. a time-variant predictor of survival).
Without further specification, the inclusion of predictors that violate the proportional
hazards assumption can produce incorrect results. There are several proportionality assumption
tests available after running a conventional Cox proportional hazards model. For competing-risks
analyses, however, there are much fewer tests available (as has been criticized repeatedly but no
further tests have been added yet (status: Stata version 14)). One proposed approach is to interact
each variable with the analysis time and specify those variables that are significant in Stata’s tvc
option (Coviello, 2009; Clayton, 2013). The disadvantage of this approach is that graphs are not
readily available when such variables are specified. Thus, we were forced to choose rigor over
visualizations and therefore only able to produce graphs for the prediction of exits, after we had
asserted that no such specification was necessary.

5.8.4 Analytical Approach for “Synchronizing”
The analytical approach for the set of hypotheses in the “Synchronizing” section was
slightly different than that for the preceding sections. The rationale behind this was to capture as
much of a time-based effect as possible. In particular, we expanded the subpar performance
sequences to also include the first two years in an effort to better map the effects of a “knee-jerk”
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reaction (Hofer, 1980). For the first set of hypotheses which offer determinants of the time-tofirst response variable, we employed a linear OLS regression while clustering standard errors by
the unique subsidiary identifier. For the second set of hypotheses, assessing curvilinear effects of
the time-to-first-response variable (also by subgroups) on the probability of recovery (versus
exit), we used a logit regression and analysed the marginal effects statistically and graphically.
Again, we clustered the analysis by the unique subsidiary identifier, to adjust standard error for
those cases where subsidiaries experienced more than one subpar performance sequence.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
Before reviewing the results for each part of the resource orchestration framework
(“identifying”, “responding”, and “synchronizing”), it is worthwhile to generate a deeper
understanding of the frequency and composition of the subpar performance sequences contained
in our pre-analysis sample. To this end, we utilized a sequence analysis approach and review the
results next.

6.1 Sequence Analysis
Table 6.1 shows that about 60 percent of all response sequences in the sample experience
subpar performance that lasts up to four years. About 90 percent of the subsidiaries experience a
sequence that lasts up to seven years.
Table 6.1. Maximum Length of Subpar Performance Sequences.
Maximum
length of
sequences

Number of
sequences

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Totals

2,973
1,769
1,250
595
333
181
123
73
38
26
17
15
8
4
0
1
7,406

Number of
subsidiaries

Difference
between
sequences and
subsidiaries

Percentage of
sequences in the
sample

Cumulative
Percentage of
sequences

2,657
1,643
1,197
585
323
181
123
73
38
26
17
15
8
4
0
1
6,891

316
126
53
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
515

40.14
23.89
16.88
8.03
4.50
2.44
1.66
0.99
0.51
0.35
0.23
0.20
0.11
0.05
0.00
0.01
100.00

40.14
64.03
80.91
88.94
93.44
95.88
97.54
98.53
99.04
99.39
99.62
99.82
99.93
99.99
99.99
100.00
100.00

134

Table 6.1 also illustrates that a total of 7,406 subpar performance sequences were
observed and some subsidiaries experienced more than one sequence (indicated by the difference
between the number of observations (i.e. sequences) and the number of distinct subsidiaries).
Additional analysis regarding the concentration of sequences revealed that the total amount of
7,406 sequences can be categorized into 1,451 distinct sequence types. About 14.93 percent of
all observed sequences are unique, with only one subsidiary each following that respective
trajectory. The overarching measure of concentration of sequences is 19.59 percent, suggesting
that there is a wide variety of different trajectories a subsidiary can experience in terms of the
duration and the specific responses occurring during the sequence.
Regarding the occurrence of actions per subpar performance sequence, the following
pattern emerges. 9 sequences contain seven different types of responses (including the nonresponse), while the majority (>50 percent) only contain one to two different types of responses.
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the frequencies of different responses observed in the sample.
Table 6.2. Frequency of Different Response Types in the Sample.
Number of different
elements in sequence
Number of observations
1
5,299
2
5,245
3
4,011
4
2,253
5
981
6
184
7
9
Total
17,982
Note: Observations indicates subsidiary-year occurrences.

Percentage of all
observations in the
sample
29.47
29.17
22.31
12.53
5.46
1.02
0.05
100.00

Cumulative
percentages
29.47
58.64
80.94
93.47
98.93
99.95
100
100.00

The frequency of each type of sequence and the responses (or non-responses) it contains
can be especially informative. Sequence analysis reveals that most common type of sequence is
that which contains no discernible response (see Table 6.3). Again, each sequence recorded in
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the table is already preceded by two years of subpar performance during which time the
responses are not considered (similar to the approach in Tangpong et al., 2015).
Table 6.3. Frequency of the Types of Sequences (Without Specifications).
Type of sequence
NR
oper. increase
combination response
NR  NR
oper. decrease
strat./oper. increase
strat./oper. decrease
NR  NR  NR
NR  oper. increase
oper. decrease  NR
oper. increase  NR
NR  oper. decrease
oper. increase  oper. increase
NR  combination response
oper. decrease  oper. decrease
combination response  combination response
combination response  NR
NR=no discernible response; the list was cut off at sequences with fewer than 50 observations.

Number of
sequences
1,185
513
421
402
359
258
185
179
96
80
78
76
75
65
57
53
52

Considering that longer periods of subpar performance may hint at even more embedded
structural challenges, we also listed the most common types of sequences when subpar
performance lasted for at least five years. With such a qualification, the results are depicted in
Table 6.4 (the list being cut off at sequences with at least 30 observations each).
Again, Table 6.4 reveals that most sequences that last at least five years consist of a string
of non-responses. At first glance, this may appear surprising because Pearce and Robbins (1993:
615) noted that continuance (or non-action) rarely proves to be sufficient for turning around a
subpar performance situation. Upon closer consideration, however, it might be exactly the
prevalence of non-responses that may cause these sequences to become this prolonged in the first
place. Moreover, it appears that most longer sequences contain operational increases or decreases
as opposed to any strategic changes, perhaps hinting at the insufficiency of purely operational
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responses in shortening a subpar performance sequence. This is mirrored in Hofer (1980: 30)
who notes that many failed turnarounds may be due to management choosing an operational
response when a strategic response was needed.
Table 6.4. Frequency of the Types of Sequences (Length of Sequence>=5 Years).

Type of sequence
NR  NR  NR
NR  NR  NR  NR
NR  NR  oper. decrease
NR  oper. increase  NR
oper. decrease  NR  NR
NR  NR  oper. increase
oper. increase  NR  NR
NR  oper. decrease  NR
NR  NR  combination response
NR  strat./oper. decrease  NR
NR  NR  NR  NR  NR
oper. increase  oper. increase  NR
oper. decrease  NR  oper. decrease
combination response  NR  NR
NR  oper. increase  oper. decrease
oper. increase  oper. increase  oper. increase
NR=no discernible response

Number of
sequences
179
47
26
25
24
23
23
18
16
15
15
15
15
15
14
14

Finally, differences in terms of sequence lengths were assessed regarding the respective
subsidiary’s ownership mode, sector membership, and age. It appears that the means and
standard deviations do not differ much between joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Service subsidiaries experience somewhat longer subpar performance sequences than
manufacturing subsidiaries. In terms of age, older subsidiaries tend to experience longer subpar
performance sequences on average. Table 6.5 summarizes the results.
In the next section, we present the results for the “identifying” part of the resource
orchestration framework.
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Table 6.5. Comparison across Subsidiaries (Based on Selected Characteristics).

ownership mode
sector
membership

categorical
subsidiary age

Joint ventures (80-20)
Wholly-owned subsidiaries
Manufacturing
Services (wholesale, retail, other)
3-4 years
5-9 years
10-19 years
20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50+ years

Observations
6,619
8,459
9,065
8,486
130
2,899
7,141
4,038
1,846
523
123

Years of subpar performance
between 1990 and 2013
Mean
SD
3.87
2.65
3.85
2.61
3.56
2.36
4.11
2.83
2.58
2.18
2.98
2.08
3.83
2.55
4.12
2.78
4.51
2.90
4.20
2.81
3.37
2.01

6.2 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Identifying”
The concern of multicollinearity was alleviated by mean-centering all continuous
independent variables. Pairwise correlations were assessed (see Table 6.6) and variance inflation
factors (VIFs) calculated. The mean VIFs for the model always remained close to 1.00 (the exact
score was 1.28) and the VIFs for the individual variables always remained below 1.7, which was
well below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998) and even
below the stricter threshold of 5 (Menard, 1995). Thus, multicollinearity did not pose a threat to
the reliability of this study’s findings.
By way of reporting the comparative results of the multinomial logit regression, Table
6.7 illustrates the effect of each predictor variable (including control variables) on the probability
of each response (as opposed to the base category). The results reported there allow for an
assessment of whether a certain response is more probable than not responding at all (“no
response” is the base category), given specific predicting determinants. However, following
Wulff (2015), the hypotheses will be interpreted based on Table 6.8, which provides information
on average marginal effects that follow from the multinomial regression, and require no
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specification of a base category. Overall, the results for each response category are in the
hypothesized directions.
Table 6.6. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Identifying”).
M

SD

1

Country-level
determinants
1 Population
290.00
444.00
1.00
(million)
4.37
4.42
0.49*
2 GDP growth
3 Geographic
6,131.40
3,423,28
-0.27*
distance
4 Cultural
3.47
1.05
-0.15*
distance
MNE-level
determinants
43.54
120.31
-0.05*
5 Network size
Subsidiary-level
determinants
16.11
9.05
-0.25*
6 Age
7 Number of
270.89
583.04
-0.01
employees
8 Number of
4.77
8.44
-0.04
expatriates
* p < 0.05; Factor variables are omitted from this table.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1.00
-0.32*

1.00

0.09*

-0.36*

1.00

-0.06*

0.04

-0.01

1.00

-0.19*

0.20*

-0.03

0.07*

1.00

-0.02

-0.06*

0.02

0.02

0.08*

1.00

-0.06*

0.07*

-0.02

-0.02

0.10*

0.39*

1.00

6.2.1 Hypotheses 1a-1c (No Response)
The first three hypotheses suggest that whether an MNE responds to subpar performance
at the subsidiary level may depend on several country-level, MNE-level, and subsidiary-level
determinants. First, Hypothesis 1a suggests that a non-response to subpar performance at a
foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur with higher geographic distance between the
headquarters and that foreign subsidiary. This hypothesis did not receive significant support in
this analysis. Second, Hypothesis 1b indicates that a non-response to subpar performance at a
foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur when the MNE as a whole is experiencing profit losses.
This hypothesis is supported at p < 0.05. Third, Hypothesis 1c offers the notion that a non-
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response to subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary is more likely to occur when there are
fewer expatriates in the subsidiary. This hypothesis receives support, with p < 0.001.

6.2.2 Hypotheses 2a-2c (Increases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment)
The next set of hypotheses predicts the occurrence of increases in commitment, be it
strategic, operational, or a combination thereof. First, Hypothesis 2a suggests that an increase in
strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in
a host country with higher GDP growth rates. This hypothesis did not receive significant support
in this analysis. Second, Hypothesis 2b indicates that an increase in operational commitment is
more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with
higher GDP growth rates. This hypothesis is supported at p < 0.05. Third, Hypothesis 2c offers
the notion that an increase in both strategic and operational commitment is more likely to occur
when the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth
rates. This hypothesis did not receive significant support. Interestingly, however, a decrease in
both strategic and operational commitment is significantly (p < 0.001) less likely to occur when
the subpar performing subsidiary is located in a host country with higher GDP growth rates.

6.2.3 Hypotheses 3a-3f (Decreases in Strategic, Operational, and Mixed Commitment)
The next set of hypotheses predicts the occurrence of decreases in commitment, be it
strategic, operational, or a combination thereof. First, Hypothesis 3a suggests that a decrease in
strategic commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary is not a
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regional headquarters. This hypothesis received support at p < 0.001. Second, Hypothesis 3b
proposes that a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is not a regional headquarters. This hypothesis does not receive statistical
support. Third, Hypothesis 3c suggests that a decrease in strategic commitment is more likely to
occur when the subpar performing subsidiary does not fulfill an R&D purpose. This hypothesis
received support at p < 0.001. Fourth, Hypothesis 3d suggests that a decrease in operational
commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing subsidiary does not fulfill an
R&D purpose. This hypothesis received support at p < 0.001. Fifth, Hypothesis 3e indicates that
a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar performing
subsidiary is older. This hypothesis was supported at p < 0.05. Sixth, Hypothesis 3f offers the
proposition that a decrease in operational commitment is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is larger (in terms of the number of employees). This hypothesis was not
supported.

6.2.4 Hypothesis 4 (Combination Response)
Hypothesis 4 states that a combination response is more likely to occur when the subpar
performing subsidiary is a joint venture. This hypothesis received support, at p < 0.05. By way
of conducting robustness checks, the average marginal effects were plotted for each continuous
independent variable. As Wulff (2015: 6) notes, marginal effects indicate the “slope of the
prediction function at a given value of the explanatory variable and thus inform us about the
change

in

predicted

probabilities

due

to

a

change

in

a

particular
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Table 6.7. Comparative Effects: Multinomial Logit Results with “No Response” as the Base Category (“Identifying”).

Country-level
determinants
Population (billion)
GDP growth
Geographic distance
(thousand)
Cultural distance
MNE-level determinants
Network size
Positive profits
Negative profits
Subsidiary-level
determinants
No regional HQ
Regional HQ
No R&D purpose
R&D purpose
Joint venture
WOS

Strat.
increase

Strat. decrease

Operat.
increase

Operat.
decrease

Mixed increase

Mixed
decrease

Combination
response

-2.550 (0.935)**
0.111 (0.112)

-0.660 (0.662)
0.042 (0.055)

-0.770 (0.217)***
0.035 (0.025)

-0.114 (0.226)
-0.049 (0.023)**

-0.525 (0.253)**
0.003 (0.028)

-0.422 (0.252)*
-0.066 (0.024)**

-0.375 (0.223)*
-0.003 (0.024)

0.047 (0.140)

0.099 (0.055)*

0.004 (0.028)

0.019 (0.029)

-0.023 (0.034)

-0.028 (0.032)

0.065 (0.029)**

-0.787 (0.489)

0.037 (0.239)

0.058 (0.086)

0.080 (0.096)

0.025 (0.097)

-0.129 (0.113)

0.190 (0.093)**

-0.012 (0.010)
(reference)
0.109 (0.940)

-0.002 (0.003)
(reference)
-0.571 (0.449)

0.000 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.208 (0.164)

0.000 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.481 (0.175)**

0.000 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.416 (0.189)**

-0.001 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.317 (0.182)*

0.000 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.205 (0.166)

(reference)
-13.661
(1.545)***
(reference)
-13.309
(1.502)***
(reference)
-16.014 (0.870)
***
(reference)
-0.142 (0.845)
0.056 (0.043)
-0.002 (0.003)
0.219 (0.097)**
-4.224 (1.175)***

(reference)
-14.900
(0.579)***
(reference)
-16.035
(0.890)***

(reference)
-0.473 (0.703)

(reference)
0.577 (0.569)

(reference)
0.864 (0.594)

(reference)
0.367 (0.599)

(reference)
0.535 (0.580)

(reference)
-16.096
(0.716)***

(reference)
-16.141
(0.800)***

(reference)
-16.761
(0.956)***

(reference)
-1.255 (0.1765)

(reference)
-0.036 (0.835)

(reference)
0.038 (0.173)

(reference)
0.075 (0.180)

(reference)
0.227 (0.193)

(reference)
-0.088 (0.196)

(reference)
-0.331 (0.173)*

(reference)
-0.433 (0.413)

Same industry
(reference)
(reference)
(reference)
(reference)
(reference)
(reference)
0.928 (0.412)**
0.081 (0.176)
-0.031 (0.185)
0.233 (0.198)
0.389 (0.196)**
0.070 (0.174)
Different industry
0.016 (0.019)
-0.014 (0.010)
0.011 (0.010)
-0.009 (0.011)
-0.005 (0.010)
-0.018 (0.009)*
Age
-0.002 (0.001)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
Number of employees
0.140 (0.048)**
0.076 (0.038)**
0.030 (0.047)
0.190 (0.036)***
0.225 (0.036)
0.176 (0.035)***
Number of expatriates
-2.681 (0.552)***
0.278 (0.175)
0.227 (0.187)
-0.329 (0.194)*
-0.302 (0.188)
0.465 (0.167)**
Constant
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses. Results of complete mlogit model. Betas are reported. Number of observations: 1,735.
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Table 6.8. Absolute Effects: Marginal Effects from the Multinomial Logit Regression (“Identifying”).
No
response

Strat.
increase

Strat.
decrease

Operat.
increase

Operat.
decrease

Mixed
increase

Mixed
decrease

Combination
response

0.061 (0.023)**

-0.007 (0.004)*

-0.004 (0.009)

-0.074
(0.026)**

0.042 (0.024)*

-0.016 (0.022)

-0.004 (0.023)

0.003 (0.027)

GDP growth

0.001 (0.003)

0.000 (0.000)

0.001 (0.001)

0.008 (0.003)**

-0.007
(0.002)**

0.002 (0.002)

-0.007
(0.002)***

0.001 (0.003)

Geographic
distance (thousand)

-0.002 (0.003)

0.000 (0.000)

0.001 (0.001)

-0.002 (0.003)

0.001 (0.003)

-0.004 (0.003)

-0.005 (0.003)*

0.010 (0.003)**

Cultural distance

-0.008 (0.010)

-0.003 (0.002)

0.000 (0.003)

0.002 (0.009)

0.005 (0.009)

-0.002 (0.007)

-0.023
(0.010)**

0.028 (0.010)**

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

(reference)
0.042 (0.018)**

(reference)
0.001 (0.003)

(reference)
-0.004 (0.006)

(reference)
0.009 (0.019)

0.000 (0.000)
(reference)
-0.035
(0.017)**

(reference)
-0.018 (0.016)

(reference)
-0.006 (0.016)

(reference)
0.011 (0.019)

(reference)
-0.004
(0.001)**
(reference)
-0.003
(0.001)**

(reference)
-0.015
(0.003)***
(reference)
-0.014
(0.003)***

(reference)
-0.106
(0.044)**
(reference)
-0.191
(0.009)***

(reference)
0.047 (0.061)

(reference)
0.080 (0.053)

(reference)
0.000 (0.043)

(reference)
0.042 (0.062)

(reference)
-0.165
(0.009)***

(reference)
-0.123
(0.008)***

(reference)
-0.034 (0.139)

(reference)
0.284 (0.172)*

Country-level
determinants
Population (billion)

MNE-level
determinants
Network size
Positive profits
Negative profits
Subsidiary-level
determinants
No regional HQ
Regional HQ

(reference)
-0.044 (0.053)

No R&D purpose
R&D purpose

(reference)
0.247 (0.185)

Joint venture
WOS

(reference)
0.007 (0.018)

(reference)
-0.012 (0.007)*

(reference)
-0.005 (0.006)

(reference)
0.016 (0.019)

(reference)
0.019 (0.018)

(reference)
0.033 (0.016)**

(reference)
-0.003 (0.017)

Same industry
Different industry

(reference)
-0.017 (0.019)

(reference)
-0.001 (0.003)

(reference)
0.011 (0.005)**

(reference)
-0.006 (0.020)

(reference)
-0.023 (0.018)

(reference)
0.013 (0.016)

(reference)
0.034 (0.017)**

Age

0.001 (0.001)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

-0.002 (0.001)

0.003 (0.001)**

0.000 (0.001)

0.000 (0.001)

Number of
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)*
employees
Number of
-0.017
-0.012
0.009
0.014
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
-0.006 (0.004)
(0.004)***
(0.005)**
(0.002)***
(0.002)***
expatriates
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001; Coefficients are the derivative of f at x (dy/dx). Betas are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.

(reference)
-0.055
(0.020)**
(reference)
-0.011 (0.020)
-0.002
(0.001)**
0.000 (0.000)
0.012
(0.002)***

143

predictor.” Assessing marginal effects is thus a key tool for assessing whether the effect of a
continuous predictor is significant over the entire data range of that variable. Specifically, this
can be achieved by deriving a graphical representation of these marginal effects and assessing
whether the 95 percent confidence interval crosses the zero line. As Wulff (2015: 14) further
notes, “The fact that marginal effects are second-order relationships makes them harder to
interpret than predicted probability curves [, i.e. conventional graphical representations of
regression results]. But what we lose in intuition we gain in information [, allowing us to assess
the] significance of the relationship between a predictor and the choice outcomes” more
precisely. The results are displayed in Figures 6.1 to 6.5 below, where the solid lines indicate the
marginal effect of the predictor on the respective outcome category and the two dotted lines
indicate the confidence interval. Note that the y-axis scale is automatically derived by the
analysis.
Geographic distance was not significant over the entire data range as a predictor of the
likelihood of a non-response (Figure 6.1). Further, the effect of the number of expatriates on the
likelihood of a non-response was negatively significant most strongly when the number of
expatriates is between 0 and 10 expatriates (Figure 6.2). Next, as the collection of graphs in
Figure 6.3 show, the impact of GDP growth on the likelihood of a strategic increase as a first
response is not significant across the entire data range. For the operational increases, GDP
growth is a significant predictor, however, not at negative levels of GDP growth. In contrast,
GDP growth is a significant indicator for mixed increases in commitment when GDP growth is
at the lower end of its data range. Furthermore, subsidiary age loses some of its significance
levels at higher subsidiary ages (Figure 6.4). Finally, for the number of subsidiaries, the
confidence interval crosses zero across the entire data range (Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.1. Average Marginal Effects of Geographic Distance (“Identifying”).
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Figure 6.2. Average Marginal Effects of the Number of Expatriates (“Identifying”).
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Figure 6.3. Average Marginal Effects of GDP Growth (“Identifying”).
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Figure 6.4. Average Marginal Effects of Subsidiary Age (“Identifying”).
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Figure 6.5. Average Marginal Effects of the Number of Employees (“Identifying”).
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6.3 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Responding”
To address possible multicollinearity, the mean VIFs were assessed for each model. They
always remained close to 1.00 and the VIFs for the individual variables always remained below
1.2. Further, Table 6.9 illustrates the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Thus,
multicollinearity did not pose a threat to the reliability of this study’s findings.

Table 6.9. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Responding”).
M

SD

Country-level determinants
1 GDP growth
4.05
3.87
2 Cultural distance
3.44
1.10
MNE-level determinants
3 Network size
71.75
167.57
Subsidiary-level
determinants
4 Number of employees
288.27
969.60
5 Number of expatriates
4.13
6.63
* p < 0.05; Factor variables are omitted from this table.

1

2

3

1.00
0.12*

1.00

-0.04*

-0.01

1.00

0.05*
-0.04*

0.02
0.01

0.03
-0.05*

4

5

1.00
0.27*

1.00

6.3.1 Hypotheses 5a-5b (No Response versus Any Response)
Hypotheses 5a and 5b explore the notion of performing any action versus refraining from
action. Specifically, Hypothesis 5a states that compared to not responding, any response to
subsidiary-level subpar performance increases recovery prospects, while Hypothesis 5b suggests
that compared to not responding, any response to subsidiary-level subpar performance increases
survival prospects. As Table 6.10 shows, responding in any form at all does not exert an impact
on the rate of recovery per se, perhaps due to the aggregated nature of the variable in this model.
Responding in any form appears to be marginally beneficial for survival prospects, such that the
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rate of exit is reduced by about 27 percent9 (p < 0.1). This suggests that any action is potentially
better than none, at least in the longer run. Figure 6.6 illustrates this finding graphically10.
Table 6.10. Results for Hypotheses 5a-5b (“Responding”: No Response versus Any Response).
Variables
Response variable
No response
Any response
Control variables
Population (billion)
GDP growth
Geographic distance (thousand)
Cultural distance†
MNE network size
Positive profits
Negative profits
No regional HQ
Regional HQ
Joint venture (20-80)
Wholly-owned subsidiary
Same industry
Different industry
Number of subsidiary employees
(thousand)
Number of expatriates†
N of observations
Prob > chi2

Rate of Recovery

Rate of Exit

(reference)
0.037 (0.059)

(reference)
-0.310 (0.181)*

-0.086 (0.078)
0.037 (0.009)***
-0.009 (0.009)
-0.109 (0.040)**
0.000 (0.000)
(reference)
-0.299 (0.057)***
(reference)
-0.262 (0.188)
(reference)
0.023 (0.057)
(reference)
-0.103 (0.058)*

0.451 (0.242)*
0.014 (0.026)
0.055 (0.030)*
0.085 (0.089)
0.001 (0.000)**
(reference)
-0.049 (0.184)
(reference)
-1.155 (1.023)
(reference)
0.014 (0.201)
(reference)
0.021 (0.202)

-0.069 (0.047)

-0.304 (0.287)

0.001 (0.004)
4,771
0.000

-0.098 (0.045)**
4,771
0.000

***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; variables marked with an † were identified as time-variant variables for the
prediction of recovery. No such specification appeared necessary for the prediction of exit.

9

These effect size percentages were derived from hazard ratios. In the tables, coefficients are reported instead of
hazard ratios.
10
Note that the graphs are depicted in the stepwise fashion that is typical for event history analyses (because the
state is assumed to be constant between two time points). While the graphs can be smoothed using a kernel option
after conventional Cox proportional hazard functions, this is not possible after a competing-risk event history
analysis (Stata stcurve, N/A: 1).
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Figure 6.6. Results for Hypothesis 5b (“Responding”: No Response versus Any Response).

Note: Outcome=exit, only illustrative graphs and the comparison group are shown.
Subpar performance sequence is measured in years.

6.3.2 Hypotheses 6a-6d (No Response versus Specific Types of Responses)
The next set of hypotheses is concerned with the specific combinations of strategic and
operational (or combined) increases or decreases (or combined) in commitment. Overall, the
findings confirm that the determinants of recovery are different from the determinants of exit.
Specifically, Hypothesis 6a states that compared to not responding, increases in commitment
affect the rate of recovery such that strategic increases worsen the rate of recovery while
operational increases improve the rate of recovery. The findings summarized in Table 6.11.
illustrate that Hypothesis 6a is not supported for strategic increases but fully supported for
operational increases (p < 0.05), such that the foreign subsidiary has a faster recovery rate of
about 22 percent when such a response is used. This effect becomes even stronger when a
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combination of strategic and operational responses is used, whereby the rate of recovery is
improved by about 46 percent (p < 0.001).
Next, Hypothesis 6b suggests that compared to not responding, decreases in commitment
affect the rate of recovery such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of
recovery, however strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. As reported in Table
6.11., this hypothesis is partially supported such that strategic decreases are not significant but
operational (p < 0.05) decreases in commitment worsen the rate of recovery by about 17 percent.
A combination of strategic and operational decreases in commitment also reduces the rate of
recovery (p < 0.05), by about 26 percent.
Further, Hypothesis 6c offers the proposition that compared to not responding, increases in
commitment improve survival prospects, such that both strategic and operational increases in
commitment improve survival prospects, however strategic increases more so than operational
increases. This hypothesis is supported for strategic increases, where the rate of exit falls to
almost zero percent (p < 0.001). For operational increases, this hypothesis does not generate
statistical significance (p = 0.148), although the coefficient points in the suggested direction. For
combinations of strategic and operational increases, the effect is significant at p < 0.05, such that
survival prospects are improved by about 68 percent.
Finally, Hypothesis 6d states that compared to not responding, decreases in commitment
affect the rate of recovery such that both strategic and operational decreases worsen the rate of
recovery, however strategic decreases more so than operational decreases. This hypothesis did
not receive statistical significance, although the coefficient for strategic decrease points in the
proposed direction.
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Figure 6.7 illustrates the significant graphs and the reference category (no response) for
the prediction of exit rates.
Table 6.11. Results for Hypotheses 6a-6d (“Responding”: No Response versus Specific Types of
Responses).
Variables
Response variable
No response
Strategic increase
Strategic decrease
Operational increase
Operational decrease
Mixed increase
Mixed decrease
Combination response
Control variables
Population (billion)
GDP growth
Geographic distance (thousand)
Cultural distance†
MNE network size
Positive profits
Negative profits
No regional HQ
Regional HQ
Joint venture (20-80)
Wholly-owned subsidiary
Same sector
Different sector
Number of subsidiary employees
(thousand)
Number of expatriates†
N of observations
Prob > chi2

Rate of Recovery

Rate of Exit

(reference)
-0.945 (0.980)
-0.578 (0.359)
0.199 (0.080)**
-0.187 (0.093)**
0.376 (0.086)***
-0.307 (0.107)**
0.078 (0.083)

(reference)
-13.250 (0.384)***
0.634 (0.588)
-0.409 (0.283)
-0.083 (0.252)
-1.130 (0.515)**
0.210 (0.302)
-0.732 (0.329)**

-0.070 (0.077)
0.033 (0.009)***
-0.008 (0.009)
-0.112 (0.040)**
0.000 (0.000)

0.441 (0.242)*
0.018 (0.026)
0.053 (0.030)*
0.083 (0.089)
0.001 (0.000)**

-0.300 (0.057)***

-0.058 (0.183)

-0.215 (0.184)

-1.198 (1.026)

0.023 (0.057)

-0.003 (0.197)

-0.100 (0.057)*

0.011 (0.203)

-0.081 (0.048)*
-0.281 (0.285)
0.002 (0.004)
-0.105 (0.048)**
4,771
4,771
0.000
0.000
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; variables marked with an † were identified as time-variant variables.
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Figure 6.7. Results for Hypotheses 6a-6d (“Responding”: No Response versus Specific Types of
Responses).

Note: Outcome=exit, only illustrative graphs and the comparison group are shown.
Subpar performance sequence is measured in years.

6.4 Results for the Set of Hypotheses around “Synchronizing”
Multicollinearity was judged to not pose a threat, since the mean VIFs for models
remained close to 1.00 and for individual variables below 1.6. Table 6.12 illustrates the
descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. The analysis regarding time-related aspects of the
subpar performance phenomenon was split into two main subsections. First, the determinants of
the time-to-first-response were assessed.
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Table 6.12. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (“Synchronizing”)
M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

342.00

476.00

1.00

4.58

4.13

0.58*

1.00

6,150.14

3,382.30

-0.35*

-0.41*

1.00

3.42

1.03

-0.13*

0.13*

-0.34*

1.00

67.40

160.36

-0.05*

-0.06*

0.10*

-0.05*

1.00

324.58

1,371.97

0.00

0.01

-0.02

-0.02

-0.01

1.00

4.86

7.92

-0.04*

-0.06*

0.11*

-0.03*

-0.02

0.22*

7

Country-level
determinants
1
2
3
4

5
6
7

Population
(million)
GDP growth
Geographic
distance
Cultural
distance
MNE-level
determinants
Network size
Subsidiary-level
determinants
Number of
employees
Number of
expatriates

1.00

6.4.1 Hypothesis 7 (Determinants of the Timing to the First Response)
Hypothesis 7 suggests that Compared to having no such communication enhancing
mechanisms, subsidiaries that have mechanisms which facilitates more frequent communication
with headquarters exhibit a shorter time to the first response. This hypothesis is supported for
R&D subsidiaries (p < 0.005) and a Japanese GM manager (p < 0.05) in Model 2a. After
excluding the countries China, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan (see Model 2b), R&D
subsidiaries were significant at (p < 0.001) and Japanese GM managers were marginally
significant at (p < 0.1). Table 6.13 summarizes the results.
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Table 6.13. Results for Hypothesis 8 (“Synchronizing”: Determinants of the Timing of the First
Response).

Control variables
GDP growth
Geographic distance (thousand)
Cultural distance
Network size (thousand)
Positive MNE profits
Negative MNE profits
Same industry
Different industry
Number of subsidiary employees
(thousand)

Communication channels
No regional headquarters
Regional headquarters
No R&D role
R&D role
Number of expatriates
Non-Japanese GM
Japanese GM
Constant
Observations

Model 1

Model 2a

Model 2b

0.002 (0.002)
-0.003 (0.003)
-0.007 (0.007)
0.106 (0.108)
(reference)
0.031 (0.017)*
(reference)
0.033 (0.017)

0.002 (0.002)
-0.003 (0.003)
-0.007 (0.007)
0.102 (0.108)
(reference)
0.029 (0.017)*
(reference)
0.035 (0.017)**

0.002 (0.003)
-0.004 (0.004)
-0.008 (0.008)
0.152 (0.128)
(reference)
0.036 (0.019)*
(reference)
0.024 (0.020)

-0.029 (0.012)***

-0.023 (0.012)*

-0.054 (0.012)***

1.218 (0.014)***
4,730

(reference)
0.003 (0.061)
(reference)
-0.179 (0.055)**
-0.002 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.040 (0.020)**
1.252 (0.022)***
4,730

(reference)
0.003 (0.056)
(reference)
-0.212 (0.057)***
-0.002 (0.001)
(reference)
-0.035 (0.021)*
1.256 (0.023)***
3,331

***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1; Note: Model 2b contains a sample without China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Korea.

6.4.2 Hypotheses 8a-8b (Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit)
Second, the effects of the time-to-first-response on the probability of recovery (versus
exit) were derived. Table 6.15 summarizes the model-building approach, where Model 1
contains control variables only, Model 2 adds the time-to-first-response predictor, Model 3
incorporates the squared term of the time-to-response variable and Model 4 adds the types of
responses. Hypothesis 8a suggests that the effect of the time-to-first-response on the likelihood of
recovery (as opposed to exit) takes an inverted U-shape, such that the likelihood of recovery is
highest at medium levels of the time-to-first-response. This hypothesis is supported in Model 3,

156

with p < 0.05 and the negative sign of the squared term of the time-to-response variable
suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship as hypothesized. Figure 6.8 underscores this
finding visually.
Figure 6.8. Results for Hypothesis 8a (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by Response Types).

Note: Time to first response is measured in years.

Hypothesis 8b suggests that the effect of the inverted U-shape relationship between the
timing of the first response and the probability of a recovery (versus exit) is more pronounced for
decreases in commitment than for increases in commitment. This hypothesis is supported in
Model 4 for increases and decreases in commitment. Both exhibit a significance level of p <
0.001. As Figure 6.9 illustrates, the line for “Increases in commitment” is indeed higher and less
pronounced than the line for “Decreases in commitment”. We interpret this finding as an
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indication that the timing of a decrease in commitment is more salient and potentially harmful to
the likelihood of recovery than the timing of an increase in commitment. The implications of this
finding will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
Figure 6.9. Results for Hypothesis 8b (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by Response Types).

Note: Time to first response is measured in years.

6.4.3 Hypothesis 9 (Effect of the Timing of a GM Replacement)
Finally, Hypothesis 9 suggests that an earlier GM replacement during periods of subpar
performance leads to better rates of recovery and improved rates of exit than a later GM
replacement. As illustrated in Table 6.15, this hypothesis was supported at (p < 0.05). When
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Table 6.15. Results for Hypotheses 8a-8b (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship with Recovery versus Exit).

Control variables
Population (billion)
GDP growth
Geographic distance (thousand)
Cultural distance
Network size
No regional HQ
Regional HQ
Same industry
Different industry
Subsidiary age
Number of subsidiary employees
(thousand)
Number of subsidiary expatriates
Independent variables
Time-to-first-response
Time-to-first-response (squared)
Increases in commitment
Decreases in commitment
Combination response
Constant
Observations
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.029 (0.115)
-0.019 (0.013)
-0.075 (0.014)***
-0.003 (0.044)
-0.001 (0.000)***
(reference)
0.554 (0.336)*
(reference)
-0.130 (0.085)
0.008 (0.005)*

0.003 (0.012)
-0.021 (0.013)
-0.076 (0.014)***
-0.001 (0.044)
-0.001 (0.000)***
(reference)
0.549 (0.337)
(reference)
-0.132 (0.085)
0.007 (0.005)

0.003 (0.012)
-0.021 (0.013)
-0.076 (0.014)***
-0.001 (0.044)
-0.001 (0.000)***
(reference)
0.556 (0.337)*
(reference)
-0.133 (0.085)
0.007 (0.005)

0.012 (0.012)
-0.035 (0.014)**
-0.074 (0.014)***
0.018 (0.044)
-0.001 (0.000)***
(reference)
0.530 (0.342)
(reference)
-0.152 (0.085)*
0.010 (0.005)**

0.245 (0.116)**

0.266 (0.121)**

0.267 (0.121)**

0.326 (0.140)**

0.014 (0.010)

0.017 (0.011)

0.017 (0.011)

0.022 (0.013)*

0.325 (0.080)***

0.575 (0.163)***
-0.061 (0.030)**

1.756 (0.118)***
6,645

1.558 (0.168)***
6,645

0.591 (0.169)***
-0.067 (0.032)**
(reference)
-1.102 (0.098)***
-0.473 (0.113)***
2.153 (0.187)***
6,645

2.174 (0.063)***
6,645
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visualizing the relationship, an interesting shape is revealed (see Figure 6.10): if the GM is
replaced rather early, the likelihood of recovery (versus exit) is higher than if the GM was not
replaced. However, if the GM is replaced later than in year two, the effect becomes reversed and
a GM replacement may be harmful to recovery prospects.
Table 6.15. Results for Hypothesis 9 (“Synchronizing”: Effect of the Timing of a GM
Replacement).

Control variables
Population (billion)
GDP growth
Geographic distance (thousand)
Cultural distance
Network size
Positive MNE profits
Negative MNE profits
Same industry
Different industry
Joint venture
Wholly-owned subsidiary
Number of subsidiary employees
(thousand)
Number of subsidiary expatriates
Independent variables
Time-to-first-response
No GM replacement
GM replacement
Time-to-first-response x GM
replacement
Constant
Observations
***p<0.001, **<0.05, *p<0.1

Model 1

Model 2

-0.002 (0.016)
-0.011 (0.018)
-0.061 (0.019)**
0.015 (0.060)
-0.001 (0.000)***

0.001 (0.016)**
-0.014 (0.019)
-0.062 (0.019)**
0.019 (0.060)
-0.001 (0.000)***

-0.322 (0.108)**

-0.318 (0.108)**

-0.160 (0.118)

-0.166 (0.118)

0.068 (0.114)

0.079 (0.114)

0.116 (0.134)

0.134 (0.145)

0.042 (0.021)**

0.046 (0.022)**

0.477 (0.118)***
0.691 (0.341)**
-0.489 (0.245)**
2.423 (0.112)
3,978

1.810 (0.187)***
3,978
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Figure 6.10. Results for Hypothesis 10 (“Synchronizing”: Shape of the Relationship between the
Timing of the First Response and the Probability of Recovery versus Exit, by GM Replacement
Status).

Note: Time to first response is measured in years.

6.5 Robustness Checks
In general, method-specific robustness checks were incorporated directly into each
respective subsection. This includes e.g. the visualization of average marginal effects for the
“Identifying” section and the exclusion of five countries in Model 2b in the “Synchronizing”
section. Using different measurements of subpar performance, however, is an overarching
robustness check which assesses our findings with different measures of performance sequences.
Unless otherwise stated, hypotheses are supported in the same way as in the main analysis.
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As noted earlier, we used a decline in sales measure of performance to construct subpar
performance sequences. In order to test for other operationalizations of subpar performance, we
first used labor productivity as an alternative measure of subpar performance. The findings
regarding the “Identifying” dimension remained largely robust. The only exceptions were with
regards to Hypothesis 1b (the impact of MNE-level subpar performance on the occurrence of a
non-response) which became insignificant, Hypothesis 2b/2c (the impact of GDP growth on the
likelihood of an operational/mixed increase in commitment) which switched significance such
that the increase in operational commitment lost significance but mixed increase in commitment
gained significance. This may be due to a stronger effect being picked up in the mixed category
which contains strategic and operational responses. Hypothesis 3a (the impact of a regional
headquarters on the occurrence of a decrease in strategic commitment) became insignificant, and
Hypothesis 4 (the likelihood of a joint venture receiving a combination response) which became
insignificant.
The findings regarding the “Responding” dimension remained largely robust as well. The
effect presented in Hypothesis 5b became stronger, at p < 0.05. Hypothesis 6a is now not
significant while Hypothesis 6c now does received significance at p < 0.05, suggesting that
operational decreases worsen the rate of exit. Moreover, we did find some marginal support now
for Hypothesis 6d, whereby strategic decreases in commitment worsen the rate of exit (p < 0.1).
The findings regarding the “Synchronizing” dimension also remained largely intact. For
Hypothesis 7, the significance levels dropped into the marginal area (p < 0.1). Regarding
Hypothesis 9 (assessing the effect of the timing of a GM replacement), the findings were nonsignificant.
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Second, we used the first operationalization of the perceptual measurement of subpar
financial performance (with loss and break-even in one category) as a robustness check.
Regarding the “Identifying” dimension, Hypotheses 1a-1c were not supported. However, similar
to what was proposed in Hypothesis 1a, higher cultural distance significantly led to a higher
likelihood of receiving no response. The effect of GDP growth was supported for strategic /
operational increases in commitment. The effects of subsidiary roles were supported for R&D
subsidiaries. The number of employees was now a significant predictor of operational decreases,
supporting Hypothesis 3f. The role of a joint venture on receiving a combination response was
not supported.
Regarding the “Responding” dimension, responding in any way is found to reduce the
rate of recovery but to have no effect on the rate of exit. The effect of a strategic increase alone
on the rate of exit was not supported; however, mixed increases in commitment reduced the rate
of exit significantly. Within the “Synchronizing” dimension, the communication enhancing
mechanisms were marginally supported for Japanese GMs in Model 2a. Hypotheses 8a-8b were
not significant. Hypothesis 9 was supported.
Third, we used the second operationalization of the perceptual measurement of subpar
financial performance (with gain and break-even in one category) as a robustness check.
Regarding the “Identifying” dimension, Hypothesis 1a (assessing the effect of geographic
distance on the likelihood of a non-response) was now significant at p < 0.05. Hypotheses 1b-1c
were not supported, as in the previous robustness check. Hypothesis 3c was also supported, the
rest of the hypotheses in this section were not. Regarding the “Responding” dimension, any
response (Hypothesis 5a) had a significant beneficial effect on the rate of recovery. Other
hypotheses received support.
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Finally, within the “Synchronizing” dimension, the effect of a Japanese GM was not
significant. The timing of a response (Hypothesis 8a) was a significant predictor of the
probability of a recovery versus exit. However, the shape was no longer curvilinear but
negatively linear. Hypotheses 8b-9 were not significant although the shape of the relationship for
Hypothesis 9 was similar to the ones from the main analysis.
In sum, many hypotheses are also supported and sometimes even strengthened when
using other measures of performance. The largest deviation seems to occur with the second
operationalization of the perceptual measure of subpar financial performance. This may be due to
the much smaller sample size that results from that operationalization. Future research could map
this measure of performance onto truly subjective measures of performance, such as managerial
satisfaction, and assess whether it is more highly correlated with those than accounting-based
measures of performance. If that is the case, the perceptual measure of performance may indeed
capture more than financial performance and may thus warrant further exploration.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSION
7.1 Discussion of Key Findings
The objective of this thesis was to examine the phenomenon of subpar performance in
foreign subsidiaries from a holistic perspective that encompasses 1) consideration of the
antecedents of the choice of responses (or non-responses), 2) assessment of the impact of such
responses on the rate of recovery and survival, and 3) exploration of the effects of time by way
of investigating the determinants and outcomes of the timing of the first response. We combined
these three dimensions into a theoretical framework that was guided by a resource orchestration
perspective, distinguishing between dimensions of “Identifying”, “Responding”, and
“Synchronizing”. Given that we are not aware of any study that has examined said phenomenon
from three such angles, with a variety of different response types, and in an international context,
there are several contributions to research and practice of this work.
The main research questions guiding the analyses in this thesis were: When a foreign
subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of
response is chosen (if any at all)? Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to
increasing recovery and survival prospects? What factors determine the timing of a response
and what role does the timing of responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in
increasing recovery and survival prospects? After the analysis, we find answers to all of these
questions, at least in the context of our dataset and sample.
The four perhaps most substantive contributions are first, that this thesis allows us to get
a glimpse into the frequency and nature of the phenomenon. One interesting insight this study
brought to light, for instance, is that non-response to subpar performance is surprisingly
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common. We supplied frequencies of sequence occurrences and brought forward some potential
explanations for this observation and found some support for the importance of communication
frequency enhancing mechanisms of subsidiaries in grasping headquarter attention and initiating
a response. Second, we aimed to expand both the organizational decline/turnaround literature
and the international divestment literature by specifically mapping the phenomenon of declining
organizations to an international, subsidiary-level context. As our analyses revealed, the
phenomenon is not a rare one, making it imperative for research to offer some evidence-based
guidelines for managers to navigate turnaround challenges. Third, this study contributes to the
nascent research on time-related aspects of turnaround responses. As our analysis revealed,
however, the timing of a response may be important for its effectiveness. Tangpong et al. (2015)
is one of the very first studies to explicitly model time and our study builds on this by responding
to their call for exploring the antecedents of response timing more, along with discovering a
curvilinear relationship between the timing of responses and the probability of recovery (versus
exit). Fourth, the framework we provide offers a guideline for structuring the investigation of the
subpar performance phenomenon at the foreign subsidiary-level. As many turnaround scholars
have lamented, a unifying theory of turnaround is lacking and new approaches such as the one
offered may be instrumental in advancing future research. In the following section, these
contributions will be discussed in more detail per analysis type.

7.1.1 Regarding the Sequence Analysis
The sequence analysis revealed that there are hundreds of subsidiaries that experience
subpar performance sequences for 10 years or more. Some subsidiaries experience more than one
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such sequence. This suggests that the subpar performance phenomenon at the level of foreign
subsidiaries is a rather prevalent phenomenon which befalls many foreign subsidiaries. It is thus
rather surprising that not more studies exist which specifically examine subpar performance and
appropriate responses (apart from only divestments) at the level of foreign subsidiaries. Given
that these subsidiaries may play an important role in the MNE’s overall performance, offer
employment opportunities to individuals at the foreign location, and provide an empirical context
for exploring the boundaries of current decline/turnaround and international divestment studies,
the study of this phenomenon seems to hold merit for practitioners, policy makers, and scholars
alike. The goal should be to generate a deeper understanding of the factors and mechanisms at
play in this context, in order to eventually offer guidelines to managers as to how the likelihood
of recovery can be enhanced.
Furthermore, many organizational decline/turnaround scholars agree that when decline
occurs, a first response should occur in the form of retrenchment (Tangpong et al., 2015;
Robbins & Pearce, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994). However, the findings from our sequence
analysis reveal that the most common sequences are those where the subsidiary does not
experience any response at all, especially if the subpar performance lasts for at least five years.
We found this to be a rather intriguing finding, since early turnaround scholars such as Schendel
et al. (1976) noted that responses are generally necessary to break the inertia of decline. Our
results may potentially be interpreted in support of Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989: 97) stagemodel of organizational decline, which consists of the following stages: blinded, inaction, faulty
action, crisis, and dissolution. At the beginning of the decline, firms may be blinded, such that
they lack the appropriate monitoring systems to detect the decline in a timely fashion. This
aspect may be especially salient in the relationship between an MNE headquarters and its foreign
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subsidiary, where communication channels may be insufficiently developed or prone to language
barriers, time zone differentials, and a general lack of attention due to its geographic and cultural
distance.
Over time, the MNE headquarters will notice the decline but often, firms will remain
stuck in the inaction stage. This stage can last several years, especially if the decline is not in the
form of a plummeting of performance but at a slower rate of decline. Weitzel and Jonsson (1989:
100) offer two main reasons for inaction despite clear signs of decline. First, the decline may be
abrupt and thus costly to turn around. Leaders at the headquarters may be hesitant to undertake
any bold move necessary to initiate turnaround. Second, the decline may be perceived as
temporary and leaders may assume a “wait and see” approach, hoping that performance will
regress to the mean eventually. The result are “responses to declining performance [which
include] denial, avoidance, resistance, or procrastination” (p. 100). Generally, such a delay of
action is not conducive to turnaround success and instead increases stress on the organization and
the decision-maker. The result of inaction that lasts too long may thus be a vicious cycle
(Tangpong et al., 2015; Lindsley et al., 1995), which can quickly lead the organization to the
subsequent stages of faulty action and crisis. At these stages, it is much more difficult for an
organization to be turned around. If all attempts fail, the dissolution stage becomes inevitable.
Another, perhaps related, aspect the sequence analysis revealed is that the most frequent
sequences (apart from non-responses) contained operational responses, rather than strategic
responses. This mirrors Hofer’s (1980) observation that even if a strategic response might have
been the more fitting response, most organizations use operational responses instead. Several
reasons may account for this: 1) strategic responses usually take a long-term perspective. Any
effects from it may take longer to pay off, forcing the subsidiary to be able to weather the
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continued short-term decline; and 2) strategic moves such as market repositioning may not
always be available, given the current competitive landscape. Despite these considerations,
however, Hofer (1980: 30) notes that “even if both of these observations are true, it still appears
that management is systematically overlooking or excessively discounting the benefits of
strategic turnarounds in many situations.”
In sum, the sequence analysis approach allowed us to gather a picture of the subpar
performance sequence picture in foreign subsidiaries and assess how similar it is to what we
already know about organizations in decline more generally. It seems that while there are
important factors at the international level, key notions such as the stages of decline and
predispositions to certain response types may also be applicable to the foreign subsidiary level.
In order to explore the determinants of responses in more depth, we conceptualized an
“Identifying” dimension in our overarching resource orchestration framework. The findings and
contributions from this section are discussed next.

7.1.2 Regarding the “Identifying” Dimension
The first dimension in the resource orchestration framework was designed to assess the
determinants of responses to subpar performance, guided by the question: When a foreign
subsidiary experiences (repeated) subpar performance, what determines which specific type of
response is chosen (if any at all)? The ABV provided a useful framework to organize the
determinants of headquarters-level responses to subpar performance at the subsidiary level,
especially with regards to non-responses. In general, this study thus contributes to the literature
by exploring the effect of determinants that are particularly salient in an international context,
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such as specific roles of subsidiaries within the MNE network, GDP growth rates of the host
country, and the number of expatriates. Moreover, this study offers a finer-grained categorization
of responses than the dichotomous responses that have been prevalent in the turnaround literature
(strategic vs. operational, retrenchment vs. non-retrenchment, strong retrenchment vs. weak
retrenchment).
We find that inaction as a “response” to subpar performance at the subsidiary level is
more likely to occur when the MNE as a whole is declining. Following the logic offered by the
ABV, this suggests that the leaders at the headquarters are likely preoccupied with turning the
entire organization around, rather than focusing their attention responding to subpar performance
at the individual subsidiary. We are not aware of any study in the decline/turnaround realm that
has considered the notion that there may be different performance levels within an MNE. This is
likely due to the preoccupation with the corporate-level or business-level of analysis in the
decline/turnaround literature. Thus, we contribute by suggesting that responses to subpar
performance at a subsidiary may depend on factors at the corporate-level or business-level of the
MNE network.
In contrast, we find that inaction is less likely if the subsidiary has more expatriates.
These individuals may act as directors of headquarter attention and can provide important
information and assessment to the decision-makers at the corporate-level or business-level.
Likewise, expatriates can act as advocates for the subsidiary and channel/translate headquarters
directives to the subsidiary-level. As a result, inaction as described by Weitzel and Jonsson
(1989) is less likely to occur.
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We did not find significance for an effect of distance on the likelihood of a response.
Perhaps geographic distance per se is not a hindrance to a response, given modern
telecommunications and travel technology. Future research could assess this aspect further, e.g.
by exploring different notions of distance such as travel time (Boeh & Beamish, 2011).
Regarding increases in commitment, we find that the country-level determinant of GDP
growth rates does indeed impact which response is chosen. Our results are in line with Berry
(2013) who found that subsidiaries are less likely to be divested if they are located in a host
country with high growth rates. We extend Berry’s (2013) finding by differentiating between
more types of responses than just divestment. Indeed, our results show that the likely response
when GDP growth is high is to increase operational commitment, while decreases in
commitment are unlikely to occur in that context. This finding may suggest that decision-makers
see potential in the market and associate the poor performance of the foreign subsidiary with it
not having enough resources to match that potential. As a result, they increase resource
commitment to that subsidiary. While we were able to support this logic for operational
responses, we did not find significance for strategic increases in commitment. This may be due
to the smaller number of observations in that category. Future research could explore this aspect
further by focusing specifically on strategic responses and gathering a larger sample specifically
for this category.
Next, regarding decreases in commitment, we find that if a subsidiary holds a specific
role in the MNE’s network, it is less likely to be subjected to decreases in commitment. This is in
line with Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) work on subsidiary weight and voice, whereby a
subsidiary can influence certain outcomes based on its importance in the network. Moreover,
decreases in operational commitment were predicted by the age of the subsidiary. Age may serve

171

as a proxy for the existence of slack and a higher risk of inefficiencies. Thus, our finding is in
line with the retrenchment stream of the literature (Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Schmitt & Raisch,
2013). This stream suggests that organizations can be turned around by jettisoning superfluous
resources. We did not, however, find support for the existence of slack in terms of the size of the
workforce as a determinant of retrenchment. Future research could explore further whether and
how the type of the source of slack (age versus size of the workforce) may affect the
retrenchment decision.
Finally, we developed a hypothesis regarding the choice for a combination response,
despite Hofer’s (1980) warning that these may be too managerially complex and confusing to
truly facilitate turnaround. In the international context, one determinant of a combination of
responses may, however, be the case where more than one headquarters determines a response.
This is the case in joint ventures, where both the foreign and the local partner may initiate
responses. Indeed, we found support for this notion. This aspect thus adds to the organizational
decline/turnaround literature by differentiating between the impact of different organizational
forms at the subsidiary level. It may also contribute to the literature on international joint
ventures, such that these organizations may be more prone to combination responses. Given the
risk associated with these types of responses, future research is warranted to explore whether the
combination response is the result (or trigger) of conflict between joint venture partners or
whether it represents a concerted (and effective) effort to turn the subsidiary around.
In sum, the findings from the “Identifying” dimension of the resource orchestration
framework highlighted that the determinants differ for each type of response. Further, several
factors that are relevant in an international context (and have been relatively neglected in singlecountry decline/turnaround studies) impact the choice of response significantly as well.
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Therefore, this study offers an expansion of concepts from the decline/turnaround literature to
the international context. Next, we discuss the second dimension in the resource orchestration
framework, “Responding”, where the efficacy of each response is assessed.

7.1.3 Regarding the “Responding” Dimension
The second dimension in the resource orchestration framework considers the question:
Which type of response (if any) is most conducive to increasing recovery and survival prospects?
We first assess the impact of responding versus not responding at all and find that at least for
survival prospects, responding appears to be beneficial. Broken down by response type, we find
that increases in operational commitment tend to improve the rate of recovery, while decreases in
operational commitment tend to worsen it.
This suggests that prescriptions for the corporate-level or business-level may not hold for
the subsidiary-level, at least without further specification. Retrenchments at the subsidiary-level,
in particular, may have an adverse effect since the gains from efficiency may be offset by
negative rippling effects resulting from the perceived decrease in headquarter commitment. This
adds to the discourse between the two camps within the organizational decline/turnaround
literature, suggesting that 1) retrenchment is a necessary first response (Pearce & Robbins, 1994)
and 2) that retrenchment may be a reflection of further decline and thus not welcomed (Barker &
Mone, 1994). We offer a broader perspective by moving away from a focus on decreases in
commitment and emphasizing the importance of increasing investments into the foreign
subsidiary.
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In general, it appears that the determinants for the rate of recovery are different from the
determinants of the rate of exit. This may suggest that MNE headquarters need to consider which
outcome they desire more: short-term financial recuperation or longer-perspective ensuring of
survival. Future research could investigate the specific characteristics of the subsidiary further
which would cause an MNE to aim for short-term or long-term recuperation.

7.1.4 Regarding the “Synchronizing” Dimension
Following Tangpong et al., (2015), we emphasized the importance of the timing of the
first response and explored its effect on the probability of recovery (versus exit). Specifically, we
asked What factors determine the timing of a response and what role does the timing of
responses play in the effectiveness of the chosen response in increasing recovery and survival
prospects?
Our findings suggest that some subsidiaries may receive earlier headquarter attention
which may aid them in their recovery, since it can decrease the risk of being stuck in inaction.
The factors that may lead to more headquarter attention can be summarized as communication
channels which enhance the frequency of communication between the headquarters and its
subsidiary. We find that especially when the subsidiary has an R&D focus, it receives earlier
headquarter attention. Also, if the GM was Japanese, the response was more likely to be
administered earlier rather than later. This may be due to fewer cultural and language barriers
between the Japanese headquarters and the subsidiary, and thus a more trusting flow of
information. We are not aware of any studies that have examined the determinants for the timing
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of a response and indeed, Tangpong et al. (2015) call for exploring this aspect further. Our study
contributes an initial look at what may impact the timing of a response.
To better assess the notion of the timing of a response, we then explored the impact of the
timing on the probability of recovery versus exit. We combined arguments about time
compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) with arguments about the detrimental effects
of inaction (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989) and hypothesize an inverted U-shape in the relationship
between the timing of a response and the probability of recovery versus exit. We did indeed find
support for this hypothesis, suggesting that very early responses to subpar performance (i.e. in
the first two years of subpar performance) may be counterproductive. This qualifies and extends
Weitzel and Jonsson’s (1989) recommendation to respond as early as possible. Indeed, extensive
due diligence may be required before an appropriate response can be administered. Further, this
finding may be interpreted in support of cutting the first two years of subpar performance
sequences from analyses, since they may contain “knee-jerk” reactions which are not good
indicators of the effectiveness of a thoroughly orchestrated response.
We then qualified this finding of a curvilinear relationship by introducing the moderating
effect of response type and GM replacement. Regarding response types, we found that different
responses are time-sensitive to differing degrees. In particular, while increases in commitment
may be more beneficial to the likelihood of recovery than decreases in commitment, we also find
that the timing of a decrease in commitment response matters more than it does for an increase in
commitment. If, as our findings suggest, a retrenchment was conducted very early on or very
late, the outcome may indeed be counterproductive to recovery rates. Thus, including the aspect
of the timing of a response may be an important contingency factor that can advance the debate
on whether retrenchment is a necessary aspect to successful turnarounds or not. We also advance
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Tangpong et al.’s finding that earlier retrenchment actions appear to be better than later ones by
considering the entire sequence range for this analysis and thus exposing a curvilinear effect.
Regarding the replacement of the top leadership during subpar performance, we build on
contingency arguments put forward in the extant literature. We particularly build on Chen and
Hambrick (2012) who note that GM replacements per se do not hold much value for the
subsidiary’s turnaround but that certain contingency factors (fit or misfit in their study) may
explain when GM replacements are a valuable approach. We extend their perspective by offering
the timing of GM replacement as a contingency factor. Our findings suggest that only when the
GM replacement was done very early did it have a productive effect; beyond that, GM
replacements were counterproductive to recovery rates. We also suspect, however, that the
replacement of a GM at the subsidiary level will be less impactful than the replacement of a CEO
at the corporate level, as the decline/turnaround literature suggests. This may potentially be due
to the fact that a replacement of the GM at a foreign subsidiary has a different (less visible) effect
than replacing the corporate-level CEO in the declining firm’s headquarters. Future research
could explore this notion further.
The construct of time is multidimensional and in our study, we assessed the aspect of a
timing of the first response on the probability of recovery versus exit. It would be interesting to
explore other dimensions of time in future research, such as the specific ordering of responses.
For instance, is a retrenchment followed by a strategic response most effective (Schmitt &
Raisch, 2013) or should this be reversed or simultaneous? What contingencies affect the
effectiveness of the ordering of events? Although Schendel & Patton (1976) called for research
on the ordering of responses, not much progress has been made in this regard.
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In sum, the findings from this thesis may expand current knowledge about organizational
decline/turnaround in the international context in several directions. Furthermore, we offer a
theoretical framework which could act as guidance when examining the subpar performance
phenomenon in an international context.
In particular, using a resource orchestration perspective, we devised three dimensions
“identifying”, “responding”, and “synchronizing” through which mechanisms could be
categorized. This approach allows us to view the phenomenon less from a phenomenon-driven
perspective as much of the existing literature has done (Trahms et al., 2013) and more from a
theory-driven perspective. Moreover, we moved the concept of time into the foreground. Most
extant research has treated time as a latent construct but responses to subpar performance are
time-critical - thus, temporal concepts such as timing, duration, ordering, and synchronization
should be explicitly modeled (Tangpong et al., 2015). It would be interesting to see future
research follow resource orchestration from its initiation to its completion. Although some
studies on resource orchestration exist (e.g. Chadwick et al., 2015), a qualitative study following
the process of resource orchestration in the case of addressing subpar performance sequences at
foreign subsidiaries would be enlightening.
The findings from this thesis thus contribute most strongly to two main literatures within
this realm: 1) regarding the organizational decline/turnaround literature, this thesis expands the
field of vision from a domestic, corporate-level or business-level perspective to an international,
headquarters-subsidiary perspective. While some notions of that literature hold (e.g. the
importance of retrenchment when slack is present), other constructs were not even considered in
that literature yet (e.g. regional headquarter role, MNE network, cultural distance). Moreover,
this expansion allows for a different take on devising a theoretical framework to guide the
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analysis. 2) Regarding the international divestiture literature, this thesis offers a more
comprehensive analysis of a subsection of the literature, which considers subpar performance as
one predictor of divestitures. By focusing only on those subsidiaries that are performing poorly,
divestitures can be seen as one type of response and the perspective opens up for other types of
responses.
Other literatures may be tangential to this thesis as well. For instance, the literature on
organizational resilience touches upon exploring what makes some firms weather a crisis and
others to fold under pressure. Perhaps the model devised in this thesis allows for a more
international perspective of influencing factors and mechanisms that are at play in such
situations.

7.2 Managerial Implications
While this thesis by no means claims any normative power, it does reveal an important
aspect that is relevant to MNE-level managers. When a subsidiary experiences subpar
performance, whether and how a response follows depends in part on how attention is allocated
throughout the organization. How misaligned attention structures can be is illustrated by
anecdotal evidence by Beamish (2008: 100) from a training module with 40 executives from a
Fortune 500 bank. The executives were asked to indicate the number of alliances and joint
ventures within the bank’s network - the best estimate was off by about 77 percent of the actual
number. The reason for this gross underestimation could be that beyond about a dozen
subsidiaries, it is difficult to know and keep track of the subsidiary network as a whole. As a
result of larger networks, each individual unit may receive less headquarter attention and thus be
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less likely to experience a response to subpar performance. Thus, if the goal is to aim for a
response when a foreign subsidiary experiences subpar performance, improving the allocation of
attention within the MNE network may be desirable.
Further, our analysis revealed that MNEs can counteract some attention-related aspects
inherent in a foreign subsidiary by assigning strategic roles to subsidiaries or placing importance
on the selection of the GM. These are but two options for enhancing communication frequency
and thus increase attention to the subsidiary. However, to reduce the out-of-sight-out-of-mind
phenomenon, managers can also allocate sufficient resources to personal visits to headquarters.
Especially then the subsidiary is many flight hours away from the headquarters, making travel
time-consuming (Boeh & Beamish, 2011) or in a country that is associated with travel-related
hassles (Schotter & Beamish, 2013), the trip is likely going to be worth it in the longer run.
When communication channels are well established, future responses to challenging situations
such as subpar performance are likely going to be easier and faster.
The arguments brought forward in the thesis, particularly in the “Identifying” section,
reinforce the view that managerial attention is a scarce and valuable resource. The allocation of
said attention is an important matter since it may be translated into monetary losses when an
ailing subsidiary is overlooked because it is further away or otherwise distant from the
headquarters. Thus, managers should monitor and evaluate not only where their individual
attention is directed but also how attention is embedded in organizational structures. For
instance, is the organization too entrepreneurially-oriented that the risk management department
is easily outvoted? Is the management team so opportunity-driven that longer-term perspectives
may be neglected?
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Further, the findings in the “Synchronizing” section underscore the importance of rigor
when conducting responses to subpar performance. It appears that very early responses to subpar
performance may, on average, not be conducive to enhancing the subsidiary’s likelihood of
recovery. A careful information gathering process may take time but prove to be more effective
in the longer run. Perhaps because retrenchment has become known as a go-to response to subpar
performance, firms may administer that response right away without anticipating the negative
effects this may have on morale and productivity. Thus, the findings from this thesis may offer
some caution with regards to resorting to retrenchments as the very first response. GM
replacements however, are likely to be more effective if done right after decline is detected. The
reason for this could be that the outgoing GM may have contributed to the decline, e.g. by
inaction, and a new GM may boost morale, bring in fresh ideas, break up political groups within
the organization, and thus facilitate the subsidiary’s recovery. Decision-makers should thus
consider the timing and the type of the response in unison when considering how to best address
subpar performance at a foreign subsidiary.
Finally, as the decline/turnaround literature has repeatedly emphasized and this thesis has
again confirmed: identifying the accurate causes of decline is a very complex and challenging
endeavor with much uncertainty. Usually, decline occurs as a result of a combination of non-time
variant and time-variant factors that are very difficult to discern. Since managers are required to
make decisions quickly, as stakeholder pressure increases, psychological stress can increase
considerably. Indeed, Whetten (1980: 583) notes that “One of the most pronounced effects of
decline is that it increases stress”. Under very high degrees of stress, decision-makers may
become paralyzed in their decision-making or jump to inaccurate, “knee-jerk” reactions, leading
to faulty action (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). It may be useful to proactively counteract negative
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stress from building up, since it is likely going to lead to adverse outcomes such as faulty
actions. Both the manager as an individual and the organization as a structural background
should account for such challenges before a decline occurs.

7.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions
Several limitations of the analyses presented in this thesis lend themselves to future
research directions. First, the study on “Identifying” has the potential of being expanded in
several directions, starting from its current limitations. The selection of response categories
resulted from a careful consideration of the tension between offering a sufficient amount of detail
and the requirement to create categories with at least 30 observations each (Roth & Morrison,
1990). Future research could build on this study by going into more detail about each specific
type of response.
Second, although the Toyo Keizai dataset offers a rich amount of information, some
forms of responding may not have been captured. For instance, responses to subpar performance
such as hiring a consulting company, intensifying advertisement efforts at the subsidiary-level,
process-reorganizations, product-line adjustments, or utilization of credit options are not
information that is offered in the TK dataset. This notion is true for all parts of the analysis that
involved a response variable measure. Future research could go into more detail regarding types
of responses by exploring this research question with a qualitative study design. However, some
confidence regarding the usefulness of the chosen responses is derived from their similarity to
Barker and Duhaime’s (1997) list of actions that were verified through a mail questionnaire sent
to CEOs of 208 U.S. manufacturing firms.
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Third, the common denominator in this study is the fact that each subsidiary in the
sample is at least in part owned by a Japanese parent firm. This has the advantage of creating a
more homogenous sample and thus eliminating one source of variability while maintaining a
large sample size. At the same time, however, this aspect may affect the results if Japanese
parent firms have idiosyncratic ways of responding to subpar performance at the subsidiary level.
For instance, Japanese MNEs have traditionally relied more on expatriates as a means to control
foreign subsidiaries than MNEs from other home countries (Gong, 2003; Peterson, Napier &
Shim, 1996). Another aspect may be the notion that Japanese managers and expatriates are likely
to be influenced by the cultural values of their home countries, at least to a certain extent. For
instance, as Hofstede et al. (2010) identified, the dimension of long-term orientation is much
higher in Japanese cultures (a score of 88/100) than in the U.S. culture (a score of 26/100). This
could potentially influence the types of responses administered and whether any detectable
response occurs at all. Therefore, the findings from this study are most directly generalizable to
subsidiaries within Japanese MNE contexts, although we suspect that many findings will also
apply to foreign subsidiaries from other contexts. Future research could extend this study by
expanding the sample to subsidiaries with other combinations of host country MNE parent firms.
Fourth, this thesis controlled for sector membership (particularly the similarity between
the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary) is controlled for. There may, however, be
differences between subsidiaries from the manufacturing sector and those from the service
sector. For instance, since the value generated in service industries is predominantly derived
from the interaction between a customer and an employee, a service-sector organization
experiencing subpar performance may rely less on reductions in the number of employees than a
manufacturing-sector organization. Future studies could explore this aspect in more depth.
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Fifth, the “identifying” analyses focused on first responses (after at least two years of
subpar performance) while ignoring subsequent responses. Future studies could consider those
subsequent responses and their determinants in more depth. Moreover, Chung & Beamish (2010)
may be a fitting reference here, who examined the impact of a first and all subsequent change in
ownership. A study similar to theirs could be informative to the context of first and subsequent
responses to subpar performance as well.
Sixth, the study on “responding” is also not without limitations. As Mata and Portugal
(2000) note, exit of a subsidiary from the dataset does not necessarily mean that it was closed or
went bankrupt. Instead, it is possible that the equity held by the Japanese parent firm(s) was sold
to another company, including the local partner, or the subsidiary as a whole was fully acquired
by another company. As it is the case with many large secondary data sources, it is not possible
to discern which fate befell the subsidiary. As Benito (2005) and Berry (2013) note, divestments
can occur as a result of a number of causes. What can be reasonably implied, however, is that the
Japanese parent firm likely did not envision further investment into the subsidiary anymore,
suggesting that the perceived value of the subsidiary has declined. As such, exit is an important
indicator of the subsidiary’s status within the MNE. Future studies could aim to refine this
approach by gathering data which specifically differentiates between exits due to closure,
bankruptcy, and other reasons. Furthermore, the longer the duration of the subpar performance
sequence, the fewer observations are available each year. Mata and Portugal (2000) encountered
the same concern and suggest that while analysing the full length of available subpar
performance sequences is informative, the findings towards the right tail of that duration should
be interpreted with caution.
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Seventh, in this thesis, we assess the “Identifying”, “Responding”, and “Synchronizing”
parts of the model separately, while aiming for as much rigor in the choice and execution of each
of the methodological approaches as possible. Future research could combine these parts (or
aspects of these parts) into one model, to carry the effect of a specific determinant of a response
all the way through to the eventual outcome, while accounting for temporal aspects. We believe
that such an approach could be possible with a structural equation modeling technique (SEM).
However, in order to not lose rigor within each subpart of such a model, much computational
power and a very large dataset are likely going to be necessary. Perhaps the SEM technique itself
will have to be more advanced before it can be used to adequately investigate such a model
which combines a multinomial logit regression with a competing-risk gap time event history
analysis, and a moderation effect. Nonetheless, a combined approach would likely generate new
insights about the overarching impact of determinants and may thus be an important endeavor for
future research.
Eighth, in an ideal world (and what is often approximated in laboratory settings), the
assignment of treatment (i.e. action) will be conducted in a random manner, to ensure that any
differences between groups are truly attributable to the effects of the treatment. Such a
randomized experimental design is the optimal approach for making causal inferences. With
real-world, observational data (as predominant in most social sciences settings), however, such a
randomization is often not possible: we cannot create a randomized sample by forcing some
subsidiaries to change their ownership and others to refrain from doing so. Although we
followed some of Antonakis et al.’s (2010) best practice steps for managing endogeneity, e.g.
including control variables to reduce the risk for omitted variable bias, future studies could refine
the analyses with regards to addressing endogeneity. As such, this limitation connects to the
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preceding one, whereby SEM may be the most fitting approach to include instrumental variables
or endogenous treatment designs (which have only been started to be published in Stata) into the
analyses.

7.4 Conclusion
The model offered presented in this study provides a mapping of the mechanisms that are
at work when subpar performance occurs at a foreign subsidiary. A theoretical framework
devised from resource orchestration, consisting of the sub-processes of “identifying”,
“responding” and “synchronizing” was developed. We hope that this work will spark more
studies into the analysis of the subpar performance phenomenon in an international context,
thereby fostering a deeper exploration of the next chapter in the decades-old decline/turnaround
literature.
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